You might call 2015 Turkey’s year of elections – that’s right, another one, given that 2014 also featured municipal and presidential polls that were billed as crucial to the country’s bitterly contested political trajectory.
Far more than those earlier contests, however, the June 7 and November 1 general elections brought stunning reversals of fortune for Turkey’s various political actors and opened a window of instability that showed the country’s worrying exposure to the quagmire of violence on its southern borders.
The year has ended as it opened: dominated by discussion of president Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s controversial plan to re-plumb the mechanics of the state into a “French style” presidential system, variously seen by opponents and supporters as a power grab, or else an essential overhaul of an unsatisfactory status quo.
Look Ahead: The National makes predictions for what we can expect in the world of politics in 2016
Unlike at the start of the year, though, when AKP seemed worn down by a string of crises that finally led voters to deny it an outright majority in the June poll, the party is now resurgent after winning a landslide 49.5 per cent victory at November’s replay.
That win not only seems to assure AKP’s total domination of Turkish politics at least until 2019 – when the country faces its next presidential poll – but has also gone hand in hand with an extraordinary turnaround in Erdogan’s international fortunes.
Tarnished by a lurch towards authoritarian rule over the past three years, and by the vulnerability generated by the June election defeat, Erdogan had – for a short time –begun to seem like yesterday’s man. There was talk in Brussels and Washington of having “given up” on the increasingly prickly, domineering, and nakedly anti-western Turkish leader.
That’s all changed, in part due to the election result, but also to Ankara’s potentially pivotal role in addressing both ISIL and the wave of Europe-bound migration that has plunged the continent into crisis. After seeming to slam the door on Turkey, EU leaders are now offering more than €3 billion (Dh11.96bn) in aid, renewed membership talks and visa liberalisation in exchange for keeping migrants firmly on Turkish soil.
The other big winner of the year was the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP), which, under the leadership of the charismatic Selahattin Demirtas, smashed through a 10 per cent election threshold (partly put in place to stymie Kurdish representation) and entered parliament to alter the country’s political dynamics.
But what will linger in the minds of most Turks, more than the peregrinations of politicians, is the summer of violence and instability the country suffered between the two polls. Turkey experienced the most deadly terrorist attack in its modern history: 102 people slain by the bombing of an Ankara peace rally, one of three ISIL attacks over the summer that claimed a total of 143 lives.
Simultaneously, a fragile peace process between the government and the Kurdish separatist rebel group PKK collapsed in June, leading to the worst violence seen in Turkey’s south-east since the height of the conflict in the 1990s.
Nearly 100 civilians, 200 militants, and upwards of 170 security personnel have died in the renewed violence. Most worryingly, the three-decade conflict shows signs of metastasising into something even more serious, as PKK youth militias have for the first time taken the fight from the mountains into the centres of towns and cities, prompting curfews, street fighting and a surge in civilian casualties.
The impression of a return to normality generated by AKP’s election win may prove an illusion. Fighting in the south-east continues, and the government – emboldened by a victory at the polls that almost no one predicted – is minded to keep hammering the PKK to weaken it before any possible return to the negotiating table. Meanwhile, the spectre of more ISIL attacks is also looming.
After appearing to treat the group with kid gloves for months, authorities are finally cracking down on ISIL’s extensive Turkish network. In the past, the group has focused its attacks in the country on the Kurdish political movement, which has strong ties to the PYD, ISIL’s main foe in Syria.
With Ankara’s new resolve in targeting the group, many fear it is only a matter of time before ISIL broadens its attacks, possibly targeting the economically crucial tourism sector.
For now, however, attention is refocusing on the domestic ambitions of the all-conquering AKP. After two-and-a-half years in which it has been buffeted by crises ranging from mass anti-government protests to corruption probes, it finds itself more firmly in control of Turkey than ever.
Now, with Erdogan gearing up for yet another political battle over his presidential plans – which will likely be put to a referendum – the country may find that 2016 brings scant relief after a bruising year of violence and bare-knuckle politics.
Alexander Christie-Miller is a freelance journalist based in Istanbul.
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Signs of trouble for Turkey’s regional strategy
Two recent crises have illustrated Turkey’s diminishing ability to influence the regional war unfolding to its south.
On November 24, Turkish fighter jets downed a Russian bomber that Ankara claimed had strayed into its airspace. Then, two weeks later, Baghdad demanded that Turkey withdraw a force deployed near Mosul training Sunni fighters to recapture the city from ISIL. Turkey moved its forces from the training base, but insisted they would remain in Iraq.
Both incidents reflect the broader power shift against Turkey brought about by Russia’s intervention in Syria.
While all sides insist they are fighting ISIL (Turkey finally opened its Incirlik airbase to US forces in June), the real battle lines are drawn over the fate of the Assad regime. Turkey had used its military as a deterrent to turn the north-west border area of Syria into a space where anti-Assad rebel groups were safe from the regime’s air force. In 2014 it shot down a Syrian jet to underline the point.
The circumstances of November’s incident were similar, but in contrast to Assad’s cries of protest, Moscow has been able to damage Turkish interests, from sanctions on the lucrative tourism sector to ending visa-free travel.
Baghdad’s assertiveness also reflects this shift – Turkey’s force near Mosul was in part an attempt to empower its local Sunni allies.
With the western focus on removing Assad also appearing to wane in the wake of ISIL’s Paris attacks, Turkey looks set to cut an increasingly lonely figure.