Why Kurdish extremist group TAK is cause for serious concern

During a recent trip to Diyarbakir, the de facto capital of Turkey’s Kurdish population, The National encountered support for TAK’s actions among a number of people from areas that have witnessed heavShow more

BEIRUT // Before two suicide car bombings in Ankara this year, the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons, known as TAK, was not a militant group to take too seriously in a region plagued by violence.

In more than a decade, many of TAK’s attacks could be best described as amateurish: tossing bombs into rubbish bins in resort towns, a 2010 suicide bombing in Istanbul’s Taksim Square where the only person killed was the bomber, and lobbing mortars at the tarmac of Istanbul’s Sabiha Gokcen International Airport in December.

Although people died and many more were injured in TAK attacks, until this year they remained sporadic, largely ineffective and carried the hallmarks of an inept radical group trying to make a name for itself. In a part of the world full of groups to fear, TAK was nowhere near the top of the list.

That changed when the group pulled off two car bombings in the Turkish capital in February and March, killing 67 people. While the first targeted buses carrying Turkish soldiers, the March 13 bombing hit civilians, killing 37 in central Ankara’s Kilizay neighbourhood.

The attacks come at a time when the Turkish government is locked in an eight-month-old war with guerrillas of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the country’s Kurdish-majority south-east. The PKK and its affiliates say they are fighting for independence or autonomy for Turkey’s Kurds, many of whom say they have long been oppressed because of their ethnicity.

In the latest violence, six police officers were killed and 23 people wounded on Thursday in a bomb attack that targeted a police vehicle in the Kurdish-majority southeastern city of Diyarbakir, according to the state-run Anadolu news agency. The wounded included eight police officers and six civilians.

There was no immediate claim of responsibility.

The conflict has displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians, killed “thousands” of militants, according to the government, as well as hundreds of civilians and Turkish security forces. Cities and towns have been ravaged and placed under curfews – that act more like sieges – for weeks or months ahead of, during and after offensives. Residents recall the situation in the 1990s, when the conflict between the state and the PKK killed tens of thousands.

In justifying its war, Turkey’s government has sought to equate the PKK with the extremist group ISIL, saying they operate in the same way. Now that TAK is adopting the same kind of attacks used by ISIL, the government is bolstering its argument by accusing the PKK and TAK of being one entity, despite TAK’s origins as a group that splintered from the PKK.

Whereas ISIL subjugates local populations with fear, the PKK enjoys support from a large segment of the Kurdish population in south-eastern Turkey. Even those who do not directly support the group often sympathise with them and share their goals: an independent state or federal region for Kurds in Turkey and a withdrawal of Turkish security forces from the area.

PKK attacks have resulted in civilian deaths in this and past wars. They have even assassinated civilians. But the group, particularly in this latest war, has sought to portray itself as avoiding civilian casualties and limiting attacks to military and police targets. The PKK has used car bombs and suicide car bombs, but never against random civilian targets.

TAK, on the other hand, has frequently targeted civilians. And its March attack in Ankara suggests it is adopting a tactic used almost exclusively by extremist groups such as Al Qaeda, ISIL, Boko Haram and the Taliban over the past decade: suicide bombings that randomly target civilians to achieve mass casualties.

Though such attacks achieve little tactically, they build up fear that anybody could be a target at any time. They also often foment sectarian divides, in the case of ISIL and Al Qaeda bombings, or, in the case of TAK, ethnic divides.

So far, TAK has sent mixed signals about killing civilians. After the March 13 attack, a statement by the group “expressed sorrow” for the civilian casualties, but defended its action by claiming that members of Turkey’s security forces were also killed and accusing the government of covering up these deaths.

But despite their “sorrow”, TAK has also warned people to stay away from Turkey’s tourist areas, saying that they would strike civilian targets there.

While the Turkish government asserts that the PKK and TAK are one in the same, TAK says it broke away from the PKK because the organisation was too “passive” in its resistance. However, despite TAK’s separation from the PKK and its claim to not be tied to any other group, it still asserts that PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan is its leader.

TAK’s charter states the group is not limited in its targets, saying that all across Turkey “bombs will explode, the assassinations and sabotage actions will happen. We will not recognise any rule. Everything and everywhere are targets for us”.

Beyond provoking the government to escalate military action in Kurdish areas, TAK's actions could also boost radicalism, as well as provide an outlet for already-present – and increasing – radicalism among Kurds from conflict-hit areas. During a recent trip to Diyarbakir, the de facto capital of Turkey's Kurdish population, The National encountered support for TAK's actions among a number of people from areas that have witnessed heavy fighting.

And if, as Ankara also alleges, the two suicide bombers who carried out the attacks in February and March were connected to the US-backed Syrian-Kurdish YPG militia, TAK’s effect could be felt far beyond Turkey’s own conflict.

The YPG has been the United States’ best ally on the ground against ISIL in Syria. But the US has come under increasing pressure from Turkey to cut ties with the YPG over its ties to the PKK. Turkey is an ally Washington depends on for access to the country’s Incirlik airbase, a key component of the US-led air war against ISIL.

The US is caught in a balancing act between Turkey and the YPG, as choosing one over the other would greatly harm its current anti-ISIL strategy.

The US has tried to stress the difference between the YPG and PKK – despite their shared ideology, close relationship and the presence of many PKK fighters in the YPG ranks – and express support for Turkey’s operations against the PKK while continuing to give the YPG the backing it needs to make gains against ISIL. But if evidence were produced that the YPG was involved in extremist attacks in Turkey – or if Ankara adds pressure on Washington to distance itself from Kurdish militants as a result of TAK’s action – the US could be forced to make a difficult decision.