Russia-Iran ties warm over Syria: marriage of convenience or lasting alliance?

Syria’s civil war has dramatically improved ties between Moscow and Tehran, but relations continue to be plagued by suspicions given their complex historical ties, writes Antoun Issa

Civilians walk past sanitation cylinders placed as barricades to provide protection from snipers of the forces of Syria's president Bashar Al Assad, in the old city of Aleppo, Syria on October 18, 201Show more

The latest offensive in Aleppo led by president Bashar Al Assad’s forces marks the first military cooperation between Russia and Iran in recent history.

Russian jets have been pounding targets in Aleppo as the Syrian army, backed by Hizbollah and Iranian fighters, advances to retake territory north of the city and break the siege of the regime-held Kweiris air base to the east of Aleppo.

Syria’s civil war has dramatically improved ties between Moscow and Tehran, and could lay the foundations of a lasting Russian-Iranian alliance in the Middle East.

But such an outcome is not a certainty, given the complexities of historical relations between Russia and Iran, and the differences in their approaches to the Syrian conflict.

While both powers see Mr Al Assad’s survival as essential to their interests, they – as do other regional players – see in the Syrian arena an opportunity to expand their own influence in the strategically pivotal country.

Prior to the current collaborative effort, both countries largely pursued independent strategies in Syria, and have worked with Mr Al Assad bilaterally.

The Kremlin has repeatedly justified its support for the Assad regime as necessary to prevent the collapse of the Syrian state. Russian president Vladimir Putin maintained that line in New York last month, when he warned Syria could end up a failed state and a haven for terrorists should the Assad regime fall.

Russia’s support for Mr Al Assad has, thus, been aimed at strengthening the Syrian state, chiefly the army. It has been the main supplier of weapons and ammunition to the Syrian army throughout the course of the four-year civil war, and its maintenance of Russian-made aircraft has enabled the Syrian air force to continue operations.

The Syrian army is Russia’s main pillar of influence in the country. No other power understands the Syrian army as intimately as the Russians do.

Syrian generals and commanders have been receiving training in Russia for decades, and Moscow has been the largest supplier of military hardware to the Syrian army since the 1960s.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, up until 2011, Russia accounted for 48 per cent of Syria’s total arms imports, with Moscow’s close ally and neighbour Belarus supplying another 20 per cent.

A post-war settlement that ensures the Syrian army remains the only legitimate and most powerful force on the ground will ensure the Kremlin’s continued influence in the country. The army’s survival is at the core of the repeated statements by Russian leaders on the need to preserve the Syrian state.

Conversely, the Iranians have sought to bypass the state apparatus to expand their foothold in the country. In line with Iranian policy throughout the Middle East, Tehran has invested most of its efforts in building, training and arming pro-Assad militias, chiefly the National Defence Forces (NDF).

Some analysts believe Iran has built up the militias as a backup plan should the Assad regime fall. However, Tehran’s continued support for militias is in fact undermining Mr Al Assad’s rule.

A report by the Carter Center warns the growing power of militias signals a further “decentralisation of state authority” and “could lead to a growth in warlordism” – quite the opposite to Russia’s objectives in Syria.

This scenario is not new to Iran. Indeed, Tehran has pursued similar policies to expand its influence in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen.

In all three countries, the Iranians have adopted a strategy of empowering local militias that would respond directly to Tehran’s orders. The result has been the same in all three states: a breakdown of government authority, the prevalence of warlords and non-state actors, and the paralysis of state institutions.

The policy is not limited to perceived Iranian foes, but is the modus operandi to increase Iran’s power throughout the region.

Despite cooperating with Washington to oust Saddam Hussein, Iran also empowered Iraqi Shiite militias to counter American influence over the Shiite-led Iraqi government. Why would it not do the same in Syria to counter Russian influence over the Syrian government and army?

Russian analyst Maxim Suchkov last year characterised Russian-Iranian ties as “compelled adversaries, pragmatic pals”.

That distrust is mutual. Iranian analyst Bijan Khajehpour noted that some in Tehran view Moscow’s improved relationship with Iran as “opportunistic rather than geopolitical”.

Such mutual suspicion has plagued Russian-Iranian relations for the past two centuries, but a paper last week in the Georgetown Security Studies Review argued the two powers have put such historical enmity behind them and are determined to make this relationship work.

The Syrian civil war could well be the birth of a 21st century Russian-Iranian alliance in the Middle East; or it could be a temporary marriage of convenience that crumbles when it is no longer of use.