RAMALLAH // Perhaps the most puzzling thing about the rush to secure direct talks between Palestinians and Israelis is why anyone would think that it is a good idea at this time. With the very survival of the two-state solution sought by the international community at stake, much rides on the next round of negotiations. And circumstances on both sides strongly mitigate against the chances of reaching a successful conclusion.
The Palestinians remain divided, both politically and geographically. Gaza's rulers Hamas vociferously oppose negotiations with Israel. Not only have such negotiations failed time and again, they should not be necessary in the first place, Hamas officials argue. Instead, the Islamist movement has offered Israel a generation-long truce should Israel, as stipulated by various UN resolutions, withdraw from all territory occupied in 1967 and grant Palestinian refugees the right of return.
In the West Bank, domain of the PLO - which long ago concluded that negotiating statehood with Israel over what remains of historical Palestine, namely East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, was the only viable way forward - there is also widespread scepticism that negotiations now can lead anywhere. The PLO's official position is that there can be an end-to-conflict agreement should a Palestinian state be created on all of occupied territory and a "just" solution reached to the refugee issue. In practice, the PLO has in the past proven willing to agree to minor adjustments to the 1967 border, with some Israeli settlement blocks falling under Israeli sovereignty in return for "as good as and as much" territory on the other side of the armistice line.
As for refugees, the very core of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the PLO seems to have taken a nod-and-wink approach, quietly talking around an issue that in Israel is seen as a non-starter. But the official PLO position is still a long way from any Israeli position. Israeli politicians from all major parties will not even begin to discuss refugees, consider all of Jerusalem the "eternal and indivisible" capital of Israel and want most, if not all, settlements to fall under Israeli sovereignty in any final agreement.
Opinions are more divided when it comes to control over borders, though all Israeli parties want some measure of control over the Jordan Valley, which separates the West Bank from Jordan. Similarly, all Israeli parties also consider water a security issue and insist on retaining control over water resources in the West Bank. The current Israeli governing coalition, furthermore, is closely affiliated with the settler movement, rendering both its ability and willingness to manoeuvre on any settlement-related issues severely circumscribed.
Finally, the hard-line Jewish nationalists in the ruling coalition have also raised the status of Israel's own Palestinian citizens as one to be added to the list of negotiable issues. Some have proposed a population swap under any agreement in an effort to rid Israel of as many non-Jews as possible. That is a position that has been rejected as ethnic cleansing by the Palestinians, who may now also need to secure agreement to safeguard the future status of Israel's Palestinians.
In short, the outlook is far worse now than under the last round of negotiations, at Annapolis in 2007, when a nominally less hard-line Israeli government was in charge. So why press for direct talks? There are certain time pressures at play. At the end of September, Israel's temporary settlement construction slowdown in the West Bank is due to end. While the nature of a partial settlement construction freeze that does not include East Jerusalem is problematic to Palestinians, its continuation is fiercely opposed by a majority in the Israeli coalition.
International mediators will, rightly, conclude that without direct talks, the settlement slowdown will not be extended, thus pushing chances for resumed negotiations even further away. Palestinians have also set a deadline of their own. The Palestinian Authority under Salam Fayyad has said that its state-building project will be complete by the middle of 2011, by which time it could unilaterally declare statehood. This would divide the international community and even the West, where some, notably Javier Solana, the former EU foreign policy chief, have suggested that the world recognise such a declaration.
Perhaps most significantly, however, are mid-term US congressional elections. To the surprise of many, who perhaps thought Washington would have more pressing priorities in Iraq, Afghanistan and with the financial crisis, the Obama administration has taken a special interest in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, correctly fingering it as the source of so much regional anti-US sentiment and an obstacle to America's strategic interests.
But there has been little progress so far. The White House had to back down over a complete settlement construction freeze and has seen proximity talks founder. A transition to direct talks would thus be a small victory for the US administration's Middle East policy. At what cost, though? Failed negotiations could well see the end of Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, who has already intimated his intention to quit. This would usher in an uncertain search for a successor. It might lead to an end to the PA, which would struggle to explain its raison d'être.
And chances of success hinge, as they always have done, on the ability and willingness in Washington to apply serious and sustained pressure on Israel. Israel, as the vastly stronger party to the conflict, is unlikely to take the necessary and unpopular steps to secure a viable solution, should it not be so compelled. But that willingness is not yet in evidence in Washington. @Email:okarmi@thenational.ae