US-Russia ‘deal’ will only serve to strengthen Assad

The United States is edging closer to becoming an active party in the Syrian civil war, writes Michael Young

Syrian Civil Defence members search for survivors amid the rubble following reported Russian air strikes the previous night on the Syrian northwestern city of Idlib. Omar Haj Kadour / AFP

While details of the military deal between Russia and the United States over Syria have not been made public, Josh Rogin of the Washington Post revealed the gist of a possible agreement last week. Critics feel the plan, if it is approved, will turn the Obama administration into a de facto ally of Bashar Al Assad’s regime.

The agreement would allow for an expansion of the US-Russian bombing campaign to include Jabhat Al Nusra, the Al Qaeda affiliate in Syria and arguably the most effective foe of the pro-Assad groups. In return for such collaboration, certain Syrian rebel groups aligned with Washington would be informed of safe areas where they would not be targeted by the Syrian air force.

By bringing the United States into a cooperation agreement against Al Nusra, the accord would have a direct bearing on the balance of power in the Syrian war. Until now the Obama administration has not involved itself in the domestic dimension of the conflict, focusing instead on rolling back ISIL.

The agreement would come at a particularly crucial moment in Syria. Al Nusra has successfully spearheaded recent opposition offensives against regime-controlled areas in southern Aleppo province and in Latakiya province. These are, partly, efforts to prevent the encirclement of the city of Aleppo, while raising the heat on the regime’s heartland.

It would also come as Turkey and Russia have reconciled after Turkey’s downing of a Russian plane last November. This allows for greater Russian-Turkish understanding over Syria, where Moscow has already made it clear that it opposes the encirclement of Aleppo, despite efforts by the Assad regime and Iran to push for such an outcome.

The military arrangement with the United States could mean that Washington and Moscow will share the aim of maintaining a status quo where Al Nusra is most active. Neither Mr Al Assad’s forces nor the rebel groups supported by Washington have any real capacity to take advantage of American and Russian air attacks and seize and hold Al Nusra territory, unlike the Kurds with ISIL, for example.

Deadlock serves Russian and American interests. Their objective appears to be to push the parties on the ground into a situation in which it is clear that no decisive military gains can be made by any side. While one outcome of this is to facilitate negotiations, no one is inviting Al Nusra to the table. Rather, its neutralisation would be an inducement for more palatable rebel groups, with which it co-operates, to do so.

However, this situation could create a paradox. If the American and Russian purpose is to induce all sides to return to negotiations by preventing major shifts in the military balance – and striking at Al Nusra does that for the rebels – how likely is this to make Mr Al Assad more amenable to a political solution? The Syrian president refuses to make concessions today, and would be even less inclined to do so if one of his principal rivals were pounded by US and Russian aircraft.

That is why the strategy adopted by Washington and Moscow is one that has a far greater probability in the coming months of consolidating the territorial separation of Syria, in anticipation of an eventual negotiating framework whose conditions remain unclear. But by concentrating on hitting one of Mr Al Assad’s most effective enemies, the Obama administration may also be signalling that the Geneva plan is no longer really applicable.

How so? Geneva outlines a transitional phase, at the end of which the Syrian president must leave office. However, by targeting a group that has been a major means of pressure on Mr Al Assad, the United States and Russia effectively give him more leeway to ignore Geneva, as he has in recent months.

Perhaps that is not so surprising in light of what has taken place in the past five years. The reality is that the Obama administration, no matter what antipathy it feels towards Mr Al Assad, has never seriously sought to remove him from power. In this regard it has behaved in a way similar to Russia, which would make their military partnership understandable.

Both may believe that, in the end, Mr Al Assad will have to go. There is talk today of forming a military committee to facilitate this process. Syria will not be able to rebuild until the president departs.

However, their shared preference appears to be to stabilise the country first, end the fighting, and ensure that none of the military groups has the means to challenge any long-term ceasefire. Only then might they turn their attention to Syria’s future and try to work out a post-Assad arrangement.

In the interim, however, the US risks becoming an active party in the Syrian civil war. Whatever Washington breaks, it will own.

Given how Barack Obama has systematically avoided this in Syria since 2011, it is surprising to see him reverse course today. If an accord with Russia exacerbates the situation, the president may be leaving his successor with a major headache.

Michael Young is a writer and editor in Beirut

On Twitter: @BeirutCalling