The day after Mosul is free, Iraq must face some hard truths

Taking Mosul back from ISIL will be hard, writes Faisal Al Yafai – but winning the peace will be harder still

Iraqi forces deploy south of Mosul, as they advance towards the city to retake it from ISIL jihadists (AFP / AHMAD AL-RUBAYE)

The battle for the ancient city of Mosul is a peculiarly modern battle. As the operation started in the early hours yesterday, Twitter was alive with each group speaking to its followers: Iraqis wishing the residents of Mosul well, Kurds praising their fighters, ISIL supporters still defiant.

The morning brought the tele­vision cameras, the smoke, bravado and bodies all live-streamed as Iraqi troops entered the outskirts of the city. Inside Mosul was ISIL: here was the largest city in modern times to be controlled by a terrorist group, drawn from dozens of countries.

The battle for Mosul has focused the minds of Iraq and its allies. It will almost certainly be the hardest battle against ISIL and perhaps even decisive. But below the surface there are other challenges. The liberation of Mosul will only be the start of a much tougher series of political questions, which have so far been contained.

The first is what story will ISIL tell itself about the battle for Iraq and Syria?

It was from Mosul’s Grand Mosque that ISIL's leader Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi first declared a “caliphate”, signalling a new type of terrorism, one dedicated to holding and expanding territory. If Mosul is lost, the expansion of ISIL will halt and it will be contained within its limited range within Syria.

And then what? ISIL’s ideology remains. The men and women who have come from Europe, Africa and Asia to fight will not stop. Many will return to their home countries – radicalised, angry and with military experience. Violent jihad, then, will mutate once again – perhaps into another long war, comparable to the sporadic attacks that marked the years after the invasion of Afghanistan, but perhaps into something more unpredictable.

In that sense, the end of ISIL's territorial ambitions will be another pivotal moment, comparable to the end of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when Islamist radicals were empowered. What story ISIL and their supporters tell themselves about their defeat in Iraq and Syria matters.

After 1989, jihadists believed their historical moment had come, after they had defeated the Soviet Union. It galvanised a generation of jihadis, who returned to their home countries believing victory was coming soon. What will ISIL believe? The narrative they settle on will define the shape of their response for many years to come.

A related question, in Iraq but also beyond it, is who will speak for the Sunnis? Part of the reason ISIL first found a stronghold in Iraq was because of the alienation of Iraqi Sunnis by a Shia-dominated government in Baghdad. Getting rid of ISIL from Mosul is only part of the problem – it is a symptom rather than the root cause. Without a genuinely representative government in Baghdad, a victory in Mosul will only be temporary.

What will happen to the Kurds? After so long toiling in the shadows in favour of a homeland, Iraqi Kurds have enjoyed a brief moment in the sun, drawing praise from western capitals and subject to adoring profiles in western press. But once ISIL is pushed out of northern Iraq, their utility to the west will fade. None of the most important powers in northern Iraq – neither Baghdad, Ankara nor Washington – is keen to see a truly separate Kurdistan.

The Kurds have only just concluded a deal with Baghdad to resume oil exports from the disputed city of Kirkuk – a deal widely thought to hinge on Kurdish cooperation against ISIL. Remove ISIL and the Kurds’ leverage goes too. Already the Kurdish region is struggling financially, feeling the strain of low oil prices and mismanagement. Baghdad may well decide to play hardball, once the watching gaze of the world moves on. No one should see good news in any of that.

The last, and perhaps most important question, is whether Iraq can be put back together. That hinges on whether the Sunnis can be offered representation and the Kurds can be offered an acceptable deal not to secede. And the answer to that question is all politics.

For all the feel-good cooperation of Sunnis, Shia and Kurds liberating Mosul, there is profound mistrust between the communities. The end of ISIL will only bring them to the surface.

At the same time, it will also expose the government in Baghdad to criticism. For more than two years, the government has been able to point to Mosul as its greatest challenge. Without ISIL, it will become clearer that Iraq under Haider Al Abadi currently has no plan for normalisation with the Sunni population, nor a deal with Iraqi Kurdistan. Once the dust settles on Mosul – and that could be weeks away – there will be tough questions for Baghdad.

Just as ISIL has been contained within Mosul, so these political challenges have also been contained. The liberation of the city will set both loose, with unknown consequences.

On Twitter: @FaisalAlYafai