Last month, Syrian president Bashar Al Assad gave a speech in which he admitted he was running short of men to fight the four-year-old war. Desertion was a problem, and the Syrian army had been forced to withdraw from outlying areas of the country and focus on the heartland.
The frankness of the speech, coming after statements from Washington that the trend of the conflict was against the regime, prompted a wave of speculation that the president might be sacrificed by his Russian supporters in the interests of a peace deal.
There is no disguising the concern felt in Moscow that Iran is taking the lead role in backing the Assad regime, while the continued existence of an ISIL-controlled zone on the Syrian-Iraqi border has serious consequences for Russian security. It can, in Russian eyes, only exacerbate tensions in Chechnya and Dagestan in Russian’s southern borderland.
Russia’s promotion of a new peace effort, after the failure of two earlier ones, has encouraged reports that Mr Al Assad’s days as ruler are numbered.
This week, the Syrian leader sought to regain the initiative, giving an interview to the Al Manar TV station, which is controlled by the Lebanese Hizbollah militia that is now increasingly used as a strike force in Syria against the regime’s opponents.
Mr Al Assad said Moscow would not abandon him because the Russians were a principled and reliable ally, in contrast to the Americans whose history was “abandoning allies, abandoning friends and back-stabbing”. He hit out against the “malicious media” who accused him of handing over the country to Iran and Hizbollah. Syria, he said, was facing an enemy with “limitless resources, particularly in terms of manpower”.
The Syrian leader has much to be concerned about. The pace of diplomatic contact between Arab leaders who are backing the various factions of the Syrian opposition and Moscow is picking up. More seriously, the US and Turkey are moving slowly to bury their differences. Turkey’s independent foreign policy – a stumbling block in US eyes to pursuing a successful policy in Syria – has been ditched, as Turkey finds itself threatened by ISIL and by a resumption of Kurdish terrorism.
Set against these factors, however, are many others which suggest that the time is not ripe for a grand bargain to end the war. For all the diplomatic consultations, it is hard to see any comprehensive agreement. First, the Americans believe that ISIL is more dangerous than the Assad regime, even though it was the regime’s plan – and a very successful one – to turn what started as a civilian protest into an anti-terrorist war. From the American point of view, the existence of ISIL-held territory is a threat to its allies, including Jordan and potentially to Saudi Arabia. The worst scenario possible would be ISIL taking over Damascus.
But other allies have different views. While ISIL’s so-called “caliphate” is indeed destabilising, regional countries do not forget that the Assad regime began the war, and it has been kept in place by Iran. Iran, for its part, is not ready to lose its ally in Syria, which extends the reach of the Revolutionary Guard and its expeditionary forces all the way to the borders of Israel and the Mediterranean, just as in the days of the ancient Persian empires.
This strategic contest may be ratcheted down if Iran – as the Americans hope – becomes a solid member of the community of nations rather than an exporter of revolution. Or it may go the other way, if Iran uses the wealth released by the recent nuclear deal to extend its influence. But that is not a question that is going to be decided now.
Of more immediate concern is the continuing difference between US and Turkish policies, despite the announcement of a joint programme to drive ISIL away from Turkey’s border zone. This agreement stems from a double failure: failure of America’s “train and equip” programme to create a moderate fighting force on the Syrian battlefield, and Turkey’s failure to topple Mr Al Assad, which has been the long-term goal of president Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Mr Erdogan has been pressing for a “safe zone” inside Syria that would be ISIL-free and could be home for the almost 2 million Syrian refugees inside Turkey. The Americans have refused to commit to this, as it would require the US air force enforcing a no-fly zone, putting it in conflict with Syria’s Russian-supplied air defence systems. This could easily become a US-Russian proxy war, which is the last thing Washington wants.
What Russia is looking for is a dramatic demonstration of the collapse of US power in the Middle East, but Washington is hardly ready to concede that.
So the refugees are not going back to any “safe zone”, as there will be no air cover. Mr Erdogan has accepted this compromise as the joint operations plan allows the Turkish air force to attack Kurdish forces in Syria allied to the PKK, the militant organisation of Turkish Kurds, under cover of the anti-ISIL fight.
In effect, the border zone will be used by Turkey to prevent the Syrian Kurdish militia, the PYD, controlling even more of the border area than it already does. The proposed “safe zone” will actually be a PYD-free zone. And this at a time when the Americans see the PYD as one of their their most valued allies in the fight against ISIL.
Meanwhile, the bloodshed only escalates, with ISIL continuing its shock tactics to scare its enemies and recruit the misguided young, while the Assad regime kills ever more civilians with its barrel bombs, such as the strike on Douma, in the suburbs of Damascus, which killed more than 100 on August 16.
As for the refugees, they are heading north to Europe in increasing numbers. They do not believe peace is at hand. The end of the Al Assad dynasty will come but it is hard to see that happening imminently.
Alan Philps is a commentator on global affairs
On Twitter: @aphilps