Russia holds most of the cards as the situation changes in Syria

What the Arabic press says about regional geopolitics, featuring commentary from Al Sharq and Al Hayat

Russian military support crew attach a satellite guided bomb to jet fighter in Syria. Alexander Kots / AP

Before Russia’s military involvement in Syria, Iran was the most influential foreign country in political circles in Damascus. Today, Russia is the player that holds most of the cards, Oraib Al Rantawi wrote in the Jordan-based newspaper Addustour.

With the Russian intervention in Syria, president Vladimir Putin has become the “main guarantor” of president Bashar Al Assad’s future, if not the whole of Syria. But Moscow no longer needs Mr Assad or intermediaries to secure its interests in Syria, it has decided to undertake that mission itself, Al Rantawi noted.

Preserving the Assad regime is a common interest for both Moscow and Tehran. Yet the two countries also have conflicting interests that are serious enough to challenge the long-term health of their relationship.

Russia is not concerned with the role of Syria as a point connecting Iran with Hizbollah in Lebanon. Nor is it interested in fighting Israel. This is why caution seems to dominate the Iranian stance in Syria, steering it clear of an open strategic alliance with Moscow, according to the writer.

This is vital material for understanding the controversy raging over a possible political settlement to the Syrian war and the fate of Mr Al Assad in the future Syria.

Writing in the Qatar-based daily Al Sharq, Kemal Ozturk noted that Russia has strong ties with the Iranian and Syrian regimes. Iran, Syria and Iraq top the list of countries that purchase most weaponry from Russia. The countries are also Russia’s gateway to the strategic Middle East region.

Russia had covertly been violating the sanctions imposed on Iran. This explains why Russia was against the nuclear deal between the P5+1 and Iran. Lifting the embargo on Iran would bring an end to a lucrative business model for Moscow, Ozturk wrote.

So what prompted Moscow to enter the Syrian civil war in such a grand way?

Mr Al Assad and Iran have suffered huge losses recently after the opposition groups on the ground unified, leading many analysts to speak about an “imminent collapse of the regime”. Russia knows full well that Mr Al Assad’s fall means its loss of Syria and possibly of Iraq and Iran.

If the Syrian opposition wins the war, Russia would lose its military base in Tartus, its only military base on the Mediterranean Sea. As such, the United States would remain the dominant power in the region.

The war also brings business gains. While the real quantity of Russian-made arms sold to Middle Eastern countries remains unknown, there is little doubt that the arms sold to Iran alone have earned Moscow considerable returns.

Additionally, Russia is retaliating for the European Union’s sanctions stemming from its role in the Ukraine crisis. Russia’s attempt to expand its influence in Ukraine has been met by EU sanctions, which along with slumping oil prices, have taken their toll on Russia’s economy.

In the London-based Al Hayat, Hussain Abdulaziz argued that Russia’s military intervention in Syria has dealt a heavy blow to regional players backing the Syrian opposition.

Russia’s air strikes have shown that the main goal is to weaken military groups backed by Turkey.

Considering the shared borders with Syria, Turkey is the biggest loser from the Russian intervention. Russia’s war machine could have a seriously negative effect on the Turkish-backed Syrian opposition centred in the northern part of the country.

Ankara and Moscow share several interests and have had strong business ties since the end of the Cold War. But Russia now has a presence along the southern border with Turkey and Ankara is worried that this could undermine its national security, Abdulaziz argued.

Despite that, Turkey appears to be powerless vis-à-vis Russia’s aggressive actions. A direct military face-off with Russian forces does not seem to be favour Ankara and its allies.

As it stands, Turkey is faced with only two options.

Either the Turkish leadership could accept the status quo, as the US continues to baulk at the prospect of getting involved on the ground. Or Ankara could coordinate with its regional allies to maximise military support for the armed opposition, overturning the American congressional veto on supplying these groups with advanced weapons.

Translated by Abdelhafid Ezzouitni