If the recent appearance of ISIL literature and wall graffiti in the restive north-western province of Pakistan was disconcerting, so too was the allegiance pledged to the extremist group by the militant outfit Tehreek-i-Khilafat (TIK). The newly formed Pakistani Taliban’s splinter group Jamaat Al Ahraar’s spokesperson also told Reuters: “We respect them (ISIL) and if they ask for help, we will look into it and decide”.
While being alarming pointers, they don't necessarily herald the consolidation of an ISIL foothold within Pakistan. Notwithstanding its emerging footprints and initial lure, it faces a tough challenge on a turf dominated by its patron-turned-rival Al Qaeda.
The ISIL literature was more a recruitment drive for the Iraqi war theatre than a move to establish a base in the region, but it was also an opportunity for its affiliate, the previously obscure TIK, to “arrive” on the jihadi scene. According to Wayne White, a senior scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington DC, ISIL feeds on weakness. This is exactly the strategy its local affiliates employed by exploiting narratives of socio-political deprivation especially in the most marginalised region of the country.
The initial victories of ISIL placed it at the helm of global jihadist hierarchy. With its incendiary rhetoric, organisational effectiveness and financial autonomy, it set to replace Al Qaeda as the vanguard of global jihad. Meanwhile, Al Qaeda’s ageing leadership remains marooned in Pakistan’s lawless frontier region.
But can ISIL maintain its momentum? With battle lines on multiple fronts and an international coalition firming up against it, will it be able to make greater gains or even hold its current ground? Clinton Walts, a counter-terrorism expert and senior fellow at Foreign Policy Research institute in Philadelphia maintains that “ISIL may have reached the extent of growth in terms of territory”. That may well be the case in Pakistan for now as well.
Despite being weakened, Al Qaeda remains an anchoring force for jihadist organisations in Pakistan, providing them the broader strategic vision, technical expertise, logistical support and a supply line of recruits from Pakistan’s urban areas – a network built up over several years. According to Washington-based analyst Arif Rafiq, “ISIL can’t even remotely approach what Al Qaeda can offer Pakistani jihadist groups”.
All major militant organisations continue to maintain close links with Al Qaeda and its tradition of pledging allegiance (ba’yah) to the Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar, bestowing on him the title of Amir-ul-Momineen (leader of the Muslims) – a quasi-caliphate status.
Extending support to ISIL will bring these organisations into direct conflict with their allegiance to Mullah Omar, resulting in the loss of crucial Al Qaeda linkages. Association with the Pakistani establishment-backed Afghan Taliban extends legitimacy and credibility to the anti-state militant forces. The imminent Nato drawdown from Afghanistan also presents an opportunity for the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda to step up their operational capacity, incentivising the Pakistani militias to remain under the former’s umbrella.
In a move widely seen as Al Qaeda’s bid to realign its position while blunting ISIL’s appeal, it recently launched its South Asian chapter, AQIS – Al Qaeda in the Indian subcontinent. Focusing on atrocities in Myanmar, Bangladesh and Kashmir, it sought to leverage causes with greater proximity thus resonance and legitimacy within the region.
In 2013, Urdu overtook Arabic as Al Qaeda’s main language of propagation. The formation of AQIS was welcomed by all major militant organisations across the board, including the Pakistani Taliban and its breakaway faction Jamaat Al Ahrar. With most of the Arab leadership of Al Qaeda wiped out either in drone strikes or ground operations, the mantle of its leadership has passed on to Pakistani militant leaders. With their local roots and entrenched networking, they will not allow easy access to any new competitors.
ISIL may yet be an outlier in Pakistan but it may not always remain on the periphery. Even without direct linkages or allegiances, it may give rise to the emergence of local copycat cells enacting its barbaric modus operandi and goals. This could further victimise a hapless minority while sharpening sectarian fault lines. The socio-political costs could also begin to appear as radicalised, war-hardened fighters return from their stints alongside ISIL ranks in Iraq and Syria and pursue new ideological frontiers. This will wreak havoc not only on Pakistan but reverberate throughout the region.
Asma-Khan Lone writes for newspapers in India and Pakistan