Iraqi authorities have finally reached a breakthrough in efforts to resolve the year-long tribal-cum-sectarian strife in a relatively small town between Tikrit and Baghdad. As the build-up for the battle to retake Mosul continues, the episode is a reminder of the many issues often overlooked in public discussions of the fight against ISIL.
The governor of Salahaddin, Raed Al Jubouri, said last week that displaced people from the city of Yathrib would be returning to their homes after an agreement was struck with neighbouring tribes. The deal, brokered by Sheikh Abdullatif Al Hmaym, head of the Sunni religious endowment, would allow the return of about 70,000 people.
A mix of sectarian and tribal tensions in the area had prevented the residents from returning to their homes. Neighbouring tribes accused residents of aiding ISIL when it conquered Salahaddin in summer 2014, and demanded punitive measures be taken against them, mostly based on tribal codes. Tribes were asked to pay $10 million (Dh37m) in compensation for those killed by ISIL.
Despite intervention from the government and leaders of the Hashd Al Shaabi, the pro-government militia organisation, the Al Saoud tribe insisted that families, not the government, must pay the amount.
The Shia tribe also demanded that a sand barrier be installed to separate them from Yathrib. Mahmoud Al Hassan, the tribe’s leader, said Yathrib’s residents violated tribal codes and he initially refused to accept any mediation to resolve the issue. Families who tried to return to Yathrib would be prevented from doing so, he said.
The episode highlights the convoluted issue of internally displaced people in the context of the anti-ISIL fight. It is one of many issues complicating the effort to defeat ISIL and heal the country’s wounds. Iraq seems to have reached a level where it is finding it hard to handle more displaced peoplet from ISIL-controlled areas. Both the Iraqi government in Baghdad and the Kurdish government in Erbil have indicated to western countries they would not accept newcomers, for reasons varying from financial to security concerns.
Recent suicide operations and sectarian attacks in areas including Baghdad and Diyala were attributed to the infiltration of displaced people by ISIL. This has sometimes led to local militias forcing people to leave certain areas or preventing residents from returning for fear of infiltration. Screening those returning and securing neighbourhoods delays the process of repopulation or welcoming displaced people, which in turn lead to accusations of a deliberate policy of demographic change, carried out by militias aligned with the government.
Fears of demographic change are largely a result of such complications, although the issue is real in some areas. Even though the repopulation of Tikrit was supported by the Shia-dominated Hashd Al Shaabi, for example, the delay in repopulating areas to the south of Tikrit is often interpreted as a cynical game by pro-government forces. And that is exactly why the problem requires more attention – such fears stoke tensions and create the environment that helped ISIL take over those areas in the first place.
There is no better time to consider these issues than now, as the United States and Iraq prepare to retake Mosul. The problems of displaced people and growing social tensions, as a “cost of winning” against ISIL, loom large as a struggle emerges between those who want to retake Mosul quickly and those who want to do it properly.
The liberation of Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq and a key stronghold for ISIL, will be a tall order, especially as the country suffers from political, economic and social problems that it did not necessarily have a year ago.
At the same time, however, ISIL has weakened since the US-led air campaign started, and it may seem wise to strike while the iron is hot. But the situation is more complicated than that – and the issue of IDPs is testament to this.
The question for many months was who will be fighting against ISIL in Mosul. Can the Iraqi army do it? Will the Shia-dominated Hashd Al Shaabi be involved? Will there be enough Sunni forces capable of leading the fight and controlling the city? Even within the government, speaker of parliament Selim Jubouri wrote an op-ed for The New York Times last month warning against the involvement of Hashd Al Shaabi in the effort to liberate Mosul, citing sectarian reprisals in Ramadi by "unlawful sectarian militias" affiliated to Hashd Al Shaabi and on the government payroll.
Today, the question is: who will be handling the cost of winning in Mosul? The city has more than a million residents, eclipsing any of the liberated cities so far. Can the country deal with many thousands of people fleeing the city and the destruction, and the possible societal breakdown that will follow? The expulsion of ISIL from Mosul will be a commendable outcome in and of itself. But, given the current circumstances, Iraq has no other choice.
Hassan Hassan is a resident fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy and co-author of ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror
On Twitter: @hxhassan
