Mistrust will always hinder the US and Iran’s grand bargain

Stephen Blackwell examines the deal between Tehran and Washington to resist the Islamic State.

Iran's heavy water nuclear facility near the central city of Arak. Hamid Foroutan / AP / ISNA

The “art of diplomacy” involves the promotion and defence of core national interests within the flux of events. This imperative of managing both principle and pragmatism is evident in the complex relationship between the United States and Iran. The decades-old antagonism between the two has not prevented cooperation when both parties have identified mutual benefits. Although Barack Obama’s call in March 2009 for a “new beginning” in bilateral relations was overtaken by a deepening international dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme, more recent events have revived speculation about a potential strategic accord – or “grand bargain” – between the two countries.

US and Iranian interests have aligned, at least temporarily, over the rise of the Islamic State. This threat has led to covert cooperation between the two powers to contain the extremists who currently hold sway over large areas of Iraq and Syria. While the US has launched air strikes against Islamic State forces, Tehran has been willing to play a constructive role in propping up the Baghdad government. Washington has been quietly gratified by Iranian pressure on the former Iraqi prime minister, Nouri Al Maliki, to stand aside in order to allow a new central government to attempt to heal the sectarian divisions threatening the Iraqi state.

Any “partnership” over Iraq between the two countries is likely to be a discreet affair owing to the risk of domestic criticism by pro-Israeli Congressmen in Washington and hardliners close to Ali Hosseini Khamanei in Tehran. Some recent instances of limited cooperation were scuppered by the persistence of ideological hostility. After the 9/11 attacks, Tehran’s tentative offers to assist the US in Afghanistan did not prevent then-president George W Bush from denouncing Iran as a member of the “axis of evil”. Washington also condemned the Islamic Republic for sponsoring terrorism, suppressing domestic opposition and seeking weapons of mass destruction. The Iranian government retaliated through strident anti-US rhetoric, enhanced support for Iranian proxies in Iraq and Lebanon, and further nuclear energy research and development.

In the aftermath of the unrest seen in a number of Arab countries in 2011, the growth of regional instability and Iran’s economic isolation due to sanctions has resulted in a change of tone in US-Iran relations. To a great extent this reflects a less confrontational approach in Washington. Although Mr Obama appreciates the value of “soft power”, he is notoriously reticent in terms of portraying US values as unique and worthy of emulation. Unlike Mr Bush he does not evoke the pursuit of “freedom” and “democracy” as a foreign policy goal. Mr Obama does not seek to export values, but has instead sought to be pragmatic in dealing with the Middle East. The election of Hassan Rouhani as Iran’s president in June 2013 inaugurated a moderation of the previous hostility towards the US due to Mr Rouhani’s focus on alleviating Iran’s economic difficulties through the lifting of sanctions.

Nevertheless, despite the tentative improvement in US-Iranian relations, there are plenty of potential difficulties ahead. Even if the jihadists are defeated in Iraq, the insurgency cannot be totally subdued unless it is also neutralised in Syria. Confronting the Islamic State in Syria will test the tactical accord between Washington and Tehran. While Iran remains firmly supportive of Bashar Al Assad, the US has made it clear that it will have nothing to do with the current Syrian regime. In addition, Iran will continue supporting Hizbollah as a key ally in Lebanon and Syria regardless of western attitudes.

Beyond the problematic regional issues, another uncertainty is the outcome of the current talks on Iran’s nuclear programme. Although this issue has been “internationalised” through United Nations involvement and the cooperation between the P5+1 powers (US, UK, France, Russia, China plus Germany), any eventual solution will be dependent on whether or not direct discussions between US and Iranian negotiators can succeed. Although Mr Rouhani has placed great emphasis on a successful conclusion to these talks, the deep mistrust of the US felt by Mr Khamenei and his allies in Tehran could still lead them to veto any deal.

From Mr Khamenei’s perspective, a genuine rapprochement with the US could pose an existential threat to the Iranian regime. Antagonism towards the US is fundamental to the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary philosophy. Iran’s leadership distrusts Mr Obama’s attempts at engagement as much as they did his predecessor’s bellicosity. Whether through propaganda, economic sanctions or military power, Iranian hardliners fear that their old antagonist is set on destroying the Islamic Republic. Mr Khamanei suspects that the US will continue to undermine the Islamic Republic through a “cultural invasion”, as well as political and economic pressure.

The relationship between the US and Iran is too complex to be reduced to a “zero-sum” equation, which assumes that the relationship can only evolve on the basis of either total hostility or a comprehensive resolution of all issues in dispute. The persistence of mistrust between Washington and Tehran will limit the scope for any “grand bargain”. While a convergence of interests over Iraq will encourage both the US and Iran to moderate their mutually antagonistic propaganda, it is worth remembering the observation of Zhou Enlai, the former Premier of the People’s Republic of China, that “all diplomacy is a continuation of war by other means”.

Stephen Blackwell is an inter­national politics and security ­analyst