Japan’s example could provide a model for the Iran nuclear deal

Iran can learn a thing or two from Japan's nuclear experience, writes Robert Manning

The Ikata nuclear power plant operated by Shikoku Electric Power Co. in Ikata, western Japan. Koji Sasahara / AP Photo

Surprising as it may seem, Japan’s experience may offer some helpful ways to reduce US congressional and GCC scepticism of the Iran nuclear deal.

In effect, a nuclear deal will leave Iran something of a “virtual nuclear state”, a status long held by Japan, with technical capabilities to obtain a bomb, but constraints from doing so.

Tokyo has a sophisticated civil nuclear power programme that includes full fuel cycle activities, such as reprocessing spent fuel. But Japan has also become a model signatory of the non-proliferation treaty.

It was the first non-weapons state to sign and implement the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol, which allows more intrusive monitoring. And Japan has also concluded bilateral nuclear safeguards agreements with the US, UK, Australia and Canada.

Obviously, as Japan is a US- allied democracy – not to mention the only country that has been subjected to a nuclear attack – any analogies with Iran are limited.

But the Japan case offers some possibilities to build confidence that could strengthen the agreement. For example, the IAEA could include inspectors from GCC nations. Or Iran and GCC states with nuclear facilities could agree to bilateral mutual inspections with Iran. This could enhance regional stability.

Under the nuclear deal, Iran will reduce its number of centrifuges, reduce its stockpile of low enriched uranium, enrich uranium only at its Natanz facility and not build any new enrichment facilities for 15 years. It will also convert its once secret Fordow facility into a research and development centre for peaceful purposes.

Most importantly, the agreement calls for an intrusive inspection regime, with Iran joining 55 other nations in implementing the IAEA Additional Protocol. This under-appreciated measure allows for short-notice inspections of any suspect declared facility.

Another element in the accord that parallels Japan’s situation is a major exception to US policy on the so-called back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle – reprocessing or enriching spent reactor fuel. US nuclear policy has generally opposed such activities because they are viewed as a proliferation risk. Japan is a rare exception to the rule.

The administration has been less than candid about the implications of the Iran deal for the non-proliferation treaty regime. The deal would create a new normal for full fuel cycle activities. So, when the Saudis proclaim that they want whatever Iran has, they have a point.

Given the deep distrust on both sides, this verification is absolutely key to the credibility of any final deal.

It would be a serious mistake to lift sanctions before the IAEA has its inspection regime operational and is confident of its capabilities. For Congress, this is a clearly a deal-breaker. This approach would also incentivise Iran to expedite its cooperation with the IAEA.

But will Iran actually allow such transparency in practice? If the Supreme Leader’s warnings that Iran won’t allow IAEA inspectors to talk to Iran’s nuclear scientists or inspect military facilities are more than bargaining chips, the deal will unravel. Under a side agreement, they have to account for past military activity by October 15 for sanctions to be lifted.

After a visit to Tehran this month, however, Yukiya Amano, IAEA director-general, dispelled his earlier doubts about the organisation’s ability to clarify Iran’s suspected past military-related nuclear activities.

The bottom line on any nuclear deal is not the number of five per cent centrifuges Tehran has, but transparency. Iran must ratify and implement the IAEA Additional Protocol in full cooperation.

Even in the best case, the nuclear accord turns a likely proliferator into a threshold state – somewhat similar to Japan – and redefines the non-proliferation treaty. There should be no illusions: implementing the deal will leave Iran a latent nuclear power, with residual capability to enrich uranium.

That said, barring a war and occupation of Iran, an accord along these lines would be the least bad of a spectrum of bad options.

Borrowing from the Japan experience and adopting additional safeguards to improve transparency could provide an extra layer of insurance against an undetected Iranian nuclear breakout.

Japan has been content to maintain the nuclear capabilities without going the last step and building a bomb. Will that status be enough for Iran?

Robert A Manning is a senior fellow at the Brent Scowcroft Center for International Security at the Atlantic Council and its Strategic Foresight Initiative

On Twitter: @RManning4