How Manbij can deliver a post-ISIL success story

Hassan Hassan says we must not lose sight of the extent of the extremist threat

A man cuts the beard of a civilian who was evacuated from Manbij, in Aleppo Governorate, Syria,. Rodi Said / Reuters

The fight against ISIL is entering a new stage. The US-led coalition has now recovered 50 per cent of the territory that ISIL seized in Iraq and Syria in 2014, but stagnation on the political front is hampering efforts to retake the other half.

But Manbij, the northern Syrian city liberated last week, is an opportunity to end this stagnation. The US can help present Manbij as an example for how life post-ISIL will look for the millions still living under the yoke of this organisation. If this happens, the road to ISIL’s twin capitals in Raqqa and Mosul will be much shorter and easier to navigate.

The campaign to expel ISIL from Manbij was the second deadliest for the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), after Kobane in late 2014. An insider of the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces put the number of dead combatants in the high hundreds.

The dilemma for the YPG is that Manbij is a typical Arab city, and the group might not be allowed to rule it in the same way it has in other towns it has liberated.

During the offensive, Kurdish field commanders complained that the campaign dragged on for too long and bled their militia. The US attempt to spare residents the level of destruction by reducing the number of air strikes contributed to the slow pace of the liberation.

Since they led the battle and lost many fighters, the Kurds might expect to rule the city. Turkey and the Syrian opposition have already warned against attempts to dominate. Despite such concerns, the liberation of Manbij is a rare success in the fight against ISIL. The coalition tried to avoid high civilian casualties from the air and the ground forces showed restraint in the way they conducted themselves. But Manbij can be more than that. It can help compensate for the failure to establish a political formula for ISIL-controlled communities.

Manbij was a key stronghold for ISIL, and a city that can serve as a refuge for the hundreds of thousands of civilians fleeing regime violence in Aleppo and ISIL oppression in eastern Syria. If Manbij is turned into a bastion of good governance, it will be no small success story. Due to its significance, the city’s stability and success will resonate far and wide.

Also, Manbij is easier to turn into a model of success. Unlike other places, it is not a conflict-ridden wasteland. Internally displaced people are already returning.

The city was one of the first to be liberated from Bashar Al Assad almost exactly four years ago, so its residents tend to be less polarised along political or factional lines. Thus, Manbij as a successful model for others who currently live under ISIL to follow, is a relatively straightforward task for the US coalition.

The political front of the fight against ISIL is a direct result of Washington’s preference for military gains. Political stagnation will arguably matter more than it did before.

In Mosul, for example, far more interested parties are vying for a central role in the battle to liberate the city: the Iraqi government is still divided within itself, and, indeed, with the Kurdish Regional Government, as well as with Turkey and the US. Even rival factions to the KRG, such as militias operating in Sinjar, seek to participate to ensure their leverage in their areas near the Syrian border.

In this sense, Mosul should not be viewed only in military terms. Iraqi analysts, such as Zaid Al Ali, argue that Mosul will be easier to return to the government fold than Fallujah because a great number of residents were employed by the government and the city had a culture of diversity before ISIL’s takeover. But a political framework that would ensure a coherent front to liberate Mosul is dangerously absent. This makes the liberation of the city more of a political challenge than a military one, even though the military challenge is still colossal.

Worse, prime minister Haider Al Abadi seems to have less incentive than he did two years ago to appease the Sunnis. If political reforms were resisted in 2014, at the height of the ISIL threat, they are far less likely today. In fact, Mr Al Abadi faces a political crisis in Baghdad and he feels more pressured to appease Shia militias and politicians than Sunnis or Kurds. For example, he recently announced a plan to incorporate Iranian-backed militias into the government.

It is easy to lose sight of the nature of the ISIL threat. Defeating the organisation militarily only will not resolve the issue. Despite the tendency to overstate the military gains and underplay the reality of the campaign against ISIL, the situation is much worse on the sociopolitical level. ISIL is losing ground, but its opponents are not better off.

If certain opponents gain, these opponents cause a new set of grievances that will equally benefit the extremists. To avoid the pattern, start with Manbij.

Hassan Hassan is a resident fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy and co-author of ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror

On Twitter: hxhassan