Geneva 3 must focus on ending Assad’s vile tactics

Hassan Hassan outlines what should be discussed at the Geneva 3 peace talks on Syria

Syrian ambassador to UN and head of the government delegation Bashar al-Jaafari (R) being greeted by UN envoy for Syria Staffan de Mistura (L) upon his arrival at the opening of Syrian peace talks in Show more

On Friday, a new round of peace talks between representatives of the Syrian regime and the opposition finally opened in Geneva, despite hurdles. The advantage of Geneva 3, as the negotiations have been dubbed, is that it follows an international consensus achieved in November by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. This consensus seeks a political settlement in Syria and an end to the humanitarian suffering of civilians. It has been given greater strength by unity among the rebels to endorse the political track.

So, Geneva 3 provides fresh impetus to resolve the conflict, and its – frankly probable – failure will undoubtedly exacerbate events on the ground and strengthen hardline forces who have rejected and criticised involvement in these talks.

But while the talks are unlikely to achieve their goals, the process can lead to significant change if organisers of Geneva 3 seize the momentum to alter the course of events on the ground, as a crucial first step to a political settlement. Without doing so, this round of talks will face the same fate as previous ones and will further compound the situation inside Syria.

To achieve progress, the international community must focus on two issues.

The first is how the Assad regime views and manages the conflict. Its strategy of siege, starvation and bombing continues to guide its approach and vision for ending the conflict. The regime continues to believe that such tactics provide it with the only leverage to force rebels to submit or retreat.

UNSC Resolution 2254 called for an end to this campaign, in provisions 12 and 13, as part of the international understanding that preluded Geneva 3. But, at least for the regime, such provisions put the cart before the horse, in the sense that they ignore how fundamental these tactics are to the government’s thinking about the conflict. It is a delusion to think that the regime will stop bombing civilian areas and enforcing sieges as a gesture of goodwill.

But it is possible to change the regime’s calculus.

Indeed, there are signs that the government’s backers in Moscow and Tehran have sometimes tried to strike a deal with the rebels independently from their ally in Damascus, such as in Zabadani and Eastern Ghouta. The Geneva 3 talks should seek to consolidate such thinking inside the regime.

Progress on the humanitarian front can be the ticket for Geneva 3’s success. Focus on the more intractable issue of governance or on the political process itself rather than substance will be doomed. Changing the regime’s approach to civilian areas is a hard task, but it is not harder than pushing to compromise on issues such as the fate of Bashar Al Assad or his military and security institutions. And such a change in tactics could help to create a better environment for future talks.

The second issue the organisers of Geneva 3 should focus on is how to strengthen the nationalist forces even if the conflict continues to rage. That issue also requires a shift in the approach currently followed by the regime, Russia and Iran. The targeting of nationalist forces has been well-documented, with the US and UK saying that 80 to 90 per cent of the Russian air strikes in Syria, which began in September, have focused on moderate forces opposed to ISIL.

Equally important, the regime has the tendency to strike deals with extremist forces rather than moderate rebels as part of its strategy of weakening nationalist forces that could present an alternative to its rule. According to rebel leaders affiliated to the Free Syrian Army, the regime has refused to accept prisoner swap deals with nationalist forces, while it has struck such deals with hardliners.

A rebel leader operating in the coastal region, for example, said the government recently exchanged six female prisoners for 28 dead bodies seized by the extremist Jund Al Aqsa in Mourik in Hama, while it has repeatedly declined to strike such a deal with his group, which has 45 regime prisoners. He complained that his group has been feeding the prisoners for more than a year and just wants to return them in exchange for freeing prisoners from their side. The regime today relies on its backers in Moscow and Tehran more than ever before. Most of its battles on the ground outside its heartlands are spearheaded by foreign militias.

The Russian intervention, which has concentrated on three fronts since September, has made progress recently only on one front, in the coastal region.

The regime controls 30 per cent of the country’s territory, and last year lost control of 16 per cent of the areas it was in control of the year before, according to the defence think tank IHS Jane’s.

Despite recent gains on the ground, the pro-regime forces are clearly stretched thin and will have a tough time retaking and holding new areas. The regime’s strategy of deliberately targeting civilian areas and weakening nationalist forces aims to force its opponents to surrender and to convince the world that it is the only viable option. Organisers of the Geneva 3 negotiations must recognise that the government’s strategy of starvation, indiscriminate bombing and weakening moderate forces is the core issue.

The focus must be on how to end or undermine this vile strategy that has only made matters worse, rather than validating it through a botched process that suggests to the regime that the world is finally increasing pressure on the opposition.

Hassan Hassan is a resident fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, a think tank in Washington, DC, and co-author of ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror

On Twitter: @hxhassan