The end of Hezbollah's boycott is unlikely to bring progress to Lebanon

Hezbollah's critics have accused the militant political party of obstructing an independent probe into the explosion at Beirut's port in 2020. AP

The value of the beleaguered Lebanese pound rose slightly on Sunday, after the decision by two of Lebanon's most powerful political parties, Hezbollah and Amal, to end their three-month-long boycott of the government's Cabinet meetings. After weeks of Lebanese depositors enduring unprecedented devaluations in their savings, a bump in the pound is merely the smallest consolation. Many of them would much rather see an end to the political turmoil that underpins the country's economic crisis.

The boycott has held up any progress towards discussions with the International Monetary Fund over much-needed financial assistance to Lebanon's state coffers. The IMF has said that Beirut must present an economic reform plan that includes lowering its deficit, cutting wasteful spending and improving its tax collection, among other things, in order to avail itself of any aid. And the need for aid is dire, to say the least. A majority of Lebanese citizens have slid into poverty over the past two years, as widespread corruption and graft have resulted in their country sliding into economic ruin. Last year, the World Bank warned that Lebanon's situation was among the worst man-made economic crises in human history.

At the centre of the problem is the political gridlock created by Hezbollah and its ally Amal. Hezbollah doubles as a militant group and Iranian proxy. The two parties have effectively held the country hostage to the demands of Tehran, which wants to see Lebanon alienated from the West and the country's allies in the Arab world. In seeking to take control of the country's future, the parties have set up what amounts to a parallel state, complete with a separate, Iranian-supported economy and militia forces that undermine the national government's monopoly on the use of force.

The extent to which Hezbollah, in particular, has jeopardised Lebanon's development is clear in the way governance has stalled over the course of its boycott. The boycott was declared to protest an ongoing independent probe by Judge Tarek Bitar into the causes and circumstances surrounding the devastating explosion at Beirut's port in August, 2020. More than a year later, many former and current government officials, including some allied with Hezbollah, have been investigated. None have been convicted. Mr Bitar's investigation has been hampered every step of the way by lawsuits, threats and outright violence from Hezbollah or supporters of its agenda.

On the surface, the probe into the Beirut port explosion ought to have nothing to do with the political process needed to push economic reforms through in Lebanon. But the two manifestly are obstructed by the same corruption that has become endemic in the Lebanese system, at the centre of which is Hezbollah's ruthless sectarian agenda. What for the IMF ought to be a very straightforward prescription of policy measures to get Lebanon back on track and improve the welfare of its citizens has instead become just another political game, with increasingly deadly consequences.

While the real reasons for the end of the boycott remain unclear – many analysts suspect they are motivated more by Lebanon's upcoming elections, or an Iranian desire to gain concessions in Tehran's ongoing nuclear negotiations with the West – an earnest attempt at reconciliation and progress is unlikely to be among them. In rejoining the political process, Hezbollah and Amal have certainly taken a step. But it will be for them to prove whether it is a step forwards or backwards.