Counter-terrorism strategies tend to lack a key element

To avoid the instrumentalisation of religion, it seems necessary to invoke religion in any counter-radicalisation strategy, writes HA Hellyer.

A draft law under consideration by the UAE government aims to tackle terrorism. As part of the law and a broader counter-terrorism strategy, counselling centres are to be established where terrorists are to receive “intensive religious and welfare counselling”.

Counter-terrorism has long included counter-radicalisation strategies, which tend to be divided into initiatives that aim to prevent radicalisation before it occurs, and initiatives to tackle it after it does.

When applied to radical Islamist terrorism, a part of that counter-radicalisation strategy includes the “counter-narrative”, specifically to remove legitimacy from the discourse of radical Islamists.

That discourse is usually built on two main precepts – an ideological view of how the world operates and a particular theological standpoint on how to respond to that world.

When it comes to the politics of that narrative, much of it will be skewed. There will be genuine grievances interwoven into it – the tragedy of the Palestinian people, colonialism and the destruction of Syria, for example – and these grievances will provide the backdrop to recruitment strategies. Pseudo-religious arguments engage with that narrative, and are then used to justify abhorrent actions.

The “counter-narrative”, both in terms of politics and religion, has been attempted in a number of countries. Governments and community organisations in Muslim majority countries like Saudi Arabia, and non-Muslim countries like Singapore and the UK, have tried to engage in that sphere – with varying degrees of success.

There is a key weakness in nearly all of those counter-radicalisation efforts.

One of the key reasons radical Islamist groups, even non-violent ones, have any appeal to Muslims is simple. They provide an analysis of the world’s problems – and offer a way to find a solution.

The analysis may be completely skewed and the solution may be entirely immoral, unethical or simply fantastical – but, in the minds of radicals, it’s a relevant solution to clearly identified issues.

The counter-narratives, however, are seldom equipped with such currency, relevancy or credibility.

At the core of all radical narratives are concerns around the use of power, politics and religion.

To break down those narratives from a religious perspective in any counter-narrative, there is a need to critique politics and power from a religious angle. Otherwise, the counter-narratives will be vulnerable to the accusation and charges that they are simply seeking to numb people’s concerns about what is wrong in the world.

But generally speaking, these counter-narratives have failed on that charge. Invariably, most religious institutions, groups or individuals who engage in counter-radicalisation activities will fall into two camps.

The first will be less radical Islamists, who are genuinely perturbed by the fanaticism of other Islamists. However, their narrative is also about power – and their partisan desires to have power for their own is often identified as such, rather than being considered as “speaking truth to power”.

The second camp will be those who may be deeply opposed to all types of Islamism – but they are also unwilling to “speak truth to power”. On the contrary, they are often accused of ingratiating themselves with the powers that be, as they rarely criticise them and may even praise them. That is not lost on those they seek to influence. It’s not surprising, as most religious establishments in Muslim majority countries are bound to the state and will rarely take positions that are at odds with that power.

Be that as it may, it means their credibility is handicapped in front of the very people they need to draw away from extremism.

The Arab world has seen many times the instrumentalisation of religion, by radical extremists. In order to counteract that, it seems necessary to invoke religion in a counter-radicalisation strategy. But it will not be possible to do that effectively while the state and its backers on the one hand, and Islamist groups on the other, simply instrumentalise religion for their own partisan political purposes.

Until religious authorities, institutions and personalities are able and willing to speak truth to power, in a non-partisan and non-divisive fashion, the narratives they promote against radical extremists will suffer a critical flaw.

Dr HA Hellyer is an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London, and the Brookings Institution in Washington DC

On Twitter: @hahellyer