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The Gulf’s dilemma today is not that it is living through a war, but that it no longer knows full peace. Mutual escalation between Washington and Tehran, tensions over maritime navigation, and the persistence of diplomatic channels all point to a region that is neither moving toward a stable settlement nor sliding into all-out conflict. It is trapped in an intermediate space: a state of neither war nor peace, or what may be described as a grey zone.
The danger lies in the way this zone unsettles a basic assumption in strategic thinking – that the absence of war means the presence of stability. Trade can continue, ports can remain open and markets can function almost normally, although escalation remains possible. Diplomatic contacts may continue even as limited strikes and indirect pressures persist. Stability is therefore no longer the opposite of war. Instead, it is the ability to contain conflict and prevent it from widening.
That is what makes the present phase so difficult to manage. This is a war that does not fully unfold, a peace that does not take root, and diplomacy operating under the shadow of escalation. Actors move under a calculated ceiling of confrontation, test the limits of deterrence and use tools of pressure without crossing into full-scale war. A limited strike becomes a political message, a maritime threat becomes a bargaining tool, and cyberattacks or economic pressure become instruments of influence no less significant than military force.
For the Gulf states, the challenge is not only to prevent a major war, but to manage a conflict that may continue without being declared, escalate without exploding and recede without ending. The risks do not arrive as a single shock, but through limited frictions. A maritime incident, a cyberattack, a threat to a vital facility, higher insurance and shipping costs, energy market volatility or escalation through proxies are all examples of this. The mere possibility of a ship, a facility or a digital network being targeted is enough for markets, insurers and investors to recalculate risk.
The Gulf’s vulnerability lies in the fact that its standing no longer rests on energy resources alone. Over recent decades, Gulf states have become hubs for trade, aviation, financial services, tourism, the digital economy and supply chains. With this transformation, the cost of ambiguity has risen sharply. Investment does not flee war alone – it also hesitates in the face of a climate whose trajectory is difficult to predict. Markets respond not only to facts, but also to expectations.
Gulf security is therefore no longer a purely military matter. Protecting borders and strengthening defence capabilities remain necessary, but security in the grey zone extends further. It includes preserving confidence, ensuring the continuity of supply chains, maintaining infrastructure, stabilising markets and enabling the state to function despite pressure. Development itself has become part of this security equation. Global cities, ports, airports, financial centres, energy projects and new economies are no longer merely signs of prosperity – they are pillars of national power.
Nor can this landscape be understood by treating deterrence and diplomacy as opposing choices. Deterrence prevents adventurism, but it is not sufficient on its own to build lasting stability. Diplomacy reduces the risk of miscalculation, but it requires a balance that limits attempts to impose new realities by force. Gulf states need a more flexible formula: deterrence without being dragged into escalation, openness to settlements without projecting weakness and preparedness without allowing the regional economy to be governed by fear.
The greater danger is that this condition may become familiar. When regional and international actors grow accustomed to limited escalation, when reciprocal strikes become part of the rhythm of politics, and when markets treat risk as permanent rather than exceptional, the meaning of stability begins to change. A crisis no longer appears as an extraordinary event. Instead, it becomes the background against which politics, economics and security unfold.
The question, then, is not simply when the war will stop. What is happening does not resemble a traditional war with a clear beginning and end. Nor is the question when peace will return. Peace, in its full sense, does not seem close at a time when strikes, deterrence and negotiations overlap. The more important question is how Gulf states can build stability within the space of neither war nor peace.
Answering this question requires a shift in thinking. Crisis management is no longer sufficient, because the crisis is no longer a passing moment whose end can simply be awaited. What is needed is an approach that treats risk as chronic. That means absorbing shocks, reducing the cost of escalation, protecting economic confidence and preventing limited incidents from becoming strategic crises. This does not mean militarising politics, nor turning development into a hostage of security. It means recognising that the Gulf’s development project has become part of national security.
The significance of the grey zone lies not only in its description of an ambiguous phase between war and peace, but in what it reveals: that stability in the Gulf is no longer a static concept. It has become a daily capacity to operate under pressure, sustain development despite threats and protect confidence in a phase that offers no permanent guarantees. The Gulf states’ hardest challenge may be not allowing the condition of neither war nor peace to become a permanent regional fate and not allowing limited conflict to reshape their future.
In the Gulf today, the central question is no longer how war ends, but how stability is built when peace remains incomplete.
