The massacres that took place on Syria’s west coast last weekend highlight one of the most complex challenges the country faces as it navigates its current political transition – the intersection of religious extremism and destabilising actors, both foreign and domestic.
Syria is taking positive steps towards stability but the path ahead is a rocky one. This is not only because of the multiplicity of interests and grievances among the country’s different religious and ethnic communities. There are also ideological divergences within some of these communities as well as the subversive efforts of external actors. All these factors overlap.
Interim President Ahmad Al Shara has been pragmatic in some of the ways he has approached post-Assad Syria. The recent deal signed with Syrian Democratic Forces leader Mazloum Abdi regarding the Kurdish-led militia’s integration into the armed forces – as well as unifying the north-east with the rest of the country – was a necessary compromise on both sides. This will hopefully pave the way for the wider political inclusion of Syria’s other minorities.
However, achieving stability is about more than political representation for ethnic or religious minority communities. It is yet to be seen whether Mr Al Shara’s pragmatism can withstand the threats to stability and inclusion posed by loyalists from his own Sunni community.
Although most of Syria’s Sunnis shun extremism, there remain groups in this community that hold hardline views not only towards other sects but also towards moderate Sunnis. These factions constitute some of the militants aligned with Hayat Tahrir Al Sham (HTS), with some having taken part in the HTS-led military campaign that ousted Bashar Al Assad last December. They see themselves as having earned some of the credit for Mr Al Shara’s rise to power and primarily regard him not as a politician but as the religious leader of a Sunni revival for which they have sacrificed.
In their view, such a revival means Sunni dominance over Syria – but only on their terms. At best, these mean completely excluding other religious groups and even moderate Sunnis from power in a country that evolves from a republic into an Islamic emirate. Although these groups vehemently oppose ISIS, they do not see that their own vision for Syria effectively replicates the horrific model of the so-called caliphate that ISIS established, despite the obvious similarities.
These extremist groups refer to Mr Al Shara as “Al Fateh” (the conqueror). To them, he has restored Umayyad rule in Syria after it was stolen by “apostates” – namely the Alawite community. Therefore, these groups have high expectations from the man they regard as their hero and interpret all his actions and decisions as ultimately serving the higher goal of doing away with the Syrian republic.
They believe that he is engaging with western powers so that the international community does not notice the gradual Islamisation of the country. For example, these factions think that applying Islamic jurisprudence to Syria’s military establishment would automatically deter Christians from wanting to join the army.
The belief that Mr Al Sharaa is transforming Syria into an extremist Sunni fantasy is what has kept these groups loyal to HTS so far. But it has also paved the way for them to engage in sectarian massacres against Alawite civilians. Meanwhile, Iran and Hezbollah are exploiting grievances within the Alawite community to mobilise remnants of the Assad regime under the pretext of taking back Syria. This has led to attacks on the Syrian government’s security forces in the west.
Mr Al Shara is involved in a precarious balancing act. On the one hand, he needs to stand up to the destabilising actions of Iran, its proxies and Assad regime loyalists. These forces are pursuing their goals by taking advantage of the political and economic setbacks faced by Alawites resulting from decisions such as Mr Al Sharaa’s dissolution of the Syrian Arab Army and the general exclusion of Alawites from Syrian state structures.
On the other hand, Syria’s interim President needs to reign in his loyalists. There is a real risk of Mr Al Shara repeating the scenario he went through in the not-too-distant past, when HTS was fighting not just the Assad regime and Iran-backed forces but also other Sunni extremist groups, such as Hurras Al Din, pushing them into submission or disbandment.
Although HTS largely managed to subdue such groups during its reign in Idlib, the national scale of the present challenge is much greater, particularly as Syria grapples with simultaneous crises across the whole country.
The fact that the west coast massacres happened in the first place illustrates the limitations of the Syrian state’s security capacity. Despite Mr Al Sharaa announcing the conclusion of military operations in the region and the establishment of committees to support civil cohesion and to investigate the atrocities, the roots of the problem have yet to be addressed. The danger remains that Syria could witness another bout of sectarian violence.
Syria urgently needs to implement genuine political inclusion for all its people so that no community feels disempowered and foreign actors cannot use local grievances to advance their own agendas. The international community must insist on transitional justice while also assisting Syria with its economic revival.
Syria’s friends must also support a process of security sector reform that addresses the urgent issues of both capacity and integration. Unless all these factors are implemented simultaneously, there is a risk that agreements like the one signed between Mr Abdi and Mr Al Shara will remain mere ink on paper, with Syria descending into another cycle of chaos reminiscent of Libya or Afghanistan.
