Nasrallah has been buried – and Hezbollah’s strategy now lies in ruins alongside him

No one doubted that the funeral last Sunday of Hezbollah’s former leader, Hassan Nasrallah, would be a major affair. Yet the number of attendees could not hide something obvious – namely, that burials are usually a closing of the page rather than an opportunity for renewal. This is certainly true with Mr Nasrallah’s funeral, which comes at a time when Hezbollah is in need of reinventing itself, but hasn’t even begun thinking of doing so.

Since November, when Hezbollah signed off on a ceasefire agreement with Israel negotiated by its main ally in Parliament, Speaker Nabih Berri, the party has absorbed successive setbacks. Joseph Aoun, a man Hezbollah had opposed for the presidency, is now in office. Nawaf Salam, whom the party had also blocked, is Prime Minister. The ceasefire agreement itself was no less than a surrender, and claims by the party’s new secretary general, Naim Qassem, that Hezbollah won the war sound absurd.

In light of this, the ceremony for Mr Nasrallah was seen as a way for Hezbollah and its supporters among the Shiite community to reassert themselves and affirm their presence. That’s perfectly understandable but also somewhat misguided, as no one in Lebanon is seriously contemplating banishing Shiites from the political landscape.

What Hezbollah has not engaged in, or not yet engaged in, is an internal discussion on the future of its weapons. Since Mr Aoun stated in his inaugural address in January that the Lebanese state must have a monopoly over weapons, the party has remained quiet on this question, wanting to avoid a confrontation with the President.

And yet, it is increasingly apparent that without a regional strategy that makes the weapons relevant, Hezbollah will continue to have great difficulty justifying retaining them. It is highly improbable the party will be in a position to use them against Israel, since its heartland in southern Lebanon could not long sustain a new and devastating Israeli retaliation.

So, what is left? Keeping the weapons to potentially turn them against the Lebanese and again secure power at home? That’s not likely to work either, since the mood in the country is largely hostile towards Hezbollah. Any effort by the party to intimidate its rivals would almost certainly lead to conflict, in a context in which Hezbollah is isolated. Moreover, since the fall of its ally the Assad government in Syria, the party would have no way of resupplying itself.

For all intents and purposes, if the weapons no longer serve a purpose, then it may be time for Hezbollah’s leaders to ask whether it would not be better to secure political objectives inside Lebanon by coming to an agreement with the state over its disarmament. This would represent a revolution in the party, but it would make sense in light of the collapse of Iran’s strategy to surround Israel with hostile non-state actors.

In fact, a major problem for Hezbollah is that Iran today is nowhere to be seen in Lebanon. The Iranian economy is in such crisis that it cannot spare money to help rebuild destroyed Lebanese Shiite areas. The contract between Iran and its Hezbollah allies has, therefore, been seriously undermined, amid a perception among many in the Shiite community that they were used by Tehran as cannon fodder, for no advantage to themselves.

Yet while Iran may be absent from the reconstruction effort, all the indications are that it has also taken effective control of Hezbollah since the Israeli assassination of Mr Nasrallah, his apparent successor, Hashem Safieddine, and the man many regarded as third in line, Nabil Qaouq, once the deputy head of the party’s Executive Council. It was the Iranians who allegedly appointed Mr Qassem after the three figures were killed, though many view him as a bland facade for Iran’s influence.

Another question that has arisen is whether Hezbollah is united when it comes to accepting the ceasefire agreement. There have been reports, as well as indications, that there are differences of opinion within the party over how to address the coming phase. Mr Qassem, for now, is avoiding domestic conflicts, while a younger group of party militants has reportedly taken more aggressive actions, including recently engaging in intimidations tactics on scooters and burning UN vehicles on the airport road.

It’s unlikely that this will lead to a rift in Hezbollah, especially if Iran retains some control over the party, but it does show confusion at a sensitive time. That is why Mr Nasrallah’s funeral was also very likely seen by party leaders as an occasion to unify Hezbollah’s ranks around the memory of its dominant figure for three decades.

But that won’t be enough. Without clarity from Iran on the party’s future, Hezbollah will remain in a twilight zone, unsure of which direction to take on its weapons and, beyond that, on its very identity. And the Iranians themselves may be in disagreement over this, as support for Hezbollah plays into Iran’s factional politics. All that seems certain today is that, unless such issues are resolved, the party will continue to drift.

Hassan Nasrallah’s death was a major blow to Hezbollah, and he surely understood early on the dangers in the party’s decision to support Gaza after the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel. If so, he ended up being trapped by a suicidal strategy. With his burial, this strategy – surrounding Israel with a ring of fire – is being buried too. Unless Hezbollah can refashion itself quickly, the party risks going the same way.