Elon Musk's meeting suggests Donald Trump shares Joe Biden's Iran strategy

A copy of the Donyaye Eqtesad newspaper highlighting The New York Times's report on a meeting between Elon Musk and Amir Saeid Iravani. AFP

We should not underestimate the significance of last week’s meeting between the American tech billionaire Elon Musk and Amir Saeid Iravani, the Iranian ambassador to the UN. During their hour-long meeting, the two men are believed to have discussed ways to de-escalate tensions between the US and Iran.

Also last week was a visit to Tehran by Rafael Grossi, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, followed by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s announcement that his government is ready to resume negotiations for a new nuclear deal.

If an agreement does materialise, it will effectively replace the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which was finalised between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus the EU, in 2015. The US pulled out of the deal three years later, during president-elect Donald Trump’s first term in office.

The most notable flaw with the talks that led to the JCPOA was that negotiators acquiesced to Tehran’s insistence on separating is nuclear ambitions from its regional activities. Which is why the next round of nuclear talks, were they to happen, should include tackling the very important issue of Tehran’s proxies.

Last week’s secret meeting – between a representative of the incoming US administration known to have Mr Trump’s ear and an Iranian diplomat considered close to his country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei – was not the first of its kind. Indeed, the current administration of President Joe Biden had sent a delegate to meet Mr Iravani, too.

But there is one very notable difference – and that is Mr Trump’s apparent willingness to engage with the leadership in Tehran. This amounts to a potential departure from the president-elect’s policy of applying “maximum pressure” against Iran during his first term, which included imposing sanctions on its economy.

It’s for this reason that Mr Trump’s re-election has had an impact on policymaking in Tehran. During their meeting in the Iranian capital, President Masoud Pezeshkian assured Mr Grossi that his government seeks to eliminate “doubts and ambiguities” regarding its nuclear programme.

Despite the optimism, there is uncertainty about Israel’s hawkish stance on Iran’s nuclear programme, with speculation that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu might take pre-emptive action even before Mr Trump is inaugurated on January 20. Some foreign policy hawks in the US suggest that Mr Netanyahu has a rare opportunity to impose a fait accompli on the US by launching a strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities, believing it to be the only opportune moment for it to derail Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.

However, Mr Trump (like Mr Biden) does not seek to embroil the US in a war with Iran that Israel might instigate, especially as Israel cannot carry out such an operation on its own. Mr Biden has publicly warned Israel against possible strikes, while Mr Trump has seemingly communicated to Iran’s leadership that the onus is on Tehran to avoid such a scenario.

What is common to both Mr Biden and Mr Trump is a shared belief that Iran must understand former US president Barack Obama’s willingness to disregard its regional behaviour can no longer be accommodated. Instead, Tehran must choose between continuing its doctrine of using proxies and fundamentally reforming its system.

The Biden administration has distanced itself from the Obama administration’s dovish policies towards Iran. It has allowed Israel to counter Tehran-backed proxies Hamas and Hezbollah by destroying their capabilities in Gaza and Lebanon, respectively. The current administration also appears to have tackled the issue of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilisation Forces in Iraq with careful diplomacy, engaging with key government figures and influential civil society leaders.

With Hezbollah refusing to change its behaviour, however, Lebanon’s fate remains largely in the hands of Iran’s leaders. This has become evident in the US policy conceptualisation of Lebanon as a battleground between Iran and Israel – and not one between Israel and Lebanon.

Mr Biden’s recent meeting with Mr Trump in the White House appears to have led to an agreement that Washington should work towards ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon. At the same time, both leaders believe in continuing to provide military, financial and diplomatic support to Israel as it continues to degrade the military capabilities of both Hamas and Hezbollah.

They also appear to agree on giving Iran an opportunity to rein in Hezbollah, force it to hand over its weapons to the Lebanese state and become a political party like any other. However, the first step in both leaders’ strategy is to ensure Hezbollah’s withdrawal north of the Litani River, so that the area between the river and Israel’s border is entirely free of Hezbollah weapons.

The problem with this partial step is that Israel seeks binding guarantees that Hezbollah will not return to the demilitarised zone to resume operations against the residents of northern Israel and prevent their safe return. This explains the discussions about Security Council Resolution 1559, which calls for extending the Lebanese state’s authority over its entire territory and disarming all groups, including Hezbollah and the various Palestinian groups.

Resolution 1559 is part of Resolution 1701, which provides the roadmap for ending the war between Israel and Hezbollah. The mechanisms for implementing this resolution are clear, but the political decision ultimately lies with Iran, not Hezbollah.

The Biden administration has been late to acknowledge that ending the war in Lebanon depends on applying pressure on Iran. It also made a mistake when it linked the conflicts in Lebanon and Gaza, assuming that a ceasefire in Gaza was necessary to end the war in Lebanon.

Mr Trump appears to have understood that the key to a resolution in the region lies with Iran, and that Tehran’s sincerity during nuclear negotiations can be tested through Lebanon.

The president-elect’s strategy is straightforward – one that is based on bargaining with an adversary to achieve a favourable deal. By sending Mr Musk to meet Mr Iravani, he has signalled his desire to entice Iran with an attractive offer.

The question is whether the leadership in Tehran chooses to cut a deal with the US or face even more crippling sanctions that will eventually bankrupt their country.