In Lebanon, Iranian audacity is being met with Israeli arrogance. Biden can end both

A Middle East Airlines airplane prepares for take off from Lebanon's International Airport on Sunday, amid the war between Hezbollah and Israel. AFP

Despite the significance of the US presidential election, its outcome is unlikely to mark a decisive moment for the conflict in the Middle East – for two reasons.

First, President Joe Biden will remain in power, and will continue making strategic decisions, until mid-January. Second, the imperatives of the battlefield will drown out any calls for ceasefires, de-escalation, reconciliation, or deals, and will ultimately dictate their shape and timing.

Israel is currently waging a war on several fronts – in Gaza, in Lebanon, and against Iran. These fronts are both interconnected and separate at the same time. The Iranian front remains Israel’s most significant, whether in terms of direct confrontation or in dismantling Tehran’s proxies, primarily in Lebanon and Syria. This, in turn, shapes US policy towards the Middle East.

So, as far as restoring regional peace and stability is concerned, is the Biden administration leading or is it being led? Does the longstanding US-Israel strategic alliance tolerate tactical differences, or is Washington’s implicit approval of Israel’s goal to destroy Hezbollah a shared strategy? And where does Iran stand in this strategy? Has the battlefield forced Tehran to reconsider its doctrine, given that it appears to be on the back foot right now?

Let’s begin with the broader geopolitical picture.

Russia won’t throw Iran a lifeline, as it is mired in a war in Ukraine. In any case, it won’t pressure Iran, as it needs its help in the Ukraine war and to maintain a strategic foothold in the Middle East.

China is placing its strategic interests above all else, preferring to stay on the sidelines. It is closely monitoring the US-Iran relationship, with both parties holding backchannel talks with a view to lifting sanctions on Tehran and reviving the 2015 nuclear deal with some modifications.

The EU, a number of whose members are America’s close allies in Nato, isn’t inclined to entangle itself in the Middle East quagmire, as the quagmire in Eastern Europe is bad enough. These countries have distanced themselves from their previous policy of appeasing Iran after it began supporting Russia’s war effort in Ukraine.

Of course, most EU members will want the US-Iran negotiations to succeed, especially since their leaders dread former US president Donald Trump’s possible return to the White House next year, due to his policy positions on Nato, Ukraine and Iran.

So, where is the problem?

The core issue is with ideology. Tehran’s leaders while keen to improve relations with the West are held back by their adherence to the doctrine of relying on militias to foster Iranian influence across the region. Tehran has, for instance, no intention of abandoning its influence in Lebanon.

In Lebanon, unfortunately, Iranian audacity is being met with Israeli arrogance. The latter is basking in its recent victories, claiming that it has destroyed more than 80 per cent of Hezbollah’s leadership and military capabilities. It insists it doesn’t want to remain in southern Lebanon over the long term, but its actions suggest otherwise. It is even hinting that it may seek to impose a buffer zone between the border and the Litani River with military presence, even if temporarily, in the area.

This would be a grave mistake – not only because it would expose Israeli soldiers to attrition but also because it would prevent civilians from returning to their homes, potentially planting the seeds of civil conflict in Lebanon.

If Israel and Iran are the elephants battling in the Lebanese arena, then the country is the grass being trampled underfoot.

The question is, can the US save Lebanon from these two adversaries? Neither French nor regional diplomacy alone can save the country. It appears only the Biden administration has the power to do so. But this requires vision, courage and the determination to prioritise peace in Lebanon.

If the will exists and the decision is made, the Biden administration must place Lebanon on its agenda in its negotiations with Iran. It should firmly insist that Tehran stop hindering Lebanon’s neutrality and force it to agree to the dismantling of Hezbollah’s military apparatus. If the US does not take such action, then it is simply talking a good game.

The Biden administration also needs to press Lebanese Speaker Nabih Berri on the need to call for an extraordinary parliamentary session to elect a president. Such a session should be called without the condition of dialogue, and there should be no concern given about which parties attend this election or abstain.

Mr Biden needs to assign a full-time envoy who will be dedicated to enforcing the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701.

This means establishing mechanisms to enable the posting of the Lebanese army in the south, from the border to the Litani River, to replace Hezbollah, as well as the reinforcement of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon – or Unifil. The mechanisms must also ensure Israel’s full withdrawal from southern Lebanon, along with a firm Iranian commitment to not obstruct these efforts.

Further, American leadership is crucial in rallying European and Arab support behind the political process to save Lebanon, which necessarily includes a reconstruction fund and return and rehabilitation efforts for the 1.3 million displaced people. This is vital not only for humanitarian reasons but also to prevent tensions between the country’s myriad communities.

Some may argue that this is only possible if an Iran-Israel war is averted. That’s not true. Even if an all-out war breaks out – as unlikely as it seems – it will eventually end. On the contrary, the implementation of Resolution 1701 might even serve to secure some sort of Iran-Israel rapprochement.

The pretext for fearing another necessary UN Security Council Resolution – No 1559 – which calls for the disarmament of Hezbollah and the various Palestinian factions in Lebanon, is now irrelevant. There is no longer any ground to pretend that Hezbollah’s weapons are aimed at Israel or for the liberation of Jerusalem, especially after the group’s decision to back Gaza’s “support front” dragged Lebanon into a war that both the group and the country was unprepared to fight.

Might Hezbollah’s “neutralisation” be the key to a trilateral US-Iran-Israel deal involving broader regional agreements, once the voices of vengeance fade and a new balance of power emerges in the Middle East? We can only wait and see.