Israel's war in Gaza will end up strengthening both Hamas and Iran

In the past nine months, there has been considerable debate as to whether Iran knew beforehand of Hamas’s October 7 attack against Israel. The Iranian regime has suggested it didn’t and this may be true, given that the ensuing conflict has, at least in theory, posed an existential threat to Hamas’s presence in Gaza, a key node in Tehran’s alliance network. However, ultimately, whether Tehran knew may not be relevant. The reason is that the Iranian system set up in the past decade or so, and even longer, has made it highly probable that the outcome of the war in Gaza will not be to Israel’s decisive advantage. As the Israelis have razed the territory and killed tens of thousands of civilians, Iran has consolidated its regional cards, and it will probably emerge from the conflagration strengthened. The Iranian system holds few secrets. Tehran has built a string of alliances with non-state or para-state actors all around Israel – with Hezbollah operating from Lebanon, Hezbollah and Iraqi militias from Syria, the Houthis from Yemen, and Hamas from Gaza and perhaps the West Bank in the future. Israel has shown an inability to halt the progression of such groups, despite its overwhelming military advantage over them. A main reason is that the Iranian regime has also focused on politics. In Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, Iran and its allies have succeeded in dominating weak or weakened states, creating a political foundation for their endeavours. At best, Israel's weapons can have a delaying effect on its enemies, buying time until future battles, but only a limited real impact on the political contexts in which these non-state or para-state actors are able to act. On the contrary, taking Gaza as an example, Israeli destructiveness is actually playing in Hamas’s favour. By destroying the territory and its society, Israel has undermined any social structures potentially able to push back against Hamas’s choices, even as Hamas is the actor most able to dominate the vast landscape of devastation Israel has created. Much the same would happen in Lebanon in case of a war . Lebanese society, in its majority, disagrees with Hezbollah, and this has been shown on countless occasions in recent years. Yet Israel’s usual threat to “take Lebanon back to the Stone Age” would so annihilate the sectarian social order that can impose domestic guardrails on Hezbollah, that the party could conceivably come out of a war better off in the long term. On the Palestinian scene, in fact, there are few signs that the Gaza war has weakened Hamas. On the contrary, it has only highlighted the marginalisation of the Palestinian Authority , as young men in the West Bank appear to be embracing Hamas’s choice of “armed resistance”, no matter how detrimental it has been for Palestinian lives. In the coming years, Hamas may push Fatah aside as the dominant Palestinian faction, and even perhaps join and take control of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Already, Hamas last year began indirectly challenging Fatah in the largest Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon, Ain Al Hilweh , suggesting it was preparing the ground for a bigger push once Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas leaves the scene. All this works to Iran’s advantage. It would be simplistic to dismiss Iranian allies as mere “proxies”, as many observers have a tendency to do. All are active and willing participants in a regional project that regards Iranian interests as running parallel with their own. When they gain, Iran gains; and when Iran gains, they do too. For Israel and the US, this situation would seem to be untenable. However, there is little they can do, in large part because both are so divorced from internal dynamics in Arab societies. A military attack against Iran to change its regime, which some Israelis and their backers view as a silver bullet to resolve the “Iran problem” in the region, is bound to provoke a wider conflict that leads to stalemate, changing very little. Lest we forget, it is Israel’s appalling treatment of the Palestinians and its refusal to even consider a political solution for its occupation that has allowed Iran to exploit Palestinian discontent. The Iranian regime has been accused of smuggling weapons into the West Bank, and even if Israel retains control over large swaths of Gaza, Hamas will probably continue to resist, while extending its influence into other areas where Palestinians are present. Iran has doubtless destroyed several of the Arab countries in which it functions, undermining their sovereignty, state structures and even sectarian social contracts. For the Iranian regime to thrive, these countries have been laid to waste. The so-called Axis of Resistance is, really, only an axis of misery. But for it to be overthrown, any challenge needs to come from within the Arab societies themselves, not through outside military action. Israel and the US don’t have the bandwidth, patience or interest to affect developments in countries such as Lebanon, Syria, Iraq or Yemen. It is unfortunate that Iran has spent more than a decade, and even more in some countries, using all three to advance its agenda. The war in Gaza will not change that, and Israel is already seeing limitations in its resort to extreme violence. Palestinian suffering may be intolerable, but Israel is not winning in Gaza. For Iran, this creates an ideal situation to continue to exploit in the future.