We may be witnessing the emergence of Hakan Fidan’s Turkey

In a comment that splashed across Turkey’s front pages and raised eyebrows in western capitals, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan recently asserted that US-led humanitarian efforts for Gaza based in the Republic of Cyprus were a cover for military operations. “There is serious militarisation there,” he warned in an interview, echoing recent comments from Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. “When you become part of the ongoing wars in the Middle East, this fire will come and find you, too.” Strong accusations have long been the preserve of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, but a year after taking office Mr Fidan seems to have shed his usual reserve for a bolder stance. Washington has been increasing its military co-operation with Cyprus and Greece, so his charge seemed a clear dig at Turkey’s Nato allies. And it came shortly after Mr Fidan visited China’s Xinjiang region and spoke of “ancient Turkic and Islamic cultures”, countering Beijing’s view that Uighurs are a non-Turkic people with deep Chinese roots. Turkey’s foreign minister presents a wealth of contradictions. He’s hawkish, but more bibliophile than others. He’s no wistful artist like his successor at Turkey’s intelligence agency (MIT), Ibrahim Kalin, who occasionally releases music videos singing about Islamic love. Avoiding the brusqueness of his predecessor, Mevlut Cavusoglu, Mr Fidan gives off an aura of polite implacability, grinning benignly as his eyes make clear he will not be swayed. Since the collapse of peace talks in 2015, Ankara has been more aggressive on the Kurdish issue, renewing conflict with Kurdish militias in the south-east as well as northern Iraq and north-east Syria . Yet Mr Fidan is Kurdish on his father’s side and played a key role in secret talks between Ankara and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in 2009-10. Mr Fidan is one of the few Turkish cabinet members who is fluent in English and able to debate the finer points of policy with western counterparts. He attended university in the US, earning his bachelor’s in political science in Maryland and studying under the Scottish historian Norman Stone. In his master’s thesis, on intelligence’s impact on foreign policy, he pointed to the CIA and MI6 as models for Turkey. Yet one could argue that as MIT chief from 2010 to mid-2023, he was part of Turkey’s turn away from the West and its allies. Under his leadership, MIT co-operated with rebels fighting Syrian President Bashar Al Assad, including some reportedly aligned with extremists. Under his watch, Ankara pivoted away from military co-operation with the US and Israel and developed stronger ties with Iran. Over 13 years, Mr Fidan transformed MIT into a competent, reliable and even flexible institution, a rarity in Turkey’s government. Over the past year, he has endeavoured to do the same within the foreign ministry, aiming to better position Turkey as a power player in a multipolar world. Mr Fidan reportedly urged diplomats to stop marrying foreign nationals, arguing that it posed a security threat. He moved to strengthen and refine the ministry spokesperson and communications arm and brought all of Turkey’s various strands of foreign policy, including the military and domestic defence, under the ministry’s umbrella. He nationalised privately run Turkish visa services around the world to boost ministry revenue. Finally, he created a new security and intelligence department and appointed a Central Asia and Turkic affairs ambassador, underscoring Ankara’s efforts to expand its influence in Turkic states. Abroad, his two signal accomplishments are swapping Turkish approval for Sweden’s entry into Nato for a US deal on F-16s and concessions from Stockholm, and continuing to balance ties with Russia and Ukraine even as Ankara found a way to allow for the continued shipping of crucial Ukrainian grain. Those worried about a more confident Turkey might consider the alternative. Many western officials hoped main opposition candidate Kemal Kilicdaroglu would emerge victorious in last year’s presidential election. But there’s little question Turkey’s foreign policy would be more troublesome, if not a mess, had far-right leader Umit Ozdag been named Mr Kilicdaroglu’s foreign minister, as the latter had reportedly promised. But Mr Erdogan won and handed Mr Fidan the plum post. In recent months, the idea that Mr Fidan might succeed his boss has quietly gained ground. He could probably handle the job, his compatriots seem to agree he has performed well as foreign minister, and he is likely to be pivotal in any AKP government. But Mr Fidan is no politician. His lone run for public office, in early 2015, lasted less than a month: he ended his parliamentary campaign after Mr Erdogan made clear he was still needed at MIT. He’s been more outgoing in the past year, however, and continuing on that path might make him another sort of public figure by the next vote in 2028. For now, this could be a big month for Turkey’s place in the world. After last week’s Shanghai Co-operation Organisation summit in Kazakhstan, Mr Erdogan and Mr Fidan are set to arrive in Washington on Tuesday for the first Nato summit since Sweden joined the bloc. Next week, top Turkish and Greek officials plan to gather separately in Cyprus to mark 50 years since the island’s division. Might we expect another controversial assertion about western backers of Israel’s war in Gaza? Or perhaps firmer talk of permanently dividing the island? Turkey’s leader is set to make a big speech to mark the occasion. But it would come as little surprise if the foreign minister also made his presence felt.