A global Nato will push Russia even closer to China

Nato Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg with leaders of Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea in Vilnius, Lithuania earlier in the week. AFP

At the recent Vilnius summit, Nato adopted a military, political and strategic action plan. Practical in its steps, ambitious in its aspirations, and canny in its ability to polarise, the plan is terrifying because it identifies military solutions as the only means to deal with Russia, effectively excluding diplomatic alternatives.

After the summit, it became evident that Nato aims to transform itself into a global alliance – referred to as the “globalisation of Nato” – to ensure its adaptability in the future. This much was confirmed by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who emphasised the importance of deepening partnerships around the world.

Mr Stoltenberg chaired a meeting with allies from Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea, in which he said that “Nato is a regional alliance between Europe and North America, but the challenges we face are global”, in reference to the Russian war in Ukraine and China’s increasing assertiveness.

Nato’s globalisation is a seismic development in the context of balancing international relations, both in the short and long term, and could have far-reaching consequences. One expert closely monitoring Asian-European-American relations described it as the establishment of a Nato-Asia alliance, tasked with confronting both China and Russia.

Japan, which regards China with suspicion, is taking a leading role in Asia. Its strategic partnership with the US, and improvement in its relations with South Korea, have even angered North Korea, which continues to provoke Tokyo by firing missiles towards it.

But the approach taken at recent Nato summits in categorising Russia and China as adversaries risks pushing both countries towards closer alignment, potentially creating significant problems for the alliance’s member states. The two countries’ leaders might meet at the Brics summit in late August to take stock of the Vilnius summit.

That said, Nato’s direct challenge remains countering Russia. The Vilnius summit’s logic dictated that neutrality is not an option, nor is resuming relations with Moscow (or in meeting its conditions regarding Nato membership expansion or potential Ukrainian membership). Kyiv, in fact, received unprecedented security guarantees from the alliance.

The summit’s logic also dictated that sanctions against Russia would continue, military support to Ukraine would increase, and member states would prepare themselves for a potential direct military confrontation with Moscow. With little room for repairing relations with Russia, tensions could spread to Ukraine’s neighbours such as Poland and Belarus.

The Vilnius summit shattered any hopes Moscow might have had to weaken Nato. In fact, the alliance’s cohesion and unity are stronger than ever.

Even worse from the Russian perspective, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy obtained significant commitments in Vilnius, with the result being that Kyiv has moved ever closer to Nato. Further, any prospect of a political solution was diminished after diplomacy was put on the backburner.

The refusal of the alliance’s military leaders to soften their stance against Russia could, in turn, intensify domestic pressure on Moscow to be more assertive.

Former president Dimitry Medvedev, currently serving as the deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council, has frequently spoken about the possibility of nuclear retaliation. Recently, he even stated that a Third World War could be approaching and that the establishment of a so-called “Ukraine-Nato” council could result in the annihilation of one of the parties involved.

Mr Medvedev, it is worth pointing out, continues to hold sway in Russian politics. He enjoys support from various factions within the military establishment as well as a substantial segment of public opinion, according to recent polls, although not a majority.

Russia’s critical nuclear sites and assets are located in likes of Kaliningrad, Crimea and Belarus. However, the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant remains the most dangerous friction point, due to the risk of a “nuclear incident” there, bearing in mind that the plant is situated in Ukraine and which Russia annexed last year. Zaporizhia is the focal point for those who believe that a pre-emptive nuclear war is inevitable.

Meanwhile, Turkey is part of the recent chain of events that has caused consternation in Moscow, not only due to Ankara’s withdrawal of its opposition to Sweden joining Nato, but also because of the implications of Mr Zelenskyy’s recent visit to the Turkish capital to meet President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Turkey’s decision to release the commanders and members of the Azov battalion, which fiercely fought against the Russian forces in Mariupol, will have amounted to a setback for Moscow. It was probably compounded by the fact that Ankara allowed the fighters to return home on the same plane as Mr Zelenskyy. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told Russian news agency RIA that Ankara was supposed to keep the prisoners in the country, according to an agreement forged between Russia, Ukraine and Turkey.

Turkey has also reportedly agreed to establish a Bayraktar drone factory in Ukraine. More importantly, Mr Erdogan has embarked on a strategic shift in Turkey’s relations with the West through both Nato and the EU, where Sweden has pledged to support Ankara’s accession. This is in addition to the F-16 deal with the US, which practically nullifies the Russian-Turkish S-400 deal.

This has put Moscow in an awkward spot. Russia relies heavily on Turkey to facilitate the navigation and transit of its vessels through the Turkish straits, which represent a vital economic lifeline for Moscow in a time of sanctions. But some hardliners in Russia are now demanding that their government reject Ankara’s request to extend the Black Sea grain deal that Mr Erdogan brokered between Russia and Ukraine – and which expires tomorrow. Russia is unlikely to back down from some of the conditions it has placed in exchange for extending the grain deal. This could put a strain on Russian-Turkish relations.

As if it was not enough for Moscow that Kyiv received security guarantees from Nato, the Vilnius summit succeeded in robbing it of its hopes that Ankara would play a more supportive role. But what can Russia do in response? It is likely to threaten retaliation for what it sees as provocative escalations from the alliance, but following through with such a threat is likely to be difficult right now.