Making the best of America's decline in the Middle East

US soldiers patrol an area near Syria's northeastern Semalka border crossing with Iraq's Kurdish autonomous territory, on November 1, 2021. AFP

Since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, a number of journalists, both American and Arab, have asked what the US withdrawal means for the region and for American leadership in the world. They have also wondered aloud which countries may now fill the void left by the US in the scene. These questions probably have been prompted, in no small measure, by the messiness of the withdrawal, the nightmarish and chaotic scenes at the airport, the tragic human stories of those left behind and the speed with which the US-friendly government collapsed as the Taliban’s took the country. That said, in each instance I would caution those who ask these questions to take note of the fact that America’s problems in the Middle East and its environs didn’t begin with the withdrawal. A distinct decline began 20 years earlier, with the reckless, costly and disastrous decisions to invade both Afghanistan and Iraq, followed by the decision to occupy them simultaneously and to attempt to create “democracies” that would support US interests.

These wars were reckless because in both instances the George W Bush administration was advised by experts in the intelligence community and career-level State Department and military officials that these were not wars the US could win or governments Americans could fashion to their liking. In both cases, Mr Bush ignored those who knew Afghanistan and Iraq and listened instead to influential advisers who had become the dominant force in his cabinet. Because these ideologues did not know the culture, makeup or histories of either country, they allowed ideology to trump reality. As a result, these efforts were, from the outset, doomed to failure. Both wars were also costly in lives and treasure for the US, Afghanistan and Iraq. The Afghan and Iraqi losses were incalculable and devastating. And the US lost more than 6,000 troops, with tens of thousands more left physically or psychologically maimed for life. It is also important to note that in each year since the end of active combat in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the US has lost more than 6,000 additional US veterans to suicide — an average of more than 20 per day.

In addition, there are tens of thousands more veterans who’ve joined the ranks of the homeless and those addicted to drugs — in no small part the result of war-induced trauma. The morale of the US military has been affected. These two wars and the medical treatment of veterans has so far cost America more than $3 trillion. This is one key reason why the US military leadership was loath to commit significant ground forces to fight in Syria. And these wars were disastrous because they accomplished none of their goals. Extremism wasn’t defeated. Instead, it has metastasised into more lethal forms and spread to many more countries threatening the security and stability of countries across the Middle East and North Africa, and is taking root in some European countries as well.

Another disastrous byproduct of these wars is the fact that Iran has now become emboldened to meddle into the affairs of others, creating havoc across the region. The prestige of the US has been weakened. And while the goal of these wars’ hawkish architects was to win them decisively, demonstrating American power and resolve and ensuring a century of US hegemony in a unipolar world, instead we now see the emergence of a multipolar world with regional and other global powers playing out their strategic ambitions in country after country across the Middle East. So, whether the US had stayed in Afghanistan or not, a new reality had already taken hold across the Middle East. Other powers are already either replacing Washington or competing with it for influence, and some key regional allies, wearied by American blunders and miscalculations, are pursuing new interests independent of those of the US. As a result, American leverage is more limited than it was. That said, the US cannot be written off as a “has-been” power. It still has influence in the Middle East – economic, military and cultural. It remains the world’s most successful economy, it still has significant deterrent capabilities that can defend allies and its too-often underestimated “soft power” remains its most important asset.

The disastrous nature of the US departure in Afghanistan aside, Washington had no option but to limit its losses there by leaving. And it has little option but to end its active combat role in Iraq. But making these decisions in no way means the US is abandoning the region. It simply means that it now recognises the realities that many in its past leadership tragically ignored. What is needed now is a clearheaded examination of the damage done by both wars and a recalibration of America’s regional posture that realistically matches its needs with its capacities so that the US can best protect its own interests and those of its allies.