It was a very different Barack Obama who spoke at the United Nations Security Council on Wednesday to tell the world of the “generational task” required to dismantle ISIL’s “network of death”. This was the same man who declared 12 months ago that the world was more stable than it was five years ago.
The language was startling. “There can be no reasoning, no negotiation, with this brand of evil,” he said. The former law professor and Nobel peace prize laureate seemed to be borrowing the apocalyptic tone of his predecessor, George W Bush, whose legacy of war he had promised to undo.
But he was careful not to appear as Mr Bush reborn. He did not talk of war. He said America would never be an occupying power and repeated that his foreign policy would not be based on reacting to terrorism. Unlike Mr Bush, he has assembled a coalition of Arab countries to work together to achieve his goal of “degrading and ultimately destroying” ISIL.
So the judicious Obama can still be discerned beneath the recruiting sergeant. In terms of regional politics, this military action starts from a more solid foundation. But the truth is that America has been bombing Iraq on and off for 25 years. That’s already one generation gone. The question has to be asked, how is his plan going to work any better?
The consensus among military experts is that air power will never be enough on its own to destroy ISIL. The group has been subject to some 200 air strikes already, but it is still fighting on three fronts – against the Iraqi army and its allies, against the regime of Bashar Al Assad in Syria and against other rebel factions in Syria, particularly the Kurds. Last week ISIL overran an Iraqi military base in Anbar province.
Despite this, it is not unthinkable that the new Iraqi government could regain control of the one-third of its territory overrun by the jihadists. ISIL rule in Iraq could collapse due to their brutality and ideological obtuseness, as happened to the old Al Qaeda franchise which was driven out by the tribes of Anbar Province.
But before this can happen the two million Sunni Arabs who live under ISIL rule need to feel that they would fare better under the Iraqi government than under the jihadists. This is not the case yet. It is up to the new prime minister, Haider Al Abadi, to prove that he has put aside the divisive, sectarian policies followed by his predecessor, Nouri Al Maliki.
So the solution in Iraq has to be political. For the moment the Sunni Arabs of Iraq, a minority that dominated the country for decades before the 2003 US invasion, have yet to find their place in the Shia-led political set-up. That needs to change.
Even with dramatic political opening in Baghdad towards the Sunnis, it will be hard to crush ISIL as long as the jihadists have a safe haven across the border in eastern Syria, where they have their headquarters. Insurgent groups that enjoy strategic depth are always more successful than those that are bottled up, as the Palestinians are. So the fate of Iraq is inevitably tied to Syria.
Whereas the US-led coalition has been invited in by the Baghdad government, no such arrangement exists in Syria. Much as President Al Assad wants to be seen as a partner in the fight against terrorism, none of the coalition members wants to go into battle for him.
The big question is: what are the long term-goals of Mr Obama and his successor? We can be reasonably sure about Iraq. As for Syria, the picture is opaque. Clearly, Washington does not want either the Syrian regime or ISIL to win. The proposed solution is training up the disparate non-Islamist forces of the Free Syrian Army into a real fighting force. But who is to say that their weapons would not fall into the hands of ISIL, as happened with the US-supplied Iraqi army? And who is to judge the acceptable level of Islamist ideology?
American pundits are speculating that Washington may follow the policy of containment that prevailed during the Cold War to stop the spread of ISIL; or that Washington may adopt the old British attitude to European conflicts: intervene to help the weaker side if the balance of power is threatened.
These thought experiments are best left to the academics. What emerges is that no one can think of a plan for a speedy resolution of the Syrian war, but only one for long-term management. Those Syrians wanting relief from their government’s poison gas attacks and barrel bombs will feel sorely let down. Air strikes are blunt instruments, inevitably leading to civilian casualties that can be used as propaganda by ISIL.
The anti-ISIL coalition must adjust to the fact that this is an intervention whose final outcome is still unclear.
Simon Jenkins, a former editor of The Times newspaper and prominent sceptic of the use of air power, says it is a recipe for “mission creep on autopilot”. Inevitably there will be a need for ground forces, he says. More thought should have been given to the fact that ISIL has been taunting the Americans to join the fight, which will elevate their grubby kidnappings and squabbles with rival rebel groups into an ideological battle with the US.
But scepticism should also be applied to well-ordered military plans with a clear goal. Mr Bush had a clear plan in 2003 – invade Iraq, remove Saddam Hussein and Iraq will become the Switzerland of the Middle East. That did not work.
In the long term a political plan for Iraq may prove more decisive than the air strikes, which are the starting point for turning the ISIL tide. And while Washington is fully engaged at the moment, this is not a bankable credit. American public opinion will not want a real war in the Middle East. In the end, it may be up to the regional powers to sort out this mess.
Alan Philps is a commentator on global affairs
On Twitter: @aphilps