How Israel's opposition sees the Gaza war ending and the future of the Middle East

More than a year since the beginning of the October 7 War, Israel’s security forces have had a series of impressive operational successes. But military successes should not be confused with victory. There is no victory without a diplomatic element. Israel can and should initiate a new regional order. What does a diplomatic initiative look like? What would be a strategic victory for Israel? The elements of victory will be the return of the hostages to their families; building a civilian government in Gaza in place of Hamas; removing Hezbollah from the northern border and returning the residents to their homes with a sense of trust and security; building a regional coalition against Iran and stopping the Iranian nuclear programme; the rehabilitation of communities in the north and south; and strengthening Israel’s military. The time for a diplomatic initiative is now. The election of Donald Trump in the US is an opportunity for Israel. His is an administration that is not afraid of bold initiatives, and that is exactly what we need: to work with them from day one on changing the face of the Middle East. In an unusual moment, there is a single organising principle that deals with all the arenas in which Israel is involved. This organising principle is a so-called "normalisation agreement" with Saudi Arabia. This is a misleading name because it is much bigger than one agreement with one country. It's the construction of an entire regional coalition. Alongside Saudi Arabia, the UAE – the leading player in the Abraham Accords – must be a central player in any future coalition. With proper management, it will be possible to add other countries to the agreements as well. This coalition would be the administrative basis of an alternative government in Gaza. It would assist with the rebuilding of the Lebanese Army so that the latter could stand between Israel and Hezbollah. It would be a military and economic alliance that deals with the series of threats that Iran poses, from its nuclear programme to the activity of Iranian proxies from Yemen to Iraq. This diplomatic process must start with a comprehensive hostage agreement in Gaza, which would include a ceasefire for a six-month "transitional period" in Gaza and a permanent arrangement in Lebanon. Israel would announce that it has no intention of settling Gaza or staying for years in southern Lebanon, but that it reserves the right to defend itself by force beyond its border. During this transitional period, an international force would be stationed in Gaza that could include the UAE, Egypt, Morocco and a civilian arm of the Palestinian Authority. This force would deal with the distribution of aid and the reconstruction of Gaza. Within a month at most, a regional conference will be convened in Riyadh, in which Israel, the US, Saudi Arabia, the countries of the Abraham Accords, the Lebanese government and the Palestinian Authority would participate. The conference would lead to an agreement with five main components. The first is an arrangement in Lebanon. Hezbollah would withdraw to a range of 9-10km from the Israeli border, and units of the Lebanese army would enter in its place. As the first step, this could consist of Lebanese army units that are currently stationed on the Syrian border (there is a force of 34,000 soldiers trained by the British), backed by American and French forces. In the next step, an army unit would be built specifically for southern Lebanon. It would be part of the Lebanese Army, but its soldiers and officers would receive higher salaries than is customary in the Lebanese army today – $500 a month for a soldier, $1,000 for an officer – and they will be trained by British and French forces, who will remain with them in the area for a period of 24 months. The construction of this military force would also be the first step in restoring governance to Lebanon and halting Hezbollah's takeover of the country. The second component is an arrangement in Gaza. An administrative body would be established for the reconstruction of Gaza, the restoration of governance and the return of residents to their homes. This body would be headed by a delegation that includes Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the countries of the Abraham Accords, the US, the EU and a symbolic civilian arm of the Palestinian Authority that would only deal with civilian matters. A "Chinese Wall" would be placed between this arm of the PA and Ramallah, and the PA would not have access to the bank accounts of this reconstruction administration or the ability to influence the appointments of senior officials. The third component concerns Iran. The regional coalition would work together to halt the progress of the Iranian nuclear programme by diplomatic or military means, and to stop Iran's attempts to achieve hegemony in the Middle East through proxy forces. The coalition would co-operate against the Houthis in Yemen as well as pro-Iranian militias in Syria and Iraq. The fourth component concerns normalisation. The conference would discuss the deepening of economic and diplomatic ties between the Abraham Accords countries as well as Saudi Arabia. It would do so according to the model we already built at the Negev Summit: professional committees on issues like water technology, food security and transportation that would spearhead investments and joint development. Finally, the conference would publish a statement according to which all parties will work to create the conditions for a future separation between Israelis and the Palestinians, according to the two-state principle, subject to a significant reform of the Palestinian Authority and the preservation of Israel's security interests. Israel would commit not to annex the West Bank. The Palestinians would commit to fighting terrorism and incitement, and to a deep change in their education system. This arrangement, in several versions not very different from one another, appears to be acceptable to all the relevant players. There have been discussions about it both with the countries of the region – including Saudi Arabia – and with the US. I was involved in some of them. There is consensus that an arrangement like this is not only possible, but also offers unprecedented strategic advantages to Israel. The only reason it is not happening is that the current Israeli government is not ready to accept that the PA will be part of any agreement. The problem is that, without this, no one will come. Not Saudi Arabia. Not Arab states that have relations with Israel. Not even the incoming Trump administration. It is worth remembering that Israel's current government is still collaborating closely with the PA today. Both sides have an interest in trying to hide it but there is security and administrative co-operation between them. Opposition to the PA's involvement in the Saudi normalisation process stems mainly from domestic political considerations. This is an enormous mistake. Israel is denying itself a strategic victory that would benefit its security and its economy and improve its international standing. A new Israeli government, together with the Trump administration and its partners in the Abraham Accords and Negev Forum, needs to set out on a new path which brings with it the promise of peace and prosperity to the region and offers a clear alternative to extremism and fundamentalism.