Those fearful of a US-China war are overlooking a multipolar Asia-Pacific

Russia's Pacific Fleet warships and submarines sail in the Peter the Great Gulf of the Sea of Japan during this month. AFP

Singaporean Prime Minister Lawrence Wong has warned of “dark clouds over the horizon” as today’s era, he said, was “marked by the growing contest for dominance and leadership” between the US and China.

“Restrictions have already been imposed on key technologies like artificial intelligence and semiconductors. What is worrying is that security concerns are spilling over to more and more areas,” Mr Wong said on Monday.

That same day Japanese Defence Minister Minoru Kihara accused a Russian reconnaissance plane of an “air space violation” and said that his country’s air force had used flares to warn the Russian craft to leave. Just last morning, I read a report claiming that the US air force was “prepping for a nuclear showdown over Taiwan”.

Mr Wong wasn’t wrong. When it comes to the Asia-Pacific region, it often seems as though there is no shortage of storms and squalls with the potential to set off confrontations.

But a new survey, the 2024 Asia Power Index, shows a more complex – and possibly more optimistic – picture, than the “destined for war” scenario that some hawkish analysts often paint. Published by the Lowy Institute, a well-known Australian think tank, its key conclusions are that China’s power is plateauing, although Beijing is eroding America’s military lead in the region; it remains a “dominant economic partner” to countries in the region; and it retains a lead position in terms of diplomatic influence.

America’s resilience and dynamism in Asia has “confounded the pessimists”, it claims. India has risen to third place in its power rankings, overtaking Japan, which has nevertheless increased its defence and security co-operation. South-East Asian powers are on the rise, according to the report, which notes that according to its criteria Indonesia’s power “has grown more than any other index country since 2018”. Australia is said to be holding its own, and Russia, it claims, has been distracted by the war in Ukraine.

The result? A mixture of “bipolarity” (between the US and China) and what it calls “asymmetric multipolarity”.

The Lowy Institute cannot claim to be completely impartial and disinterested. Its researchers’ belief in the necessity of America’s presence in the Asia-Pacific may not be matched by all in the 27 countries (bounded on the west by the Indian subcontinent) they survey.

The institute does not go as far as John Mearsheimer, the renowned American political scientist, who although being from the “realist” school of international relations, reiterated his insistence in a recent edition of the All-In Podcast that the US could not possibly accept China becoming a hegemon in Asia, despite the fact that America has long assumed that role in the Western Hemisphere. But it doesn’t have to, or not explicitly – because what the Asia Power Index points to is indeed a growing multipolarity in the region.

The Chinese leadership has said time and again that the country does not seek to dominate either the region or globally. This is an assertion that deserves to be taken more seriously in the West, where those who accuse it of doing just that must also face the reality that the Asia-Pacific is not, in any case, a region with one giant and an array of minnows.

Neither India, with a population of nearly 1.5 billion, nor Indonesia, with close to 300 million, could possibly be labelled as such. Both countries will vigorously defend their own interests, and if you include the Association of South-East Asian Nations as a whole – which represents close to 700 million people – it is clear that the region contains a number of substantial actors.

Moreover, as the report’s authors concede, non-aligned countries “are still the majority in Asia”. Despite India’s membership of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, with the US and its treaty allies Japan and Australia, the index still characterises the country’s stance as one of non-alignment. Its authors appear to be disappointed by that. I believe it is a strength.

I think the issue that the Asia Power Index’s authors struggle with is the same that afflicts Prof Mearsheimer: they are spending too much time looking at the region through a security lens, and a western security lens at that. This encourages a zero-sum approach when one is not necessary.

As Jeffrey Sachs, the equally renowned American academic who was in conversation with Prof Mearsheimer in the podcast, has said: “This is the American mistake, because some Americans think that if China is rising, the US must be losing. This is false. Economics is a win-win co-operative game.”

One of the index’s authors, Herve Lemahieu, wrote in an explainer that “the balance between the United States and China creates a big disincentive for competition to spill over into outright war. China has no shortage of flash points in the region, notably over Taiwan and the South China Sea. What is surprising, however, is that they have not yet turned into more deadly conflicts”.

Again, he seems to be missing the positive news in his own report. If the Asia-Pacific is now a region of multipolarity, however “asymmetric” – which according to Mr Lemahieu “allows most countries to swim between the world’s superpowers without fully committing to either” – then it is extremely relevant that the vast majority of them do not want war and are opposed to seeing their region or any part of it as a prize in a zero-sum game.

The Lowy Institute and its researchers seem to have drawn different conclusions. To me, however, its Asia Power Index – showing, as it does, rising non-aligned middle powers and a growing multipolarity – is a rare ray of sunshine. And with all those dark clouds on the horizon, that is most welcome.