What Germany's expulsion of an Iranian cleric says about Europe countering extremism

A police officer outside the Islamic Centre Hamburg on July 24. AP

Last week marked a significant victory for Germany in its new efforts to counter Iranian political activities in the country.

Mohammad Hadi Mofatteh, a 57-year-old cleric from the Iranian city of Qom – and one of Tehran's most important figures in Germany – will be deported after September 11, if by then he doesn't leave of his own volition.

Having operated in plain sight for years, Mr Mofatteh has been head of Hamburg's Islamic Centre since 2018 and has reported links with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. In July, Germany banned the centre for spreading “extremist propaganda”.

Hamburg's Islamic Centre was said to be a focal point for Iranian activities in Germany. Since 2017, the country's domestic intelligence agencies had been warning that the centre reportedly served as a platform for propaganda, recruitment and intelligence gathering.

This is not unusual. From Maida Vale in London to Vienna and many other major cities the Iranian government has used its network of religious centres in Europe to undermine western democracies and to support extremist groups.

Before the Hamburg institution was ordered by the German Ministry of Interior to shut, it was under surveillance for more than 30 years, suspected of being a base for Hezbollah (that Germany banned in 2020), and exerting undue influence over some local Muslim communities.

Mr Mofatteh has been described as particularly effective in his work for Iran. And the centre was perhaps the most pre-eminent organisational node in Iran’s European intelligence and political activity.

After years of monitoring, but not acting, Germany decided to look at what goes on in the centre – one of the largest such in Germany and recognisable by its spectacular blue dome – eventually deciding to push back against the people there. Mr Mofatteh had been a pivotal figure since his arrival in Hamburg six years ago. Though perhaps few would have seen him on the street.

When German police raided the centre last November, they did so on the basis that they could no longer postpone action. A total of 55 properties owned by the Hamburg Centre were raided by the German authorities. The properties were scattered across seven federal states and files and computer systems were seized, boosting the investigation to this point.

In its published annual report on “efforts to protect Germany’s constitutional order”, the country’s domestic intelligence agency singled out Mr Mofatteh’s linchpin role for Iran’s supreme leader since 2022.

“The [Hamburg Centre] was under direct control of the office of the Iranian revolutionary leader Ali Khamenei – thus of the Iranian regime – and was controlled from there,” it said, adding the centre was viewed as the “spiritual home” of all Shiite Muslims in Germany and as a “significant reference organisation” globally.

When a ban was first mooted, Tehran organised a community-wide public backlash against German authorities. Surveillance by the domestic intelligence agency is a longstanding constitutional safeguard in Germany. The first priority of these reports is almost always the fear of a far-right resurgence in Germany. Another strand is the effort to ensure the five to six million Muslims who live in Germany are not subject to undue pressure from either homeland governments or from countries that seek to control an entire religious segment.

What we learn about the damaging effect of Iranian figures such as Mr Mofatteh is the scope of foreign-based influence in Germany. This includes espionage and intelligence gathering, especially across the network of religious centres. The impact in terms of destabilisation stems from both nurturing hardline groups and fomenting sectarian discord among Muslim communities.

Let us not forget the Iranian government has used its influence in Germany to silence critics and persecute Iranian dissidents living in the country. As far back as 1987, an Iranian dissident was murdered in Hamburg. In 1992, the Iranian government was able to use people in Germany to assassinate Iranian dissidents. It followed three men, for example, in Berlin, and shot them dead in the Mykonos restaurant.

Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security was caught out in 2018 when Assadollah Assadi, a Vienna-based diplomat was arrested on the German autobahn while orchestrating a plot to use a bomb to blow up a Paris rally by using a couple, a husband and wife based in Antwerp. Held in a Belgian prison on a 20-year sentence, he was freed last year in return for Belgian aid worker Olivier Vandecasteele in a deal arranged by Oman.

There are relatively frequent trials in Germany for running safe houses and underground activity. In April, Germany warned its citizens to leave Iran because of the threat of retaliation for prosecutions in its own courts.

The intelligence reports offer the layman an unprecedented insight to Iran’s nuclear proliferation.

Tehran's nuclear programme poses a serious threat to international security. Iran has used its influence in Europe to try to evade sanctions and to obtain nuclear technology. So it is long overdue that Mr Mofatteh as its head should be sent back to his native Qom. For the German authorities, the big question remains: is this just a blip or a real turning point?