Bush called off Fallujah offensive after ‘dose of reality’ backlash

Newly released papers from the UK's National Archive show then President George W Bush was egged on by a gung ho commander in Iraq

US Marines burn their fortifications on front line positions in Fallujah, Iraq, in 2004. AP

The US siege of the Iraqi city of Fallujah in 2004 was called off after then President George W Bush faced a “dose of reality” from officials, newly released official British minutes reveal.

A year after the US invasion of Iraq toppled Saddam Hussein's Baghdad regime, US troops were engaged in a bloody battle against Sunni Muslim loyalists and insurgents in Fallujah after four US military contractors had been ambushed and killed.

Egged on by his generals, Mr Bush wanted to allow troops to occupy the entire city. US commander in Iraq John Abizaid had claimed to Mr Bush that he could dismantle the estimated 1,000 insurgents in Fallujah “in two or three days”, if he was allowed to use using “precision attacks” followed by marines conducting house-to-house searches and the imposition of martial law.

US troops had already taken over a third of the city, and detained hundreds of Iraqi and foreign suspected insurgents. Politicians on the Iraqi governing council (IGC), which had been set up by the coalition following the fall of Saddam, had disapproved of the tactics.

But Abizaid’s plan was dismissed as nonsense and “politically crass” by US official Richard Armitage, the former deputy secretary of state, in a conversation he had with the UK’s ambassador to Iraq at the time, Sir David Manning, on April 14, 2004.

Rather, the escalation could have damaged the UN-led political process of appointing an Iraqi transitional government, officials told Bush, who then had a change of heart.

UN’s envoy to Iraq, Lakhdar Brahimi, had been tasked with appointing the new government to run the country after the Coalition Provisional Authority handed over power in June that year.

Mr Bush was warned by Paul Bremer, the leader of the coalition provisional authority, that such a course of action would lead to the collapse of the IGC, damaging hope of establishing an independent Iraqi administration.

“Faced with this ‘dose of reality’, Bush backed off,” Sir David reported.

Records of the conversation were released to the National Archives in London on Monday. They show that Mr Armitage appealed to former prime minister Tony Blair to persuade Mr Bush of the need for a “political process” to restore order in Iraq, and to underline the importance of Mr Brahimi and the UN.

Mr Armitage was scathing about the commander Gen Abizaid and his claim that around 1,000 insurgents were operating in the city. “Rich said Abizaid … could not possibly know how many insurgents were in Fallujah nor how to find them,” Sir David wrote. “Ideas for precision targeting and marine occupation were politically crass.”

Overall, Sir David said Mr Armitage believed the US was “gradually losing on the battlefield” and that it was “inevitable” the administration would have to send more troops which would be “politically ugly” for Mr Bush.

Mr Bush had come to accept that Mr Brahimi now offered the only “exit-strategy” for the US, despite being subject to “constant argument” from vice-president Dick Cheney that they were “contributing to the problems”, according to Mr Manning’s note.

“Rich said it followed that he hoped the prime minister would urge Bush to deal with Fallujah as part of a carefully judged political process, and that he would also underline the critical importance for all of us of Brahimi and the UN,” Sir David noted.

Two weeks after their meeting, the US, under pressure from the IGC, finally called off the offensive in Fallujah.

The US lost 27 troops, while around 200 insurgents and some 600 Iraqi civilians were thought to have been killed.

Coalition forces took the city in a second offensive launched in November 2004. American troops remained in Iraq until 2011.

After their burnt and mutilated bodies were displayed hanging from a bridge over the Euphrates river, the US launched Operation Vigilant Resolve to regain control.

After four private military contractors were ambushed and killed by the insurgents, US troops took over a third of the city within a week, detaining 200 Iraqis and 100 foreigners.

Within one week US troops had taken around one third of the city, but their tactics caused dismay among politicians on the Iraqi governing council (IGC), which had been set up by the coalition following the fall of Saddam.

Heathrow security operation

The new files released by the National Archives show then Home Secretary David Blunkett defending troop deployment to Heathrow Airport in February 2003 at a cabinet meeting, which critics claimed had been a stunt to garner support for the Iraq war.

Several units of soldiers in tanklike armoured cars were stationed outside the airport, in response to a terror threat.

Mr Blunkett told the Cabinet that while the deployment had been agreed with the security services and the military, they had not been expecting such a high-profile show of force.

“The armed forces had not been expected to use their military hardware quite so visibly and this had, perhaps, led to the threat seeming more dramatic than was in reality the case,” he said, according to the minutes of the meeting.

He said the action had been authorised in response to a “specific terrorist threat” identified by the security services, but did not go into detail.

“The security services were continuing to work on assessing the threat but were having to strike a difficult balance between intervention and surveillance,” he added.

In discussion, ministers dismissed claims the deployment operation was “merely a tactic” to build support for the impending invasion of Iraq by British and US forces as “absurd but not surprising”.

But with the threat of Islamist terrorism on the rise after the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York in 2001, they acknowledged lessons needed to be learnt so as not to create unnecessary public alarm in the face of future incidents.

“Unfortunately, greater threats were likely from time to time for the foreseeable future and the government and the public would have to learn not to overact to them,” the minutes noted.