What next for Iraq's anti-ISIS coalition after 10 years of operations?

US announced formation of international force to defeat terrorist group a decade ago

Iraqi Special Forces participate in a military operation against ISIS militants in the desert of Anbar, Iraq, in April 2022. Reuters

Operation Inherent Resolve, the global coalition against ISIS, turns 10 today, amid a transition to end its mission next year. What started as a promised US “limited” operation as the terror group surged across northern Iraq in the summer of 2014 soon expanded to a 77-nation coalition.

The operation seldom exceeded 5,000 US and foreign soldiers deploying to the country to train – and in many cases retrain – the Iraqi army, which had partially collapsed during the fall of Mosul, but eventually French, British and US special forces fought alongside Iraqis in major battles.

The coalition now winding down, leaving the question of what comes next. The US is currently the biggest funder and logistical facilitator of the mission. There have been continuing talks between Washington and Baghdad, since April, to secure a bilateral security arrangement, widely expected to involve the departure of all US forces, except a contingent in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, or at most, an extremely constrained role for a small number of US forces.

The fall of ISIS?

The drop in intensity of operations has been years in the making, following ISIS’s bloody last stand in Mosul in summer 2017 – a battle in which about 10,000 civilians were killed.

The coalition logged 13,331 air strikes against the group, peaking that year. Nearly $15 billion had been spent on the “kinetic” side of the operation – on weapons and operations. ISIS has been in steady decline since, although it has surged lately in parts of eastern Syria.

OIR’s relatively low cost compared to the $1 trillion 2003-2011 Second Gulf War, and few coalition deaths, are reasons why the UK’s then-defence secretary Sir Michael Fallon last week said the operation could be “chalked up as a success".

This year, the US effort to support Iraqi forces will cost $242 million, not including possible US air strikes against ISIS – now a rarity – and the cost of keeping US forces on the ground.

Today, there’s evidence that, at least in military terms, success endures. According to Joel Wing, a California-based Iraq expert who painstakingly tracks attack levels, ISIS manages a few dozen attacks per month, mostly using automatic weapons. Sometimes it is successful with roadside bombs or attacks in remote areas – killing four Iraqi soldiers earlier this month, for example.

At other times, the group is mercilessly hunted in remote desert locations, as occurred in the desert near Fallujah on August 29, when 14 ISIS fighters were killed, including several commanders, in a joint Iraqi-US operation in which seven US troops were wounded.

It was a rare large operation. Mr Wing told The National it was likely “a political move since there hadn't been anything like it for so long,” to demonstrate the utility of having some US forces remain after OIR ends.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohamed Shia Al Sudani’s government is divided over the extent of future US military support, but political momentum overwhelmingly favours withdrawal, including among his key backers. Momentum to expel the US was stepped up in 2020 when the US assassinated Iranian Maj Gen Qassem Suleimani and de facto head of the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces militia, Abu Mahdi Al Muhandis.

The militia umbrella group is now the main challenger to the US. Both sides have exchanged several rounds of attacks and counter air strikes this year, intensifying amid the Gaza war.

This leaves the coalition in a netherworld: few ISIS attacks to justify its presence and the risk of becoming embroiled in a major confrontation with Iran-backed groups.

The terror army

During its rise in late 2013, ISIS mounted dozens of car bombings – much harder to plan than gun attacks – per day. At its peak, the group burnt out with nearly 500 suicide car bomb attacks during the battle of Mosul, among thousands of other self-detonations.

In 2014, according to the NGO Iraq Body Count, there were more than 20,000 deaths from violence, many of them victims of the ISIS rampage. Last year, that number was 537, including deaths unrelated to ISIS, such as to tribal violence.

The dwindling in numbers of casualties comes despite painfully slow reconstruction of ruined cities, particularly Mosul – efforts challenged by corruption, political paralysis and the rise of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), which has attacked coalition forces and killed civilian protesters.

Political dysfunction, corruption and insecurity could lead to a return of old problems in the Iraqi security forces, warns David Witty, who worked closely with elite Iraqi Counter Terrorism Services.

“The Iraqis and US said after the end of the International Coalition, the security mission will transform into a bilateral US-Iraq relationship. I think the Iraqi government has to walk a careful line between how much US support it will accept versus balancing against the resistance militias and the Co-ordination Framework,” he says, referring to Iran-backed militias within the PMF, which attack US forces and targets in Israel.

The Co-ordination Framework is the most powerful political bloc in the Iraqi Parliament and comprises influential Iran-backed politicians, who could decide the fate of Mr Al Sudani.

Mr Witty is a leading authority on what is widely regarded as the most effective, non-partisan Iraqi Security Force unit, the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS). He was a senior adviser to the CTS during the rise of ISIS and counter offensives against the terrorists, when the service spearheaded most major battles in the war.

“CTS’s ability will degrade quickly if there is no continuous US presence. It deteriorated very quickly the first time we left. So, over time, the US may have no partner unit in Iraq, unless something is worked out with the bilateral relationship,” he says.

Mr Witty says if the rare joint operation in August near Fallujah was for political optics, it probably won’t influence those who want the US to go.

“The Iraqi government doesn’t highlight these kinds of raids. Their message is they can counter ISIS threats without US help. But in reality, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and CTS know they need US help, but the militias’ influence is strong.

"The militia's red line seems to be an open, large US presence. There is, however, a point for the US on the ground periodically for counterterrorism ops with units like CTS.”

He says the current coalition advisory effort is potentially too minimal to have lasting effect. In the past, US Special Forces were co-located with CTS, essentially training on the job. Now OIR advises “at the ministry level”, meeting commanders and ministry staff for training at a site in Baghdad called Union III. This approach, through OIR’s Military Advisory Group, lacks an in-depth view on the ground and according to US government reports, lacks co-ordination with the Iraqi MoD.

It has identified old problems in the Iraqi army that contributed to its partial collapse in the face of ISIS. The last official report on OIR, released in August, highlighted that “planning efforts lack structure and do not fully integrate warfighting functions”.

Lack of integration was a key problem during the rise of ISIS, when the Iraqis possessed attack helicopters, powerful M1A1 tanks and artillery, but were unable to co-ordinate effectively, allowing their smaller adversary to outmanoeuvre them.

If OIR ends before a US-Iraqi bilateral security arrangement, Nato will have an ongoing small advisory mission, also at the ministry level, called Nato Mission Iraq.

“NMI advises Iraqi defence and security officials in the Ministry of Defence, the Office of the National Security Adviser, the Prime Minister’s National Operations Centre and the Federal Police Directorate in the Ministry of Interior,” Danish Lt Col Jan Komen told The National. "The mission also supports Iraq’s military education institutions by means of, among other things, curriculum development, faculty development and train-the-trainer programmes

“The Iraqi ministries of defence and interior have agreed with NMI on 32 long-term objectives to create stronger and more reliable armed forces. These include defence planning, human resource management, cyber defence, logistics, building integrity, crisis management, training of non-commissioned officers, women’s empowerment, intelligence, international law and human rights and financial resource management,” he says.

The last part – financial resource management – is seen as critical after reports during the rise of ISIS that Iraq’s MoD had employed tens of thousands of “ghost soldiers”, who did not work but whose salaries were pocketed by commanders, eroding unit strength and draining resources.