Small drones pose hard challenge for Hezbollah and Israeli troops in ground war

Analysts say quadcopter drones fitted with explosives or used for reconnaissance will pose major test for both sides

Israeli soldiers evacuate injured people by helicopter after an anti-tank missile was fired into Israel from Lebanon. Reuters

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With Israeli forces claiming to have launched an invasion of southern Lebanon – though that has been denied by Hezbollah – analysts are wondering how a new war could pan out amid rapid changes in modern warfare.

Many weapons have not been used extensively by either side and could alter the course of fighting. Quadcopter drones, including first person view (FPV) drones used by both sides, can travel extremely fast and have proved deadly against enemy tanks in the Ukraine war, in some cases flying at claimed speeds of 200mph and sometimes chasing soldiers inside bunkers.

In August, a Ukrainian FPV may have even downed a Russian Mi-28 attack helicopter mid-flight. In south Lebanon’s valleys, Israeli helicopters slowing to land or extract troops, including casualties, could be vulnerable to this new threat unless they can electronically jam their signals.

Used in their thousands, alongside drones that drop grenades, these weapons have stopped tank attacks in Ukraine and are fitted with purpose-built warheads, ensuring soldiers have little respite from the hard-to-spot machines. Hezbollah is one of the pioneers in the use of these quadcopters, deploying them against rebels during Syria’s civil war, for attack and reconnaissance.

But it’s not clear to what extent Israel and Hezbollah have embraced the “drone revolution”, which has seen Russia and Ukraine build hundreds of thousands, even millions of them. Ukraine has seen a rapid evolution of small drones, from being fitted with anti-tank grenades to being modified to carry modern anti-tank missiles, custom-made bombs or even thermite which burns at 2,500 celsius to burn troops out of forest positions.

Adopting drone warfare

Ukrainian drone units are said to use hundreds of explosive quadcopters per month. By contrast Israeli forces in Gaza, such as the 55th paratroop brigade, which could currently be fighting in Lebanon, quickly acquired about 100 small drones for reconnaissance for fighting in the enclave. Such drones can check the entrances of tunnels used by Hamas and Hezbollah.

But experts say modern armies, including Israel, are still learning how best to use small "tactical" drones. Even with these eyes in the sky, it will be hard for Israeli forces to concentrate armoured vehicles, which would maximise numerical superiority, but increase their visibility in big convoys. Modern battlefields, experts say, are “transparent."

“You would see drones used a lot for reconnaissance, because they would need as much advance warning of Israeli positions and their routes as possible, so that they could set up ambush teams, so that they could field mortars and artillery to support them, or so that they could potentially move high-risk assets out of the way,” says Sam Cranny-Evans, an independent defence consultant and an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, a think tank.

An illustration of just how hard they are to defend against came in June, when Hezbollah released footage of an FPV drone flying into an anti-drone system on an Israeli base, known as Drone Dome. The system advertises the ability to detect small drones to over 3km, suggesting a possible failure by its operators.

Hezbollah has used a TV-guided missile with a similar capability, the Almas, for attacking Israeli border positions, but the drones could offer a much cheaper alternative.

“Drones may be used in the FPV role, especially as they can separate the crew from the target and improve survivability. However, Israeli formations will not be working in isolated packets in wide open spaces all of the time, so we should not expect the results to be the same as in Ukraine,” Mr Cranny-Evans says.

Israel may be wary of big tank operations, but has also invested heavily in countering small drones, which were used against its forces at the start of the Gaza war, dropping grenades on unsuspecting troops – until more effective jamming devices (electronic warfare) was deployed.

“Electronic warfare will play a big role, and Hezbollah forces are likely to be under a lot of pressure if they engage. They will likely be able to operate behind Israeli lines in some areas, but the stakes for those fighters will always be high,” Mr Cranny-Evans says.

To illustrate initial Israeli fears of drones, in mid-October last year Israeli tanks were pictured before the Gaza ground invasion fitted with cages, intended to detonate explosive drones before an explosive charge can fire a “penetrator” into the tank – normally hitting thin turret armour at the rear.

Planning for war

A year later, Israel is far more prepared for a confrontation with Hezbollah, says Danny Citrinowicz, a defence analyst who held a senior role in Israel’s military intelligence in the aftermath of the 2006 war.

“Israel really invested in developing its understanding regarding the organisation, from the capabilities standpoint but also from the command and control and the senior leadership, and that’s really coming into effect in the last two weeks,” says Mr Citrinowicz, also a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies.

“Hezbollah is a very different organisation than it was two weeks ago but it retains major capabilities. The body is there, but the head is gone,” he says, speaking of the September 27 killing of leader Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut.

This could complicate their military operations, from organising defences to deployment of drones. But the small quadcopters aren’t the only weapon that could shape how battle unfolds.

Tank cages only offer limited protection against the feared Kornet anti-tank missiles used by both Hamas and Hezbollah. From Syria to Ukraine, they’ve knocked out some of the world’s most heavily armoured tanks.

“Hezbollah has a good array of guided anti-tank missiles, which are very effective and would be more likely to achieve target defeat if they get past Trophy. And against helicopters of course,” Mr Cranny-Evans says.

The Trophy active protection system comprises an array of sensors that detect missiles and destroy them with a cone of shrapnel, but this hasn’t stopped Israel losing a number of Merkava tanks and heavily armoured Namer personnel carriers in Gaza.

It’s not clear whether the Trophy can defend against explosive quadcopter drones, but according to analysis by RUSI, software that operates its sensors can be tweaked, suggesting it could be used against small quadcopters. Israeli armoured units also use Elbit’s Iron Fist active protection system, similar to Trophy, which uses highly sensitive AESA radars, reportedly providing all-round protection.

Helicopter attacks

If Israel wants to avoid concentrations of tanks and armoured personnel carriers, watched from all sides as they pass through narrow valleys, soldiers could ride into battle by helicopter. This raises the threat of portable anti-aircraft missile systems, or MANPADS, which can be effective against low-flying aircraft, and have shot down several large, fixed wing Israeli drones.

Israeli Apache helicopters responding to the October 7 Hamas attack had to evade volleys of MANPADS, and carry electronic defensive measures that alert pilots to an attack and can jam missiles or deploy decoys.

If Israeli forces manage to advance while jamming drones and surviving anti-tank missiles, they will face an old foe: the explosively formed penetrator roadside bomb (EFP).

Developed by Iranian engineers and Hezbollah, the bomb was extensively used against armoured vehicles in Iraq, killing nearly 200 American and British soldiers, and has also been effective against Israeli armour in Lebanon and Gaza. The bombs blast a thick piece of copper into a “shaped” penetrator which flies at the target at over 1km per second.

Israel could use jamming devices to block signals detonating the bombs, but they could also be detonated by operators using wire, rather than signals. Iranian advisers are thought to have helped Yemen’s Houthis disguise the devices as roadside rocks.

“Nobody knows what will happen in the next couple of days, we’re entering uncharted territory,” Mr Citrinowicz says. “This campaign, based on what the US administration is saying, it's supposed to be very contained. But you know where you're starting, you just don't know where you're finishing. I hope it will be contained and will push the sides for a ceasefire.”