Hack or sabotage? Theories swirl over audacious pager attack on Hezbollah

Experts say the group suffered serious damage to its communications network but retains significant combat power

An explosion in a man's bag at a supermarket in Beirut, Lebanon. This was one of many incidents where pagers blew up on Tuesday September 17, maiming and killing users. Reuters

Ambulances are surrounded by people at the entrance of the American University of Beirut Medical Centre as casualties of the wave of explosions are brought in. AFP

A stretcher bearing an injured person is taken to American University of Beirut Medical Centre. Reuters

A man donates blood in the southern Lebanese city of Saida after a wave of injuries and fatalities in pager explosions. AFP

Friends and relatives of injured people arrive at the American University of Beirut Medical Centre. EPA

An ambulance arrives at the American University of Beirut Medical Centre. EPA

Ali Ammar, Hezbollah member of the Lebanese Parliament, accepts condolences for his son, who was killed in the detonation of pagers for which Hezbollah blamed Israel. Reuters

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A Hezbollah strategy to avoid Israeli electronic surveillance by using pagers instead of more easily trackable mobile phones disastrously backfired on Tuesday, when thousands of the devices simultaneously exploded, injuring 2,800 people, and killing nine. Health authorities say 200 people are in critical condition. Iran's ambassador to Lebanon Mojtaba Amani was injured in the attack, Iran's state-linked Fars news reported.

Experts tell The National that the decision to use older technology, a move believed to have been implemented since the group joined the Gaza war on October 8 in support of Hamas, was likely exploited by Israeli security forces who mounted an operation to distribute the rigged devices to the group.

Hezbollah has blamed Israel for the “criminal aggression, which also targeted civilians”.

A source within an international intelligence organisation told The National that it was understood that an explosive charge in the pager was designed to delay detonation for five seconds from a page being received.

“That was done so that if the recipient unclipped it to look at it, it blew up in their face,” he said. “Or if they ignored it, it blew up in their waistline or in their pocket.”

Over the summer, reports emerged that Hezbollah adopted low-tech communication methods to evade persistent Israeli electronic eavesdropping, which had allowed the Israelis to mount a series of targeted strikes against key commanders, sometimes deep within Lebanon, or in the heart of Beirut.

In the latter case, the Israeli killing of senior Hezbollah commander Fouad Shukr nearly brought the two sides to the brink of full-scale war – a significantly worse escalation than 10 months of cross border violence, that has killed nearly 600 people.

Mr Nasrallah said his organisation intended to “blind” Israeli surveillance, with the primary focus on striking electronic warfare and surveillance outposts. The intelligence source said members of the group had been ordered to double down on pager communications in recent weeks.

It is unclear what model of pager used, but there is a suggestion a number could have come from the 1990s. Hezbollah has used pagers before, but on a much more limited scale.

Noam Ostfeld, an Israeli expert at Sibylline geopolitical security firm, gave two likely ways in which the pagers were compromised.

When the pagers were ordered it is possible that operatives managed to insert a small amount of explosive somewhere in the supply chain. He referred to the 1996 Mossad assassination of Hamas's military commander Yahya Ayyash, known as “The Engineer”, who was killed with 50 grams of explosives hidden in a mobile phone which he answered.

It is also possible that the security services managed to hack into all the devices then using technology, possibly from the US, managed to cause the batteries to overheat and explode.

A western security source described the attack as “operationally devastating” for Hezbollah with so many people in serious condition.

“This attack is a master demonstration of combined psychological and electronic warfare,” the source said. “An armed organisation's supposedly secure communications network being compromised in this manner is operationally significant and utterly devastating.

“Israel is well-known for its world-leading intelligence and electronic warfare capabilities, both within the IDF and civilian agencies. The modus operandi is almost certainly well in line with their capabilities.”

Fears of wider war

Mr Ostfeld also raised the possibility of the attack leading to a retaliation from Hezbollah that could result in war.

“This is possibly an attack that seeks to get below the threshold of war but we are already seeing Hezbollah blaming Israel and threatening significant retaliation. This will significantly increase the risk of war and uncontrolled escalation,” he said.

“However, Hezbollah have been significantly degraded by the sheer amount of casualties, and it still remains unclear whether they or their Iran-backers want a full-scale war.”

Danny Citrinowicz, a research fellow at Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies and former Israel Defence Intelligence commander who headed its Iran branch, warned against Israeli hubris after the attack.

“This could lead us to a really, very, very problematic escalation. Not only Hezbollah operatives were hurt by this attack, but also the families that were near the targets. Given the vast nature of this attack, Nasrallah will have to do something dramatic in order to balance the deterrence equation, between the organisation and Israel and that will be a dramatic response. It will put us back to the days after the killing of Foud Shukr, a very tense period when Hezbollah had to decide how to act.”

Mr Citrinowicz said that despite this risk, the attack had undoubtedly done serious damage to the group, although he warned against overstating this.

“It probably will influence Hezbollah’s command and control, that's for sure. Those pagers were for coordination.” But he says the group is “robust.”

He notes that despite taking hundreds of losses since October 8, when the group joined the Gaza war on Hamas’ side, as well as thousands of injured, it likely retains significant combat power.

“We should be very, very cautious in assessing the capabilities of the adversary, especially when discussing an organisation that is fully embedded within the population. They really prepared themselves for the last almost 20 years for a war against Israel. The killing of Shukr, of unit commanders heading the Radwan commandos and Aziz unit, are really hurting the organisation, because those people were very experienced and they had a set of skills and knowledge that were very hard to find. So obviously the organisation paid a severe price.

“But it is a very dangerous organisation and it will be very hard to undermine its centre of gravity.”