Gaza-Egypt border control dispute could shape the enclave's future

Talks on who will control contested area after war focus on international force despite opposition from Netanyahu

The border fence between the Gaza Strip and Egypt in Rafah, southern Gaza. EPA

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There were conflicting reports this week that Israeli negotiators would allow the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the so-called Philadelphi corridor, known in Gaza as the Salah Al Din corridor, a narrow strip of land on Egypt’s border.

Created as part of a buffer zone following the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace accords, it passes through the devastated town of Rafah, widened in parts by Israelis during the current war through mass demolitions of housing. Israeli forces seized the Rafah crossing in May, closing one of the Strip’s key aid conduits and prompting international anger.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu insisted on Monday that forces would remain in the narrow strip of land, which he characterised as critical for Hamas’s resupply, using underground tunnels.

"Netanyahu is interested solely in preserving his coalition. But to do that, he's squandered opportunities earlier in the conflict, for instance, to tie Israeli withdrawal from territories it held in Gaza with an entry of a multinational force into these territories," says Nir Arielli, a historian at the University of Leeds in the UK who has advocated a multinational peacekeeping force for Gaza.

A foreign contingent of peacekeepers is still being discussed according to the Israeli publication Haaretz, which claimed Israeli negotiators would allow a phased withdrawal, a plan endorsed by the US. Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer said on Wednesday a withdrawal would occur if a "practical solution on the ground" was found - a new security arrangement that would exclude Hamas.

Some reports suggest a multinational force could take their place. Its exact role and composition, and whether they would be armed peacekeepers or civilian monitors, is unclear.

A lot is at stake. Rafah, and nearby Kerem Abu Salem, known as Kerem Shalom to Israelis, are key transit points for aid and potential reconstruction material. Egypt strongly opposes occupying Israeli forces on their border – a once bitterly contested area in the Arab-Israeli wars.

On Thursday, Egypt's army chief of staff Lieutenant General Ahmed Fathy Khalifa was shown on state TV visiting forces in the area. Egyptian troops "are capable of defending the nation's borders generation after generation", he said.

EU returning to Rafah?

One significant development might be the redeployment of an EUBAM, or European Union Border Assistance Mission. Josep Borell, Vice President of the European Commission, said in May that “the political green light to reactivate EUBAM, our mission in Rafah”, had been given.

"But this has to be done in accordance with the Palestinian Authority, the Egyptians, and obviously Israel. We are not going to be the outsourcers of the security in the border. We are not a security company.”

EUBAM operated in Gaza as a civilian organisation with a small security contingent – originally 70 people in total, between 2005 and 2007, until the enclave was taken over by Hamas following a violent battle with the Palestinian Authority after contested elections. It then continued limited operations for another decade, working with the PA on a limited basis, from offices in Israel and Gaza City.

Mr Borell implies it would face serious challenges in returning unaided amid continuing violence and also political threats.

Those include Israelis taking an extremely hard line on Gaza’s future. On Thursday, Amnesty International again accused Israel of war crimes because of its razing of neighbourhoods across eastern Gaza to expand a buffer zone. Hamas, meanwhile, wishes to retain a key role in postwar Gaza.

“EUBAM was not based in Rafah and had a remote observing station in Kerem Shalom, and in that station, there were Israeli officials and Palestinian Authority officials, but EUBAM was the nominal overseer. And they only had real-time inspections on the movement of people and baggage through Rafah,” says David Harden, managing director of the Georgetown Group and former USAID mission director.

At Kerem Shalom, EUBAM was able to monitor people transiting Rafah remotely through a live camera feed.

In its short existence, the organisation helped nearly 500,000 Palestinians transit through Rafah, reprising a slimmed-down role aimed at preparing potential Palestinian Authority border control in 2015.

“The Palestinian Authority were at the actual border terminal, checking passports and bags and they’d run those names of people singled out for checks through a terrorism screening cell. It didn’t involve checking cargo or contraband. It was just to make sure no weapons were coming in. It was only above ground in limited terminal space. The real challenge now is the tunnels can be 65 metres deep and surface-level monitoring would be irrelevant,” he says.

During its 19 months of operation on the ground, Israel retained veto powers over its decisions, including who could transit the border.

Mr Harden says it could be possible to limit a larger force to a small geographic area on the border, but with a degree of flexibility built into the mission.

“There may be some allowable zone they can enter on a limited basis and then return to a core zone. So, what are the choices? The Israelis control it, Hamas controls it, Egyptians and PA or a multinational force controls it. The US can’t do it, but it doesn’t mean we should not contribute.”

Rebuilding Gaza

Mr Harden’s reference to the PA importance in any deal chimes with EUBAM’s post-2015 aim of “supporting the relevant Palestinian Border Authorities in enhancing their capacity to redeploy at the Rafah Crossing Point once political and security conditions allow.”

“The options are the Palestinian Authority is embedded or is tangential or a partner and not embedded. And that is fine because reliance is not on the Palestinian Authority. And for the most part, the Israelis have valued Palestinian Authority security efforts in the West Bank. The PA component of this doesn’t strike me as a non-starter, it’s solvable,” Mr Harden says.

Mr Arielli agrees. An advocate for a multinational force in Gaza, he emphasises that such a force should be part of an ambitious reconstruction and peacekeeping operation, rather than confined to the border. “This is the least bad option available. Of course, we need Palestinian endorsement and Palestinian engagement with planning and execution of deployment. Without it, the mission will lack legitimacy,” he says.

He warns that any plan aside from an Israeli force would face stiff opposition in Israel. “There has been the refusal of Netanyahu to participate in any planning for the day after, consistent refusal to engage with any sort of longer-term solutions. Obviously his far-right coalition partners want to see an Israeli reconquest of Gaza, establishment of Jewish settlements there."

Mr Arielli says that a small force in Gaza risks “mission creep” – a chaotic expansion of operations as new crises emerge – which has historically affected military operations from peacekeeping to war. A UN aid mission in Somalia in the early 1990s which led to US forces battling militiamen in Mogadishu is one famous example.

“There has to be a large commitment, by regional powers, by the European powers and by the Americans as well, to reconstruct and revive Gaza after what has been a horrific nearly year of suffering there. And this could also send a clear message to communities on the Israeli side of the border that we're not going back to managing the conflict. This is going to be something different, something better.”

In Israel, some security officials say whomever monitors the border would struggle without a significant commitment of forces, even with modern security cameras and movement sensors.

“Yes, there are some advanced technological means and there have been great advancements in this field. But this war proved, again, what even the most junior combat leaders know – an obstacle that isn't under physical control will not serve its purpose. Would the sensor and other means be able to detect some of the action? For sure. Would some precision air strikes or other means be able to disrupt them? Yes,” says one veteran officer who chose to remain anonymous.

“Would it be as effective as physical control over the Philadelphi and Rafah border crossing? Not nearly. This is without even accounting for regular maintenance that will be required for any technological means that would be deployed there and would require direct and regular physical access,” he says.