Iraqi militias reinforce Syrian defences in latest push to stop new insurgency

Experts say hard fighting lies ahead for bitter rivals

A damaged Syrian army helicopter at the Nayrab military airport in Aleppo. EPA

Iraqi militias backed by Iran reportedly surged into Syria on Monday with 9,000 fighters, The National has been told by a commander of Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), a collection of militias mostly backed by Iran. One aim of their deployment could be to shore up crumbling government defences in northern Hama.

These forces could theoretically bring powerful multi-launch rocket artillery to the fight, as well as drones provided by Iran. They join an estimated 200,000 regime forces, in addition to local militias, but these troops are spread across the country.

The surge of forces comes five days after a shock insurgent offensive captured Aleppo, the second-largest city in the country with a population of around two million. It was fought over for more than four years during the country's post-2011 civil war. Experts say the outcome of the current fighting is uncertain, and both sides face difficult battles in the coming days and months.

The attacks, spearheaded by militants from Hayat Tahrir Al Sham (HTS), designated a terrorist group by the US and the UN and formerly linked to Al Qaeda, were enabled by a gradually weakening Syrian regime. At the same time, experts say, a strengthening insurgent movement had time to recover from years of intense fighting in the country’s civil war, in the northern enclave of Idlib.

“The heart of the matter is morale, the decisive factor, and morale is very low on the regime side, for a number of reasons,” says Malik Al Abdeh, a London-based analyst who works in conflict mediation. “The government hasn't been able to convert the military victories that it achieved between 2016 and 2018, when Russia intervened decisively, and Iran was in a position to send massive enforcements, into a political victory.”

A decaying army

Syria’s economy has struggled to recover from years of civil war during which over 300,000 people are thought to have died and which devastated the country’s major cities. Even with limited funds and hyperinflation, the government has spent increasing sums trying to maintain a large army and a network of militias such as the National Defence Forces.

Last year, the government set the national minimum wage at $21 per month, chasing rampant inflation. Because payments are so low, there have been reports of some soldiers choosing to pay a small bribe to escape military service, or secretly work on the side, eroding the combat power of units. The weak economic conditions still provoke occasional protests, suggesting the northern insurgency could spread.

For most conscripts in the Syrian army, this minimum wage was the norm, but even at the height of the Syrian civil war in 2016, soldiers reported being paid just $65 a month. That sum dropped sharply amid worsening economic distress.

More recently, the army has moved towards a volunteer force, reportedly offering around two million Syrian pounds ($150) a month according to the Syrian Observer, an organisation which monitors government announcements.

That’s much more than most Syrians make, and, in theory, a strong incentive on the front lines. But it’s well below the World Bank poverty line of around $200 per month. Mr Al Abdeh says even with additional incentives, it’s not clear whether the debt-laden government can afford the additional salaries, even in a leaner force.

“The government failed to translate civil war victories into better governance and better services, better quality of life for ordinary Syrians, across the country. People who were sympathetic to the regime for a long time, have come to realise that actually the regime is simply a mafia. It's no longer a state.”

According to a report last year by the New Lines Institute think tank, political dysfunction has crept into the armed forces, including the formerly elite unit the Fourth Armoured Division, which has become widely associated with mafia-like racketeering operations.

By contrast, the militants appear highly organised. In recent analysis, US military analyst and historian Ben Connable points to their use of the latest military tactics, including FPV (first person view) drones, which have been used to devastating effect in Ukraine.

“Opposition units look to be well-equipped and aggressive. Video shows them using suicide drones, infantry-armour teams, and multiple-launch rockets,” he says, although he cautions these videos are curated and don’t necessarily show the full picture.

Nonetheless, “it looks like some of the battles that took place during the height of the fighting in the mid-2010s,” he says, an ominous sign for president Bashar Al Assad. During this period, most analysts agree that the involvement of Iranian advisers, Lebanese Hezbollah – both as fighters and advisers – and Russian air power and special forces, turned the tide for Mr Al Assad.

Rallying allies

At the height of the Syrian civil war Hezbollah might have had 10,000 fighters in the country, while Russia’s air strikes peaked at 150 a day. It’s not clear whether either of those allies can step in with that kind of force this time, with Hezbollah seriously damaged following its war with Israel and Russia heavily committed to its war in Ukraine.

Iran, meanwhile, has offered to help, but faces a logistical struggle on the country’s northern front with the loss of Aleppo International Airport, which used to be a conduit for arms transfers. Iran is also grappling with its own economic crisis.

In terms of equipment, Syria’s army has also been greatly weakened and has yet to recover from its civil war losses. According to a detailed analysis of video-recorded tank destruction by rebel groups and terrorists, including ISIS, researcher Jakub Janovský found 3,380 confirmed destroyed Syrian tanks in the conflict up to 2020. He notes the actual number of destroyed vehicles – he could only count those caught on camera – could be far higher.

This meant Syria could have lost most of its prewar tank force of around 5,500 vehicles. The cash-strapped country has been unable to re-equip these armoured forces with replacements, and now the rebels have captured dozens more.

“The lack of unified decision making and general complacency within Syrian forces, the fact they were so ill-prepared meant you had this rapid collapse, and once the insurgents broke through the first lines of west Aleppo it pretty much guaranteed the fall of the rest of the city. People who are supporters of the government or didn’t want to live under the insurgency all rapidly fled," says Aymenn Al Tamimi, an expert on militancy and translator.

This could raise the importance of the involvement of the Iraqi PMF. Elements of the PMF fought on the regime's side during the civil war. Religiously motivated militias, many of whom said they were going to Syria to defend holy shrines, such as the Sayyida Zainab shrine in Damascus, were among them.

Estimates of the number of HTS and allied forces currently fighting vary. HTS was thought to have 30,000 fighters in 2017, although estimates in 2020 put the figure closer to 20,000. Without further uprisings across the country, the regime could probably hold critical areas due to numerical advantages, Mr Al Abdeh says, providing it quickly deploys troops to key areas.

The Syrian National Army, a powerful umbrella group of rebels backed and armed by Turkey, has so far concentrated its operations against Kurdish militias, who are backed by the US but loosely aligned to Damascus. Their further involvement could be decisive, but for now HTS has pressed for a non-aggression pact with the Kurds.

“The Alawite core of the army, these are the people who are prepared to fight and die standing their ground, historically, since 2011. But now the Alawite component of the army is no longer prepared to die for areas that are not deemed as being their hometown. So this is a big problem because there's been a steady stream of deaths in places like the Syrian desert, because of ISIS activity there, and it’s been quite unpopular in Alawite areas," Mr Al Abdeh says.

“Iraqi militias could be sent north of Hama to shore up the defensive line rather than launch a massive counter-attack,” he says, noting that Damascus will push hard to defend the next strategically important city in the rebels' sights.