Why did Israel accept a ceasefire with Hezbollah?

Most experts say Israel accepted the deal from a position of strength, but point to long-term opportunities for Hezbollah

Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks at the Mount Herzl military cemetery in Jerusalem, Israel, on October 27, 2024. AP

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The Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire came into effect on Wednesday following a massive last-minute Israeli bombardment of Beirut, which sent columns of dust and smoke across the city’s skyline.

But the news was met with mixed reactions, including anger from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s most extreme cabinet member, Itamar Ben-Gvir, who called it a "historic mistake" to stop fighting before inflicting more damage on the militia.

Mr Netanyahu claimed Hezbollah had been set back “decades” and that the ceasefire – backed by nine other cabinet members – would allow Israel to pause and refocus military assets “on the Iran threat.”

Hezbollah seemed defiant, with an MP from the group Hassan Fadlallah saying “thousands” more would join the group and that it would re-equip following setbacks.

Who is right? Has Israel secured a deal that will see the group hobbled and pushed away from its southern strongholds?

Or were the Israelis under military pressure, fighting through the rugged terrain of southern Lebanon in an increasingly costly war, and still facing threats from Iran and militias in Iraq and Yemen? In Gaza, too, Hamas is weakened but the Israeli military still takes casualties and occasionally mounts large operations.

Can Hezbollah rebuild?

Initial assessments suggest both can be true, to an extent. The war has been disastrous for Hezbollah and smaller allied groups, who have lost scores of commanders, including Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.

Losing lower down leaders, the backbone of its semi-autonomous command structure, has lasting impact. Vast numbers of rockets and weapons stockpiles have been destroyed. Much focus has been on the rockets that the group has amassed, thought to have numbered 150,000, most of them relatively short range between 20 and 40 kilometres, but including drones and ballistic missiles that struck deep into Israel.

Much of that arsenal appears to have been blown up or captured. Israel claimed to have pre-emptively destroyed an attempt to fire 1,000 in one day, an attack that was foreseen and foiled on August 25. The group was unable to fire more than 300 of the inaccurate weapons in its biggest daily total.

Captured Kornet anti-tank missiles are another symbol of just how large the group’s arsenal was, built up over years through the maritime “Syrian express” to Latakia and Tartus, and then overland to Lebanon, flown in to Syria – and again moved overground – or trucked.

The Israel army said “tens of thousands” of the weapons had been seized in caches across the south. This, along with strikes on commanders with specialist skills, such as drone operations, will be extremely hard to rebuild, along with bunkers and tunnel infrastructure that has been destroyed.

If the group sticks to the agreement, which involves moving back north of the Litani river in line with a failed 2006 UN resolution 1701, it puts a significant part of northern Israel out of range of most of their weapons. The void is meant to filled by the Lebanese army and bolstered UN peacekeepers, as the Israelis withdraw.

These aspects of the deal secured the support of hardline allies of Mr Netanyahu, including finance minister Bezalel Smotrich.

Militarily, then, the group has been set back. But Mr Netanyahu’s assertion of “decades” of reversals is uncertain – it took the group about 15 years to build most of its arsenal after the 2006 war. Even rebuilding to half that would present a significant threat to Israel.

“Hezbollahs has been constantly on Israel’s radar for many, many years. Israel was preparing for a war and growing intelligence on them for many years, ever since 2006, Israel was well prepared in terms of actually fighting them and being prepared on the ground” says Tal Hagin, an open source security expert and consultant.

But he warns the idea that the Israelis emerged on top this time could be fleeting. Israel suffered fewer casualties than in their 2006 war (90 dead compared to 121) and inflicting vastly higher losses (between 200 and 500 Hezbollah and allies dead in 2006 compared to around 1,500 today).

Today's losses have mostly been compiled by open source analysts monitoring funeral announcements, since the group stopped officially announcing their dead once Israel invaded. Israel claims it is significantly higher, at 2,000.

Israel launches strikes across Beirut hours before ceasefire

“The idea of destroying Hezbollah is a fever dream, at the end of the day. It's a very, very powerful militia group that has a lot of backing within Lebanon. Unless there's a total occupation by the IDF of southern Lebanon, south of the Litani River, they're going to just keep popping up, unless there's strong co-operation between the Lebanese Government and Israel and the UN forces. We see this in Gaza, where Israel has military dominance and yet is still fighting house to house in some areas to find weapons and Hamas fighters.”

This assessment suggests Israel knows it cannot sustain the war indefinitely. Stopping now from a position of strength is better than open-ended conflict that could be costing several hundred million dollars per day.

This brings Mr Netanyahu’s focus on “concentrating on the Iran threat” into play. Hezbollah was long seen as Iran’s insurance against an Israeli air attack on its nuclear facilities, which would trigger the devastating 1,000 rocket plus onslaught. This capability is now gone.

Israel, too, launched a strike “package” – the number of aircraft on one mission – of 100 jets in early October against the group. That’s the same size as the reported strike on Iran and a sizeable chunk of Israel’s roughly 290 fighter-bomber jets. This could free up more forces for a potentially larger strike on Iran.

Danny Citronowicz, a senior researcher at Israel's Institute for National Security Studies, says that this isn’t likely to be a major consideration. The number of air strikes launched on Israel has declined since the onslaught of the invasion, and the distance for the jets to fly puts less strain on aircrews than long range, high intensity warfare with Iran.

“I wouldn’t say this isn’t a consideration. But citing Iran really is an excuse, he’s saying, ‘we have to focus on that now that Trump is coming.’ I'm not saying it's not right, but looking for something to explain this fact that he stopped the war," Mr Citrinowicz, who was also a senior commander in Israel's military intelligence with a focus on Iran, said.

"I do think that, given the announcement of the Iranian nuclear programme, if there won't be a nuclear deal, I think that the chances of Israel doing something kinetic are extremely high,” he says, referring to the possibility of a major Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear programme.

“But Netanyahu is only interested in his survival.” He is due to testify in a four-year-old court case in December, an appearance his lawyers have long sought to delay, facing multiple charges of bribery and fraud. While he has seen a surge in popularity following assassinations of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, there is growing pressure to get 65,000 Israelis back to their homes in the north.

Saying there is a new focus on Iran plays well with his backers in Washington, Mr Citrinowitz says, including the incoming president.

“Trump is entering the White House and leaning towards redeploying the maximum pressure campaign. Iran is important, but it's his excuse, to explain to this audience why you have to stop the war.”