Does Israel face a 'never-ending' military operation in Gaza?

Israeli military operations involve large assaults into parts of the territory, while Hamas rebuilds in other parts of the enclave

Israeli troops on patrol along the Israel-Gaza border area. AFP

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The Gaza war is winding down – that was the view of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in June. Many commentators shared the same view after the killing of Hamas ground commander in Gaza and overall commander, Yahya Sinwar on October 16 – although Mr Netanyahu stressed operations would continue, dashing hopes of an end to a conflict that has killed 42,500 Palestinians in the enclave.

On Wednesday, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken was in the Middle East pressing Mr Netanyahu for a Gaza and Lebanon ceasefire, as well as a postwar plan for Gaza, in his 11th trip to the region since war began.

The Israeli army is prepared to keep fighting in Gaza “for months,” an Israeli security source said Wednesday during a briefing with media outlets. The source characterised the war, and the recent Lebanon invasion and bombing as a conflict against Iran and its proxies, which began on October 7 after the Hamas-led attack on Israeli settlements, killing around 1,200 people and abducting about 240.

The assessment of “months” of more war in Gaza is supported by the Israelis’ own estimates of Hamas’ remaining strength, as well as a separate assessment by conflict monitoring organisation Acled.

Various figures given on the number of Hamas fighters killed – the highest Israeli estimate is 17,000 – suggest the group could continue fighting for many months, perhaps over a year, by lying low and reconstituting battalions in areas seldom visited by Israeli forces.

Visually too, Hamas continues to release evidence of operations, recently filming fighters heavily damaging or destroying an Israeli Merkava tank with an unexploded Israeli bomb, and sniping at other soldiers.

The issue has important ramifications for Gazans, exhausted and hungry after a year of war and siege conditions. It’s also critical for policymakers who believe the regional crisis has shifted north to Lebanon or zooming out, to a direct Israel-Iran war.

Ongoing hostilities point to further crisis with aid distribution, more Israeli justifications for slowing aid into Gaza, which they claim has to be tightly controlled to stop Hamas benefiting, despite widespread anger at the trickle of supplies and deaths from hunger in Gaza.

It will also stop badly needed reconstruction amid humanitarian catastrophe, and continuing regional anger, including action by the Houthis currently blockading the Red Sea transit for about 12 per cent of maritime trade.

“We can see preparations for a prolonged Israeli military presence already, with satellite photos and reports indicating fortification of the Netzarim Corridor, dividing north and west Gaza. We saw reports of construction of several outposts throughout the corridor and implementation of defences and equipment – including radar systems,” says Noam Ostfeld, an analyst with the UK's Sibylline risk consultancy.

“Reports indicate that the IDF are also working to make the service conditions of its personnel in these positions more comfortable – indicating preparation for a long stay.”

The Israelis believe they have killed 17,000 Hamas fighters out of 25,000 to 30,000. This leaves around 8,000-13,000 armed opponents, close to the larger estimate of ISIS forces during the nine-month battle of Mosul. Hard data on how many are still active is likely impossible to obtain.

In May, it was reported that US intelligence estimates suggested Hamas had between 9,000 and 12,000 fighters left, a depletion of around one third, they believed. Even if this number has been reduced significantly – perhaps to 5,000, it could represent a long conflict ahead.

Acled believed 8,500 Hamas fighters had been killed, in an assessment last month, based on announced Israeli military operations. None of the tolls included estimates of wounded or captured, which would reduce numbers even further. But the group is also said to be recruiting.

Prolonged urban war

Even after more than a year of conflict, it’s not clear whether Israel is deploying enough forces to suppress Hamas and their allies, groups such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad, across all of Gaza at once. This is based on a comparison of previous urban battles and the size of Gaza.

In the second battle of Fallujah in Iraq in 2004, the US deployed around 10,000 soldiers, along with several thousand Iraqi troops in support, and 850 British forces against around 5,000 insurgents, led by Al Qaeda who in many cases were willing to fight to the death. They could hide out in the city of around 50,000 houses, and the population of around 200,000 was largely evacuated. The battle lasted six weeks.

In the battle of Mosul in 2014, Iraqi forces fought anywhere from 5,000 to 15,000 fanatical ISIS members, through around 200,000 housing units, although the number of government troops in direct combat was much smaller, perhaps 40,000. The battle took nine months, even with US-led air support and western special forces advisers, killing around 10,000 civilians.

That could be the closest match to Gaza, thought to have had at least 330,000 housing units before the current war, much of which is now utterly destroyed, which experts say can complicate military operations because armoured vehicles struggle on roads blocked by rubble. But Israel has deployed far smaller forces – currently about two divisions, the 152nd and the 162nd, or around 20,000 men.

It could be a recipe for open ended military operations as Hamas move covertly through remaining tunnel networks and rebuild their battalions.

“The urban environment makes it hard to root out all operatives in a fast and effective manner. Moreover we don't see much progress on a civil plan for Gaza from the Israeli side. Without a civil plan – to put a trusted authority in place to manage civilian aspects of daily lives helping to shift away from war conditions – the military is essentially having a never ending 'mission',” says Mr Ostfeld.

Peter Mansoor, who was the executive officer of US Gen David Petraeus at the height of the Iraq war, now a military historian at Ohio State University, says another complicating factor is Israel’s multi-front struggle.

“The larger issue extending the conflict is the Israeli government's strategic goal of destroying Hamas and significantly degrading Hezbollah. As a tactical or operational task, destruction requires a significant amount of resources and time. Provided there is no ceasefire to end hostilities, I don't disagree that fighting could go on for some months to come,” he says.

This leaves the question of how many Gazans still support Hamas and other militant groups, which will be critical for the rate they can reconstitute, and their likely dwindling arms supply.

In September, the Ramallah-based Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research think tank released a survey suggesting 36 per cent of Gazans still supported Hamas remaining in power, but that support for the Palestinian Authority was lower, at 20 per cent.

More recently, another poll by the Arab World for Research and Development put support for a “Hamas led arrangement” to lead Gaza after the war neck and neck with a “Palestinian Authority-led arrangement”, at just six per cent.