Dubai's financial supremos will have one subject at the head of their agenda in the next 12 months - trying to keep the emirate on top of a demanding schedule of debt repayments in tough financial times.
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It is becoming an annual challenge. Ever since the Dubai World crisis of 2009, when the property developer sought to restructure some US$25 billion (Dh91.82bn) of debt, the emirate's financial strategists have struggled with the debt problem, a legacy of the incredible property-fuelled boom years between 2002 and 2008.
So far, they have managed to stay on track through a mixture of hard-nosed deals with creditors, extending the terms of repayment of some, and meeting other repayments, mainly to bondholders, on time and in full. They also had the benefit of a cash injection totalling $20bn from energy-rich Abu Dhabi.
Yet next year, several big debts are due to be repaid, and this time market forces are not as benign as in the past two years.
This month, the ratings agency Moody's estimated the emirate would have to deal with some $10bn of debt falling due next year. The ratings agency talked of its "concerns about renewed medium-term pressures when the refinanced obligations become due, and about Dubai potentially needing further financial support".
Moody's concern focused on three Dubai entities, each with a different level of connection to the emirate's power nexus.
Dubai Holding Commercial Operations Group (DHCOG), the property and leisure arm of the Dubai Holding conglomerate, which is owned by Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid, Vice President of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai, has a $500 million bond due in February.
Dubai International Financial Centre Investments has a $1.25bn sukuk, or Islamic bond, up for repayment in June.
Jebel Ali Free Zone Authority, part of the Dubai World conglomerate, has another $2bn sukuk due in November, and Dry Dock World, another Dubai World operation, is in ongoing talks about restructuring some $2bn of obligations in the coming months.
With other smaller bundles of debt also due, it adds up to a formidable $10bn repayment bill next year. Can Dubai work the same magic with creditors it has for the past couple of years?
One man who is adamant it can is Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum, who as the chairman of Dubai's Supreme Fiscal Committee is the man charged by Sheikh Mohammed with seeing the repayment programme through.
Sheikh Ahmed has denied they would need to restructure on the same scale as Dubai World in 2009, and is upbeat about the companies' ability to meet their obligations. "We are following a solid financial policy that enhances trust in the ability of government-related companies [GRCs]," he said in response to the Moody's analysis.
In particular, he denied there was any need for restructuring, although accepted some of the indebted entities might have to "refinance" their debt terms. He also said the Government was "fully prepared to support GRCs through all available means".
He can point to a track record of dealing with debt going back to Dubai World but also including some parts of Dubai Holding, and especially the success of Investment Corporation of Dubai, the asset-rich financial flagship, in dealing with creditors.
The problem going into next year, however, is that there are many more variables in local, regional and global financial markets, all of which could conspire to make Dubai's debt challenges more difficult to overcome.
The first is a hardening of attitude by the creditors. One banker involved in the Dubai World restructuring, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said: "Dubai World had the advantage of being the prime mover in the sovereign debt crisis. It happened before the crisis in Europe, which has made all banks much more risk-averse. I doubt very much we would have gone for the Dubai World deal if it had been presented to us today."
Credit conditions in all markets, but especially European financial circles, are much tighter and few analysts are predicting a significant improvement while the crisis in the euro zone continues. That makes things more difficult for Dubai. Despite the successful handling of the debt repayment issue over the past couple of years, the emirate still has high levels of indebtedness. Moody's estimated total debt of $101.5bn linked to the Dubai Government and GRCs.
Nick Stadtmiller, the head of fixed-income research at Emirates NBD, says that while EU credit to the GCC countries amounts to only about 7 per cent of the region's GDP, that still amounted to $100bn, "a sum that would be challenging to replace".
Moreover, there are some concerns among analysts of the capability of the UAE banking system to withstand further absorption of distressed assets, which has been one of the features of Dubai's technique for dealing with GRC debt over the past couple of years.
UAE banks are generally regarded as well-capitalised, and rank high according to the main criteria for "stress testing" financial institutions, such as Tier 1 capital ratios. Nevertheless, there are weaknesses. "Limited transparency, sizeable related-party exposures and high loan and deposit concentrations will also continue to render many UAE banks vulnerable to name specific risks," says Khalid Howladar, the senior credit officer at Moody's in Dubai.
The financial fallout from the Arab Spring is also a factor. While Dubai's relatively buoyant macro-economy has done well in luring trade and tourism that would otherwise have gone to other Middle East centres, capital inflows to the emirate have lagged as international investors sat on their hands while chaos and revolution prevails in many parts of the Middle East.
The oil price - still the most significant economic indicator in the UAE and the region - has held up comparatively well, allowing Gulf governments to commit to high levels of expenditure for social and infrastructure investment and keep their economies growing.
This is on the face of it a good thing for those dealing with Dubai's debt dilemma, even though the emirate has little oil. There is a significant "feel-good factor" there when the oil price is strong.
High energy prices also mean that Abu Dhabi might feel more inclined to help Dubai again if, in extremis, it was unable to meet a significant part of its repayment schedule. But there is a new spirit of budget orthodoxy in the capital, resulting in the cancellation or delay of several high-profile projects there.
"Dubai would be unwise to rely totally on another handout," said an Abu Dhabi banker who declined to be named.
So Dubai's options for dealing with the debts are narrowing. International bankers are less likely to be as understanding as they were in the past; local banks are probably already up to their toleration levels of Dubai-related debt; a much-heralded programme of privatisation to raise cash via the sale of state assets has not materialised, and is unlikely to do so while global market conditions remain volatile.
In the next 12 months Dubai will have to prove once again it has the resources and expertise to get itself out of the debt trap once more.
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