Boeing concealed key 737 Max design changes from US regulator, report says

The company did not submit certification documents detailing changes to its flight control system

A fleet of Boeing 737 Max aircraft stored in an area adjacent to Boeing Field, on June 27, 2019 in Seattle, Washington. Getty Images

Lawyer Frank Pitre of Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, LLP discusses details of a lawsuit filed on behalf of the family of Samya Stumo, who was killed in the crash of Ethiopian Airlines flight on April 4, 2019, in Chicago, Illinois. Getty Images

Investigators examine engine parts from the ill-fated Lion Air flight JT 610 at a port in Jakarta on November 7, 2018, after they were recovered from the bottom of the Java sea. AFP

Indonesia's National Transportation Safety Committee investigator Nurcahyo Utomo, left, briefs journalists during a press conference on the final report of the Lion Air flight 610 crash, in Jakarta on October 25, 2019. AFP

Members of a rescue team carry the flight data recorder, part of the Lion Air flight JT 610's black box, after it was recovered from the Java Sea, at Jakarta port on November 1, 2018. AFP

Family members of those who died aboard Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 hold photographs of their loved ones as Dennis Muilenburg, President and chief executive of the Boeing Company, and John Hamilton, Vice President and Chief Engineer of Boeing Commercial Airplanes, testify before the Senate Commerce on October 29, 2019 in Washington DC. Getty Images

A relative of a victim of the Lion Air flight JT 610 is given assistance as she grieves during a visit to the site of the crash in the Java Sea on an Indonesian Navy vessel off the coast of Karawang in West Java on November 6, 2018. AFP

Relatives with family members on board the Lion Air flight JT 610 interact with airline staff and officials as they await information on their loved ones in Pangkal Pinang airport, in Bangka Belitung province on October 29, 2018. AFP

Getachew Tessema, right, father of Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 captain Yared Getachew, unveils a plaque during a commemoration ceremony held by the Airline Pilots' Association of Ethiopia on the first anniversary of the Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 crash in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on March 10, 2020. AFP

Nadia Milleron, the mother of Samya Stumo who was killed in the crash of Ethiopian Airlines flight 302, reacts before an aviation subcommittee hearing on 'Status of the Boeing 737 Max: Stakeholder Perspectives', at the Capitol in Washington DC on June 19, 2019. AFP

Boeing 737 Max planes are stored on an employee car park near Boeing Field, on June 27, 2019 in Seattle, Washington. Getty Images

A pedestrian walks by the headquarters of the plane maker Boeing on January 29, 2020 in Chicago, Illinois. Boeing said costs associated with grounding the 737 Max aircraft were expected to exceed $18 billion. Getty Images

Boeing failed to submit certification documents to the US Federal Aviation Administration detailing changes to a key flight control system faulted in two fatal crashes, a government report has found.

The flight control system, known as MCAS, was “not an area of emphasis” because Boeing presented it to the FAA as a modification of the jet’s existing speed trim system, with limited range and use, according to the report seen by Reuters.

The 52-page report by the US Department of Transportation’s Office of Inspector General (IG), dated June 29 and due to be made public on Wednesday, laid bare mistakes made by both the planemaker and FAA in the development and certification of Boeing’s top-selling aircraft.

The FAA declined to comment beyond the department's response attached to the report. The IG did not respond to a request for comment. A Boeing spokesman said the company had taken steps to enhance safety and was committed to transparency. "When the Max returns to service, it will be one of the most thoroughly scrutinised aircraft in history, and we have full confidence in its safety," he said.

The IG’s report is the latest of reports questioning the plane’s approval, while the Justice Department has an ongoing criminal investigation.

The 737 Max has been grounded from commercial flight worldwide since March 2019 after two crashes killed 346 people in Ethiopia and Indonesia in a span of five months.

Boeing’s so-called MCAS stall-prevention system has been found faulty in both crashes, when the system repeatedly and forcefully pushed down the jet’s nose as pilots struggled to intervene, among a mix of factors mentioned by crash investigators.

The IG report listed activities from the early phase of the certification process in January 2012 through the second crash. It also mentioned allegations of “undue pressure” from Boeing management on workers handling safety certification, though it added that all “formally reported” instances of undue pressure were “satisfactorily addressed”.

The IG’s office will issue recommendations to the FAA later this year, the Transportation Department said in comments about the draft report submitted on June 8.

The FAA is currently evaluating the MCAS upgrades during a series of certification test flights this week that could pave the way for the jet’s return domestically by year end.

In response to the report, the Transportation Department said the FAA’s certification of the 737 Max was “hampered by a lack of effective communication” between the agency and the US plane maker.

Crucially, that included the “incomplete understanding of the scope and potential safety impacts” of changes Boeing made to the jet’s flight control system to give it more power and authority, the agency said.

“Boeing did not submit certification documents to FAA detailing the change,” the report said. “FAA flight test personnel were aware of this change, but key FAA certification engineers and personnel responsible for approving the level of airline pilot training told us they were unaware of the revision to MCAS.”

The FAA conducted its detailed review of the system in January 2019, three months after the first crash in Indonesia. The review resulted in documentation that was never finalised, the report said.

The report also said that, after the Indonesia crash, the FAA completed a risk analysis that found that the uncorrected risk to the 737 MAX was 2.68 fatalities per 1 million flight hours, which exceeded the FAA’s risk guidelines of one fatality per 10 million flight hours.

A December 2018 FAA analysis determined a risk of about 15 accidents occurring over the life of the entire 737 Max fleet if the software fix was not implemented.

After the crashes, Boeing proposed and FAA accepted a redesign of MCAS software that would include additional safeguards against unintended MCAS activation.

Boeing also created a Product and Services Safety Organisation for employees to raise concerns over safety and undue pressure.

Boeing agreed to develop the MCAS software update by April 12 and operators would have until June 18, 2019, to install the software. As Boeing worked on proposed software upgrade for MCAS, a second plane crashed in March 2019 in Ethiopia.