Four months after the Deraa protests erupted in March 2011, Bashar Al Assad called Farouq Al Sharaa, his vice president, to discuss the issue. Mr Al Sharaa suggested that instead of making offers that could be rejected by protesters, the regime should ask for a specific list of demands. The president approved the idea and asked Mr Al Sharaa to set up a national conference to end the crisis.
After three days of talks with various opposition figures, four main demands were presented to the vice president: free all political prisoners, investigate the violence in Deraa, establish a supreme council for human rights at the parliament and sanction political parties.
“Al Sharaa had the list in front of him and called Bashar Al Assad,” a top government defector told me recently. “Bashar showed enthusiasm and support for the ideas and said ‘I will issue a decree about these the following morning’.”
He never did. What is astonishing about this story is that it is consistent with accounts given by so many former officials who interacted with Mr Al Assad. The common thread is that they suggested certain initiatives that they say would strengthen the regime, and that Mr Al Assad would not only agree but offer his own insights about how the initiative would be improved, implemented and enforced. To the officials’ disappointment, the issue would never be pursued again.
Mohammed Habash, a former member of the parliament who suggested establishing a supreme council for human rights, told of a similar incident with the president just before the 2003 Iraq war. He said that when he proposed establishing the council during a meeting with the president, the president promptly responded: “That’s a great idea, I personally have three similar proposals, to have a ministry for human rights, a committee at the parliament and an independent entity.”
Mr Habash said the president added that that should be done gradually as “the Americans are at the door” and that a committee in the parliament would be a good first step. The president added that he would then submit a draft law for the cabinet to study. A while later, Mr Habash said: “I was surprised that Mahmoud Al Abrash [the chairman of the parliament at the time] told me, ‘how can you suggest something like that to the president?’ I told him the president was happy [about the suggestion]. He said, no way, the president got upset and you embarrassed him.”
Mr Habash said the issue came up again during a parliament gathering and that the president told the members that “Mohammed Habash speaks for himself, no one told him to do that”.
I asked my source about the veracity of reports that Mr Al Assad had prepared a conciliatory speech before the parliament in which he was going to offer substantial concessions to avert the crisis – which he didn’t do. “That is Assad, that is how he thinks. He has been consistent from day one that this is a conspiracy to topple his regime.” He says one thing and he does something else.
And yet, almost three years later, many still give the president the benefit of the doubt, as if he’s somehow not fully responsible for the clampdown, that it is possible he could change his ways or that he could be a partner in fighting extremism as jihadi fanatics hold sway in the country’s liberated areas.
This flawed narrative predated the uprising – Mr Al Assad was seen as a reformer and that the old guard were blocking his initiatives, probably because visitors would, like Mr Al Sharaa and Mr Habash, leave the president with a sense of optimism that their advice had been heeded.
Even today, many still try to find an explanation for his brutality other than it was his choice and thinking. As a Syrian who grappled with this question, I asked the former official whether the chiefs of the intelligence services would act on their own volition.
“Look, he is in full control. No one disobeys his orders. He might turn a blind eye to some 50 top army officers when they brawl among themselves or with other officers, but they follow his orders to the letter.”
The author Annia Ciezadlo addressed this common theme about meetings with Mr Al Assad in an article in the New Republic last week: “If there’s one thing those who know him agree on, it’s that Bashar Al Assad is awfully eager to please.” This eagerness to please is perhaps a clear characteristic of the president but it should not be mistaken for innocence or generosity, or that his words are not law. Nothing will change Mr Al Assad, that is just him.
Giving the benefit of the doubt to Mr Al Assad is particularly dangerous now as the United States and Russia prepare for the Geneva peace talks, which many hope will help to bring peace to Syria. The belief that Mr Al Assad is less dangerous than radical Islamists, as suggested by diplomats like former US ambassador Ryan C Crocker, only undermines any efforts to reach a solution in Syria. When the gap between Syrians, who know full well that the president cannot be trusted, and world powers is so wide, the prospect for a viable solution becomes slim. The success of the Geneva talks will hinge greatly on whether this thinking informs the policies of countries like the US.
Instead, if outsiders move beyond Mr Al Assad and start working on a solution that excludes him, only then can we imagine a peace settlement in Syria. If he goes, the question will be largely about what system or roadmap will be acceptable for as many people and groups as possible. As long as Mr Al Assad is in power, any transition plan will be doomed and will only bolster the standing of extremists.
hhassan@thenational.ae
On Twitter: @hhassan140