Libya’s politicians deepen the crisis with populist talk

Less than two months since the beginning of a national dialogue, it is a cause for concern that new fault lines are emerging.

Libya remains locked in a vicious cycle of violence, with its politicians failing to curb the rising power of militias. A recent protest in the Gharghour district in Tripoli to drive out a militia from Misurata ended with more than 50 dead and 500 injured. This tragic episode, sanctioned by the ministry of interior and actively encouraged by local and government officials, raises the question: what was the government thinking?

This was not the first time a protest outside a militia base ended violently. A protest in June outside the base of Benghazi’s Libya Shield brigade, a quasi-official amalgamation of militias favoured by the government, ended with more than 30 dead. The response? A national discussion of sorts regarding “legitimacy” with the group’s leader, Wisam Ben Hamid, and others.

A tragic rerun of that event – this time in Tripoli – suggests the problem is worsening, and the government is no closer to breaking the militias’ grip on power. The prime minister, Ali Zeidan, called on civilians to “liberate” the country’s oil assets from armed groups only days before the protests.

The silver lining to the chaos has been the rally call of “Law No 27”, a declaration for the removal of all illegal militias from Tripoli and its suburbs. Following the withdrawal of the militias, the appearance of police and army forces on Tripoli’s streets restored a sense of stability and formality to the city.

This welcome calm was, however, achieved at great cost. After the violence, an insidious populist political discourse emerged. The citizens of Libya are beginning to believe that quick solutions exist.

An appealing narrative about popular sentiments and “people power” cannot make up for an absence of robust leadership. Libya’s post-conflict reconstruction and national reconciliation efforts continue to falter and vital socio-economic solutions are yet to be found. What is needed goes beyond catchphrases that have become stale and redundant for this chapter in history.

Slogans and protests are expected but the rising populism should be viewed with caution. What always comes in the wake of such an environment are politicians and parties seeking to exploit such circumstances, promising people overnight solutions, which often create fresh social and economic problems.

Instead of political and economic programmes to steer the country's transition, politicians and media have perpetuated a series of myths or half-truths since the end of the revolution in an attempt to explain the political landscape. Rumours persist of an "elite" class, presumably in their ivory tower waiting to exploit the masses, a fifth column of Muammar Qaddafi's regime. The names are never revealed, and the evidence is sketchy.

The Muslim Brotherhood tend to receive the bulk of criticism for the country’s failings, often stoking the flames of violent protests and displays of anger, without the sober political call to visit voting records, statements from the group, or financial records to underpin the critique.

The most perennial and darkest of these myths is of some invisible hand interfering in all affairs, guiding the incompetence of Libya’s elected congress, which in January spent a session debating the name of the country, before deciding on the State of Libya. On the very same day, the ministry of interior announced that the murder rate had increased by 500 per cent in the past two years.

The divisive populist rhetoric of “them” and “us” has left large blocks of the populace bereft of options, believing that protests with huge numbers are the only way to move the country forward. In truth, in the protest on November 15 many brave but also desperate citizens lost their lives to the arrogance and greed of the militias that have plagued the country, but also undoubtedly to the negligence by the government in its approach towards reforming the security sector.

Slogans have become the solution for the public, but now too for the government. The current jubilation regarding the implementation of Law No 27 and the expulsion of militias from the capital may be short-lived. “Get Out of Tripoli!” is a slogan and not a programme for managing the disarmament or demobilisation of militias. Its implementation may mean that militias leave their bases in Tripoli, but not an end to the militias themselves.

Each of the convoys that left the capital ensured they took their arsenal of weapons and ammunition with them. The thousands of militiamen, who return to their own cities without jobs and without a programme to reintegrate them into their communities, find themselves as the new post-Qaddafi enemy in the now concrete “us versus them” narrative. They are, however, armed to the teeth.

After less than two months since the beginning of a national dialogue, it is certainly cause for concern that new fault lines are emerging, while older ones have not been healed.

The widespread perception that Libya’s politicians in Tripoli have completely disregarded the rest of the country is often heard by extreme supporters of self-autonomy and the more nuanced federalists.

As the country prepares to enter its second elections, the sense that Libya’s leaders think about Tripoli and ignore the rest of Libya’s cities should be of concern. It may not be too long before Tripoli’s problems with militias come back to haunt its politicians in other cities.

Anas El Gomati is the founder of the Tripoli-based Sadeq Institute, the first Libyan think tank