In response to a question on Egypt’s new protest law, which was signed into force by interim president Adli Mansour last week, an advocate of the law, Ezzedine Shoukri Fishere, said: “It’s impossible to come up with a piece of legislation that would satisfy everyone.”
Mr Fishere’s statement is, of course, true. But one wonders if it would have been possible to come up with a piece of legislation that would dissatisfy more parties inside and outside of Egypt.
At this particular juncture in Egypt’s uncertain transition, where the country stands in need of economic support to avoid more hardship after a tumultuous three years, the military-backed interim government will do well to consider drafting a law that shows that Egypt is truly on the road to a more democratic future. Instead, the new protest law, which sets prison terms and high fines for violators, has been greeted by a flurry of international condemnations.
The UN high commissioner for human rights, Navi Pillay, said the law left the “door open to a very restrictive and repressive interpretation”. The US defence secretary, Chuck Hagel, who cannot be considered anything but friendly to the Egyptian military, and who has a close, cordial relationship with the head of the Egyptian armed forces, has also expressed his concerns about the law.
It seems that internationally, Egypt’s protests law has far more detractors than allies – including among those who have accepted the post-Brotherhood political road-map, or those who were opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood-led government.
Opponents to the law include the Brotherhood, which calls for a reinstatement of the ousted president, Mohammed Morsi, although Mr Morsi’s government drafted a similar law during his tenure. But while it has been supporters of Mr Morsi that make up the bulk of protests and protesters in the past four months, and were likely the main target of such a law, others have now begun protesting.
Such groups have been careful to protest separately and distinctly from pro-Morsi supporters, but non-Islamist activists who claim to support the January 25th revolution are again making their way to the streets to protest against the institution of this law. Others who oppose both the Brotherhood and the military have been reticent to come to the streets in order to distinguish their own struggle from that of supporters for the Brotherhood.
As though external dissatisfaction were not enough, the law has its opponents inside the government itself. Ziad Bahaa Eldin, the deputy prime minister, who had earlier been touted as a possible candidate for prime minister, announced publicly that he rejected the new protest law. Moreover, he called on the government to review and reconsider this piece of legislation, which he said would “only widen the gap between the state and the youth”. He was joined in that regard by many different Egyptian political parties that supported the removal of Mr Morsi. Supporters of this law within the political arena are few.
On October 6, before the issuing of this law, there were protests in favour of the reinstatement of Mr Morsi. Neither the protesters nor the ministry of interior reported the presence of arms or weaponry among the protesters – but as the security services moved to break up the protests, several dozen protesters were killed. There are already laws to ensure that any armed protesters are restrained – any law that seeks to regulate any aspect of protesting in Egypt should be aimed at restricting the security forces, ensuring that any further deaths be averted and that any violators from the security sector be held to account.
Egyptians are heading to the ballot box several times in coming months, to voice their opinions on the draft constitution, cast their vote for parliamentary elections and elect a new president.
The interim government stakes its claim to legitimacy by insisting that it restored the will of the people against a deeply unpopular president. But this law ensures that there will be a deeply restrictive campaign, at a time when Egyptians already feel that the political process has failed their aspirations. None of that is conducive to any future democratisation process.
One would be hard pressed to point to any accomplishment when considering this law – unless, of course, the interim government considers an increase in opposition to it a success.
Rather than further empowering its security sector against citizens, Egypt remains in need of reforming them. That would be an accomplishment indeed.
Dr H A Hellyer is an associate fellow of the Royal United Services Institute in London, and the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC
On Twitter: @hahellyer