A Jordanian minister stated the government’s response to the killing of the captured air force pilot, Lt Maaz Al Kassasbeh, in uncompromising terms: “Whoever doubted the unity of Jordanians in the face of evil, we will show them the proof. The martyr pilot does not belong to a specific tribe or province. He is the son of all Jordanians, united as they have been throughout their history.”
There is little doubt that the statement sums up a majority view of Jordanians as they recoil from the brutal burning to death of the pilot by ISIL. But this cannot hide the fact that before the release of the horrific ISIL video, a significant minority were concerned that Jordan was taking too prominent a role in the anti-ISIL coalition put together by the Americans.
A country bordering both Iraq and Syria while playing host to almost two million refugees is uniquely vulnerable among Arab countries and should not be sending bombers over Syria, the argument went. This is not to say that those who questioned the military involvement were in favour of ISIL. Far from it, though the founder of ISIL’s predecessor, Al Qaeda in Iraq, was a hoodlum turned jihadist from the distressed Jordanian town of Zarqa.
Concerns about the stability of the Hashemite throne have been a diplomatic constant since the 16-year-old King Hussein, father of King Abdullah, acceded to the throne in 1952 after his grandfather was assassinated by a Palestinian gunman. Since then the history of Jordan has rarely been crisis-free. As the Arab Spring revolts turned sour, two authors, Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, speculated in 2012 that the main components of the country's population – the Trans-Jordanians and the Palestinians – would unite under the influence of militancy to oust the Hashemite monarchy. At the same time, there was talk of a crisis on the scale of the events of 1970, when King Hussein had to unleash his army to expel the Palestinian guerrillas.
None of these scary scenarios came to pass. Indeed, as Syria collapsed into seemingly endless civil war, the commentariat relaxed, taking the view that the bloodbath across the border had doused any prospect of unrest in Jordan.
A staple of recent commentary on Jordan is a somewhat nostalgic view of King Hussein, as a ruler who never put a foot wrong. This ignores the criticism of him, and the assassination attempts against him. He was indeed a towering figure, charismatic and charming, with a long-term commitment to peace. But he could be indecisive and he showed little interest in economic development, which had the effect of turning Jordan into a dependency of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.
Perhaps a more balanced interpretation of history is that the Hashemites have proved over almost a century that they know how to rule a country that has almost no resources beyond its pivotal geographic position and a highly educated population.
The real question facing King Abdullah is how his small country can best put into practice his promise to deliver a “severe response” to ISIL. For all the rallying around the flag in recent days, it is clear that the capture of the pilot has dented confidence in the coalition, as the ISIL propagandists intended. How is it possible that the Americans, with their control of the air and global eavesdropping capabilities, did not know where the pilot was being held and launch a rescue mission?
Jordanian political analyst Labib Kamhawi told the BBC that Jordan’s involvement in the military fight against ISIL was no more than symbolic, but it had immense political repercussions. Air strikes alone have never won a war against paramilitary organisations, he said, and Jordan would be more effective by choking off ISIL supply routes through the desert.
Mr Kamhawi is not a lone voice. On Wednesday, a British parliamentary committee noted that there was “a significant gap between the rhetoric of Britain and its partners, and the reality of the campaign on the ground”. Defence chiefs, the committee’s report added, were unable to say what the strategic goals of the air campaign were.
This is not surprising, as the air campaign covers two linked but different spaces. In Iraq, the struggle against ISIL has a clear road map: to support the new government in Baghdad, to create an army for all Iraqis and then drive out ISIL. In Syria, policy is beset by contradictions. By bombing ISIL the coalition gives heart to the Assad regime, spreads despondency among the US-backed “moderate” opposition and encourages them to join forces with Al Qaeda affiliate, the Nusra Front.
For the Arab partners there is a further complication. In Iraq, the Americans have Iranian proxies fighting against the same enemy, though Iran is not part of the anti-ISIL coalition. There are reasons for this temporary alliance of convenience. But that does not make it any easier for Arab governments to explain the rationale of their involvement.
Against this background it is not surprising that a few voices in Jordan are heard saying it would be better to sit out this military engagement, as it did when King Hussein stayed out of the 1990 Gulf War coalition that drove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The world does not stay still, however, and such historical comparisons are facile. Nevertheless, ISIL’s online resilience, even if it is no longer advancing on the front line, makes it harder to explain exactly how the American-led air campaign in Syria is achieving its goal of disrupting and ultimately destroying the jihadists.
Alan Philps is a commentator on Arab affairs
On Twitter: @aphilps