Even before International Security Assistance Forces wound down their operations in Afghanistan, there was concern about “conflict spillover” into Central Asia. This worry reflected a misplaced urgency and simplification of complex dynamics. Without underestimating the real threat, there is a need to review the situation in its proper context.
The newly independent Central Asian republics were ill-prepared to meet the challenges of statecraft. Gaps in governance structures were compounded by the breakdown of the Soviet era welfare apparatus in the early 1990s. The ensuing scramble for resources fuelled divisions between the Turkic population and their Russian counterparts.
The prevailing sense of social injustice created space for radicals to move into Fergana valley, the historic heart of Central Asia, where extremist tendencies were propagated by Salafist preachers such as Tahir Yuldashev, who later fled to Tajikistan and onwards to Afghanistan.
There he founded the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which relocated to the tribal areas of Pakistan after the September 11 attacks, where it came into contact with Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
IMU became increasingly integrated into both structures, becoming part of their leadership hierarchy and playing key roles in the Karachi airport attack in June 2014 and the army children’s school attack in Peshawar last December.
Despite being one of the most professional forces in the region, it will be difficult for the IMU and its sister organisation, Islamic Jihad Union, to stage a strong comeback into Central Asia.
Firstly, the dwindling central Asian composition of the party has induced a global focus beyond Central Asia. Secondly, the iron fist with which dissent is quelled in Central Asia has constrained its ability to recruit members. The death of Yuldashev and other key figures such as Juma Namangani further weakened its appeal.
The initial appropriation of radical interpretations of Islam has also died down in the region as governments pursued a strategy of clamping down on dissent while allowing monitored religious freedom.
There is also inherent trust in the Turkish model, with most Central Asian countries enlisting the expertise of Diyanet, an official Turkish body overseeing relations among Islamic institutions, the state and society.
The region has also witnessed tapered jihadi attacks with dissent being articulated through sociopolitical narratives, such as during the Andijan crisis in 2005.
In fact, such disputes serve key foreign policy pursuits. The Uzbek intrusion into southern Kyrgyzstan in 2010 was premised on seeking out extremist operatives. Russia utilises the cover to extend its military interests in the region through the collective security treaty organisation.
It also enables the region to attract major assistance. The Nato supply routes enabled it to accrue huge remunerations from the various bases dotted the region. They were finally closed down after host countries were able to derive lucrative deals with competing powers.
For example, Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan, which was a key hub for US military operations, closed down in June 2014 after Russia offered an attractive deal made up of military aid, infrastructure projects and membership of its ambitious customs union. Both China and US place the region at the heart of their respective Silk Road projects as a means of stabilising the region. The prospect of extremist spillover also enables the region to deflect foreign attention from its domestic clampdowns.
There is however, no denying the credible threat to Central Asia, especially as the Pakistan army is pushing militants out of its tribal areas and into Afghanistan. Of late there has been increased militant activity in the north western Afghan border regions. The looming ISIL threat adds another toxic layer to the tapestry. Cross-border drug trafficking further threatens destabilisation through its networks of official complicity, which breed corruption and policy paralysis that in turn infiltrates all aspects of governance and society.
To plug these gaps, Central Asia will have to begin a process of internal reform – only then will an extremist foothold be denied in the region.
Asma-Khan Lone is an assistant professor at Jindal School of International Affairs, India