Recent advances by Syrian regime forces and US-backed rebels towards the city of Raqqa appear to be a determined pincer movement to overthrow ISIL.
With Russian air support, government forces advancing from the south-west have now moved within 60 kilometres of the so-called capital of the ISIL proto-state.
At the same time, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an anti-regime coalition, have made steady progress since they began an offensive towards Raqqa two weeks ago. Their units have also effectively surrounded ISIL forces in the city of Manbij in the Aleppo province, raising the prospect of severing one of ISIL’s last remaining major supply routes.
Nevertheless, despite their recent reverses, it is unlikely that ISIL will concede Raqqa without a determined fight. As the simple ability to resist in the face of the forces arrayed against it is central to the extremist group’s propaganda, the city has acquired a symbolic value that its occupiers will strive to protect.
So far, the regime forces have pushed through empty desert. An assault on Raqqa is a far more difficult prospect, as any attempt to storm the city with a population of 200,000 would risk heavy casualties. Continued Russian air support would probably have little impact on resilient opponents willing to wage intense street-to-street fighting.
In addition, government units remain weakened and overstretched after more than four years of heavy fighting. Though Syrian president Bashar Al Assad recently pledged to retake “every inch” of his country from rebels, his boast signified mere posturing given his absolute dependence on Russian aid to recapture territory.
Although the Putin regime must be tempted to beat US-backed forces in a “race to Raqqa”, the Kremlin will almost certainly hold back given the limitations of Mr Al Assad’s forces and the complexities of the situation on the ground.
In reality, Mr Al Assad’s only option is to pursue a long-term strategy of attempting to rebuild his shattered legitimacy and eventually persuade major external powers that only his government can hold Syria together. Damascus will therefore strive to consolidate its grip on the territory it holds, take opportunities to make further incremental gains where possible and exploit every chance to weaken and further divide anti-regime forces.
Among the most effective of these forces is the SDF, which has received significant US backing in the form of equipment and embedded Special Forces personnel. The SDF is increasingly dominated by the Kurdish YPG (People’s Protection Units), which acts as the military wing of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), and is seen by Washington and its allies as the most effective local force opposing ISIL.
The situation is complicated by the PYD having received discreet encouragement from a Russian regime eager to unnerve the Turkish government with the spectre of Kurdish nationalism. After the sharp deterioration in relations between Moscow and Ankara since late 2014, the Kremlin is seeking, for now at least, to back the PYD’s aspiration to secure greater autonomy for Kurdish majority regions within a future federalised Syria.
While recent Russian air strikes launched in support of the Syrian regime have enthusiastically targeted non-ISIL forces opposed to Mr AL Assad, a tacit non-aggression pact between the PYD and Syrian regime forces means that both sides have worked carefully to avoid a clash. The Kurds have also indicated that Manbij, close to the Kurds’ ethnic heartlands in Syria, is a far more important strategic objective than Raqqa.
All of this suggests that the US cannot count on the SDF as an instrument to overthrow ISIL’s nerve centre. Therefore, rather than being a concerted attempt to topple ISIL, the advances towards Raqqa represent further moves in a chess game in which the regime, backed by Russia, and the mosaic of US-supported factions are vying to establish new facts on the ground while the troubled diplomatic process in Geneva stumbles along.
Also, Russia has pushed for the Kurds to be invited to the next round of the multinational talks on Syria’s future. Widening participation in the talks increases the likelihood that the western powers will eventually endorse an imperfect settlement that nevertheless protects Moscow’s interests. Both Mr Putin and Mr Al Assad remain ready to exploit differences between European states wrestling with sluggish economies and facing increasing resentment, exploited by populist politicians, against Syrian refugees.
While France has generally taken a strong anti-Assad stance, Germany’s leading role in sponsoring a deal between the EU and Turkey to limit refugee flows suggests that Berlin may be more willing to accept a compromise. Whether or not the Nato powers can remain a united stance towards Syria will inevitably depend on the direction of US policy after a new president enters the White House in January.
With Moscow’s backing,Mr Al Assad will continue to wait until the slow strangulation of ISIL and the possible marginalisation of retaining non-state groups such as the SDF leaves the Damascus regime as the “last man standing”.
Whether the US and its allies in Europe and the Arab world are willing or able to prevent this will be a key factor in the future progress of the war and the chance of a political settlement acceptable to all.
Stephen Blackwell is an international politics and security analyst